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Foreword 
 
 
The current edition in English language turns into account 
and completes the studies published in the previous edition. 
Carrying on the research and publication activities on the topic of 
corruption is based on its novelty and on the special interest for the 
Romanian language edition. 
At the same time, we hope that the current volume will 
provide greater opportunities for foreign access and thus the 
admittance in the European and international flows of information 
in this field. 
The core ideas of the book focus on social perception, 
modelled through  statistic analyses, on the specificity of 
corruption in the public administration or the public health system 
in close correlation to the processes of decentralization and 
performance of health services. 
The analysis of the corruption topic is in interference with 
the effects of the   European integration processes, globalization, 
being correlated to adjacent developments concerning the public 
integrity, national or regional economic freedom and development. 
This book represents the result of the scientific collaboration 
between teams of teaching staff and students from the National 
School of Political Studies and Public Administration and 
Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest. 
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The book is structured on nine chapters, organised according 
to a didactic logic, in view to provide the reader a profound 
overview of the mechanisms and methodology of research as well 
as the conclusions and the economic and social impact of 
corruption. 
Data processing in view to estimate the correlations and 
parameters of regression has been achieved through SPSS and 
Eviews statistic programs. 
The authors will be grateful to all those who will formulate 
remarks, comments or suggestions for improving the content of the 
book. 
 
23 July 2009          The authors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction to the Study of Corruption 
 
 
1.1. General Aspects Connected to the Corruption 
Phenomenon  
 
Analysis of corruption is an important field in contemporary 
economic research. In the recent years, researchers and university 
professors, as well as international organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) have been particularly 
concerned with the study of corruption levels, trying to identify its 
causes and the mechanisms of transmission of corruption through a 
system. The main issues in studies on corruption are those 
connected to defining and measuring corruption levels, identifying 
causes and mechanisms of its transmission throughout the system 
and measuring corruption effects on the economic and social 
environment in a country or a development region. 
The choice of the most appropriate index for measuring 
corruption levels, and ensuring its universal validity is one of the 
most important issues in this particular field of research. The 
literature of specialty uses a series of indices and ratios for 
corruption levels measuring, each of them expressing a certain 
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aspect of the corruption phenomenon, for a number of selected 
countries and for different lapses of time. One of the first indices 
used in corruption measuring was published in International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Many firms consult data published by 
ICRG, when they want to take decisions on making their 
investments and developing their businesses throughout various 
regions of the world.  
The second index used in measuring the level of corruption 
is the Corruption Perception Index, published yearly by 
Transparency International (TI). The third index, Corruption 
Control (CC), was proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
(2003) and proposes other strategies of aggregating indices 
measuring corruption, than those used by Transparency 
International. We must also mention the fact that other institutions 
or organizations use some other methods for measuring corruption, 
than those already explained. 
One of the issues difficult to analyse is to identify the causes 
causing corruption to appear in a public system. Literature of 
specialty identifies four categories of factors directly influencing 
corruption phenomena within a system: political and juridical 
factors, historical, social and cultural factors and economic factors. 
Within the first category of factors we include the quality 
of the political system, the particular features of the juridical 
system (see Leite and Weidmann – 1999); especially the 
legislation and the institutions having the mission to fight 
corruption in a given country, the quality of the democratic 
system, the features of the election system in a given country, the 
type of administrative institutions, the degree of de-centralization 
of the system, and so on. 
A series of studies, such as those written by La Porta (1999), 
Treisman (2000), or Alesina (2003) show that traditions and 
cultural factors of a country have a strong impact on the level of 
corruption and on mechanisms enabling its transmission 
throughout the system. 
Social and cultural factors play a special part in identifying 
levels of corruption of a country, according to La Porta – 1999, 
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Treisman (2000) and Alesina (2003). Equally, religions factors 
have their impact in propagating corruption within a social system. 
Economic factors, such as the level of openness of economy 
(see Dreher – 2003, Treisman – 2000 and Wei), the size of the 
public sector within an economy (see Tanzi – 1998; Treisman – 
2000), the level of remuneration in the public sector (see van 
Rijckeghem - 1997), have a direct impact on the levels of 
corruption within a country.  
The choice of the most adequate econometric models in 
estimating corruption levels and its effects on activity sectors.  
Among the most appropriate econometric models for measuring 
corruption consequences on the economic and social environment, 
we mention: the general models of economic growth, explained by 
Mauro (1995), Abed and Davoodi (2000), and Krueger (1974); the 
models of economic growth of some particular sectors within 
national economies (see Tanzi - 1998; Shang-Jin Wei - 2001); the 
effects of de-centralization processes on levels of corruption and 
types (see Shah - 2000); the quality of financing systems in certain 
fields, such as the military sector, (see Gupta - 2000); the effects of 
remuneration systems in public sectors, on  levels of corruption 
(see van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997); the industrial policies of a 
given country (see Emerson - 2002; Bhagwati - 1982) and the 
efficiency of investments (Sarkar - 2001; Mauro - 2002). Most of 
the studies mentioned above use, in order to measure the impact of 
corruption on economic or social fields, at national, sectorial or 
regional levels, models of linear regression, VAR models, analysis 
of co-integrated series, and so on. Kaufman (1999) and Andrei 
(2008) propose models of simultaneous equations. In this case, the 
variables of the models are exogenous or endogenous, and 
parameters are estimated by the method of the smallest least 
squares (TSLS) and the general method of moments (GMM). 
These methods take into account the endogenous or exogenous 
character of every variable within the mathematical model. In 
applying the above mentioned models, mention should be made of 
the fact that specialty studies in the field do not offer a convenient 
approach on the choice of variables used for estimating parameters 
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of models with simultaneous equations, in the study of corruption 
levels in a public sector (see Bai and Wei - 2000; and Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton - 1999). 
Among the most prominent classic studies in this field of 
research, we shall mention A. Krueger (1974), S. Rose-Ackerman 
(1975) and so forth. The lapse of time that followed political and 
economic changes occurring in Eastern Europe after the fall of the 
socialist regimes, conducted to new forms of corruption, more 
refined, and to more sophisticated ways of propagating it into the 
new, changing social systems. The situation of these countries 
stimulated new research studies in the field, the more so as the 
IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) - 
2001, identified the phenomenon of corruption as “the only serious 
obstacle in the way of economic and social growth and 
development”. A series of important studies were published during 
this period of time, especially of quantitative methods used in 
corruption measuring. Among the most prominent studies, 
published in the nineties, we quote studies by P. Mauro - 1995;  
P. Bardhan, 1997; V. Tanzi- 1998; Shang-Jin Wei - 1997 etc. 
Presently, there is a set of parameters measuring corruption levels 
in economies, generally accepted as valid. The best known is the 
index used by Transparency International, published yearly. 
For the case of Romania, a series of estimations of the levels 
of corruption and its consequences on the administrative reform 
were made in the study analyses by T. Andrei (2007), M. Profiroiu 
(2007), and Teodorescu (2007a); Studies on corruption phenomena 
in Romania Universities were made by Teodorescu (2006, 2007b) 
and studies on effects of corruption in financing some activity 
sectors were also signed by T. Andrei (2002) and A. Matei (2007). 
1.2. Corruption and performance in higher education  
If the phenomenon of corruption exists in a country, it will 
propagate into the educational system and especially in higher 
education and universities (see Rumyantseva, 2002). The types of 
corruption, the levels of propagating it and its consequences in this 
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particular system, and the results at the society level, are different 
(see Rumyantseva, 2005). Corruption in educational systems 
causes problems connected to financing of schools from public 
money, if we speak about corruption at the level of education 
ministry, or about the institutions responsible for the financing and 
administration of an educational system – but it can also have a 
direct impact on young generations of students, on their system of 
values, and on the cultural models of a country or of a region, if we 
consider corruption facts directly connected to students’ life. These 
consequences cannot be measured directly, on short term, but they 
can have very serious impacts on lowering the standards of 
education in the long run, in decreasing economic competitiveness, 
especially in those education fields where corruption phenomena 
are present and obvious. According to a study of the World Bank 
(2003), made in Kazakhstan, the correlation ratio between quality 
perception in education and education as such is – 0,27%. 
In the field of higher education, in countries in transition, 
there are no studies or analyses to examine the general level of 
corruption in the educational system, or its specific features. 
According to Chapman study, quoted by Rumyantseva (2005), 
corruption in the educational field can be seen at the following 
levels: the Ministry of Education, the regional levels in a country 
(territorial departments or counties), educational units, the 
relationship between pupils and teachers, and international 
agencies. If we try to adjust this index to higher education 
institutions, we can identify the following levels where corruption 
phenomena may appear: the Ministry of Education and government 
agencies having the responsibility to issue rules of functioning, to 
finance and to supervise financing activities for higher education 
institutions; the relationship between professors and students, the 
Boards of universities and faculties, and also at the level of 
international agencies within higher education field.  
At the first level, corruption doesn’t imply the direct 
relationship student-professor, the ways of its propagation being 
the same as in any type of ministry. At the second level, of the 
Boards of universities and faculties, students do not participate 
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directly in corrupted activities. Students can explicitly participate 
in corruption acts only the third situation, i.e. the direct 
relationship student-professor. If, in the first two cases, the 
effects are perceived by inefficient expenditure of funds, 
lowering the standards of education process and also of the 
prestige of the universities, at the level of society as a whole, the 
third situation, where students benefit from corruption acts, 
causes effects that are difficult to measure and have very serious 
consequences in the long run.  
As a matter of fact, one of the specific features of corruption 
acts in this particular field, is the way in which if manifests its 
consequences on the economic and social environment in the 
medium and long run. If, in administration or in other fields of 
activity corruption causes immediate effects, by lowering 
efficiency of public money expenditure, in higher education 
environments its consequences are even more dramatic in the 
medium and long run, because it modifies the attitudes at the level 
of ethics and morality for large groups of persons. Thus, it is 
difficult to think that a student who took his exams mostly by 
frauding, will later have a correct and fair attitude in his job, or in 
developing his future businesses. 
Analysis of corruption is recommendable because of the 
following reasons: (i) at present, there is no methodology or 
indices for measuring corruption levels in various sectors of 
activity. Civil society and various international bodies have a 
negative perception on a series of activity sectors, such as: justice, 
administration, public health, public education, public 
administration, but there are not standards of measuring corruption 
size in these fields. This is why it is necessary to develop an 
adequate system of indices, and a subsequent methodology, 
appropriate for each and every sector, in order to work out efficient 
mechanisms for fighting corruption. (ii) Annual reports of the 
European Commission underlined the necessity for Romania to 
continue the de-centralization process. By using techniques of 
simulation, it is advisable to estimate levels of corruption in the 
above mentioned domains. We should also bear in mind that by 
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decentralization processes, a series of mechanisms generating 
corruption phenomena can be transferred from central levels to 
local levels. (iii) There is not yet a model of quantitative analysis 
of corruption consequences on economic and social development at 
regional and national levels. This is why econometric techniques or 
models can estimate a series of corruption consequences on 
economic and social development of a region, a sector of activity 
or of a country. 
1.3. Corruption phenomenon and the decentralization 
process 
Decentralization can have multiple forms, depending on the 
nature of functions which are decentralized, depending on the type 
of control made by local authorities on these functions and on the 
type of institutions where these responsibilities are devolved. 
In developing countries, objectives of the decentralization 
process are generally focused on increasing efficiency, fairness, 
accessibility and good quality of the services provided by the 
organizations concerned, as well as on the way in which local 
needs are covered. In fact, de-centralization is directly connected to 
both economic development of an area, and to the democratic 
systems of governance. 
By de-centralization we try to improve performance in 
providing a certain type of service, by changing types of authority 
and responsibilities between key actors, improving information 
flows on the basis of which decisions are made, improving 
performance estimation indices, setting up mechanisms of 
accountability for fulfillment of tasks, and finding motivation 
means for all actors participating to the tasks  process (see Paul L. 
Hutchinson – Monitoring and evaluation of Decentralization 
Reforms, 2004). 
One mechanism for evaluating changes at the moment when 
responsibilities are passed from one organization to another is the 
“responsibility framework” (see Brinkerhoff (2003), Aucoin and 
Heintzman (2000). These changes, applied in a consistent and 
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coherent manner will implicitly lead to diminishing levels of 
corruption phenomena in the public system. 
During the last decade, Romania made important footsteps 
in financial de-centralization, but the process of implementing this 
policy was hindered by the absence of a national strategy of de-
centralization. Within the process, three cycles could be identified. 
During the first cycle, (1991-1994), important changes in the 
structure and financing of local authorities were made, also 
including a local taxation system. During the second cycle of 
administrative reform (1998-2000), new steps were made in the 
reform of administrative and financial decentralization process. 
Thus, on the basis of a new legislation on financing local public 
authorities (amendments were made to Law no. 69/1991 and Law 
189/1998 on local public finances), the share of the GNP allotted to 
local budget increased; also, the share of local budgets in the 
overall amount of public expenditure increased: (from 1998 to 
2001, the percentage of the GNP allotted to local public 
expenditure increased from 3.6 per cent to 6.5 per cent and local 
public expenditure increased from 14.4 per cent to 26.6 per cent). 
During the third cycle (2001 to the present) the new laws and rules 
set up new standards for certain positions of local authorities, 
especially in public services, utilities (see Law no. 215/2001 on 
local public administration; Law no. 326/2001 on public services 
of town administration; GO no. 86/2001 on local public transport 
for persons; GP no. 84/2001 on public statistics of the number of 
persons in a community; GO no. 88/2001 on community public 
services for emergency situations; GO no. 202/2002 on integrated 
administration of coast line; GO no. 21/2002 on administration of 
urban and rural communities; GO no. 32/2002 on public services 
of water supply and sewage; GO no. 71/2002 on administration of 
public and private assets of local interest.  
Corruption phenomena, as well as an incoherent and 
inconsistent model of  de-centralization caused a serious 
diminishing of funds for every state, as well as lower standards of 
efficiency in the expenditure of public funds. In this context,  
(i) setting up an appropriate index of standards for measuring the 
Chapter 1 
 
19 
levels of corruption and the subsequent methodology,  (ii) setting 
up an efficient mechanism of implementing services de-
centralization, (iii) evaluation of consequences of corruption and of 
decentralization on public services, as well as (iv) ensuring 
transparency in public money expenditure, represent top priorities 
for all  Member States of the European Union and for all 
candidates to membership. 
Recommendations made by the European Commission and 
by the World Bank are major priorities of Romania’s process of 
integration, and they all focus on reducing corruption levels and 
continuing de-centralization processes. 
1.4. A methodology of analysis of corruption 
The approach mentioned above not only tries to effectively 
measure corruption levels, but also to identify mechanism causing 
it. Thus, our approach brings forward a series of new ways of data 
collection, statistics and econometry tools in working with 
databases, and with the domain of the specified subject, 
consultation of the main actors who evaluate corruption levels, and 
its consequences on economic and social fields. 
The most important elements in the methodology of 
corruption measuring, are data collection, statistics, econometric 
and macro-economic techniques used in identifying and measuring 
corruption phenomena, the performance of the public systems, the 
economic and social development at national and regional levels, 
the type of informatics systems used in creating data bases and 
working with them. The following pages will treat pertinent 
elements connected to these aspects: 
The choice of the most adequate methods of data collection 
for estimating parameters of the econometric models that 
characterize aspects connected to levels of corruption, the 
relationship between corruption and performance in the public 
sector, the relationship between levels and types of corruption and 
the degree of satisfaction offered to the clients of services supplied 
by an institution, the impact of corruption on regional 
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development, and so on. The series of data used in estimation 
parameters and in working out economic analyses were mainly 
obtained by the technique of statistical sampling, by treatment of 
data gathered in public institutions documents, by methods of 
simulation of econometric models. 
The technique of statistical sampling was applied at the level 
of a few target populations. Thus, a series of specific methods were 
used, among which we mention: estimations using auxiliary 
information and complex plan, estimations of variance by linear 
modeling, and so on. In this respect, we used specific 
methodologies proposed by Cochran, W, Sampling Technique, 3rd 
edition; Wiley, New York, 1977; Soon, R, Practical Sampling 
Techniques, Wiley, New York, 2004; Dumitrescu, M: Statistical 
sampling and applications, Ed. Tehnică, Bucureşti, 2000. 
Statistical tools used in the measuring of performance at the level 
of a sector or at the level of a region, as well as for measuring 
corruption characteristics were first tested  in a pilot phase. The 
method of data collection from representative samples of people 
was the statistical inquiry. Questions asked in the questionnaires 
were edited by the team members, after investigating specialty 
literature, discussions with experts in statistics, in corruption 
analysis, de-centralizing, services quality, regional development, 
education, and so on. 
Working with statistical data collections existing in various 
types of institutions, national or international represents an 
important source of information in analyzing the consequences of 
corruption on economic, social and political fields. Thus, in order 
to estimate parameters of econometric models, the necessary data 
can be obtained from: i) The National Institute of Statistics (INS), 
the National Bank of Romania (BNR), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the OECD, and so on, 
provide data on macro-economic development and regional 
development; data on corruption can also be obtained from 
Transparency International and IBRD. 
Statistical Methods of Simulation of Econometric Models. In 
this type of analysis, a series of classical techniques of simulation 
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can be used, such as those proposed by Monte-Carlo, Gibbs, but 
also simulations on the basis of non-parametric Bayesian 
inference. Of great help working with these techniques, can be 
studies written by Congdon P., “Bayesian Statistical Modelling”, 
(Wiley Series in Probability  and Statistics), Wiley, New York, 
2007; Greenberg, E., “Introduction to Bayesian Econometrics”, 
Cambridge, 2007; West, M., Harrison, P.J., “Bayesian 
Forecasting and Dynamic Models”, 2nd edition, Springer-Verlag, 
New York, 1997; Favero, C., “Applied Macro-econometrics”, 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
The Choice of Statistical, Econometric and Macro-economic 
tools for analysis of corruption characteristics, performance of 
public systems and economic and social development at national 
and regional levels.  In this area of analysis, the following 
categories of tools are used: (i) for data processing, a series of 
statistical methods, such as: the method of grouping, the method of 
regression, non-parametric methods, data analysis methods, and so 
on. In Romanian speciality literature, there are books treating these 
topics, such as: Isaic-Maniu, Al. “Statistics for Businesses 
Management”, 2nd edition, Ed. Economica, Bucharest, 2000; Jaba, E., 
“Statistics” Ed. Economica, Bucharest, 1998; Andrei, T., 
“Statistics and Econometrics”, Ed. Economica, Bucharest, 2003. 
(ii) Econometric tools used in working with longitudinal series: 
because a correct estimation of parameters play an important role 
in understanding mechanism of corruption propagating and taking 
into account the very special character of these series of data, we 
use Kalman type philters, described by Dejong, Ingram and 
Whiteman (2000); Chari, Kehoe and McGrathan  (2004) and 
Clement and Hendry (1998); the above mentioned authors propose 
new and more refined models of Box-Tiao method (1976), for the 
analysis of the variance of parameters  in  a  model  and  of  
treating  points  of  change  in  a  series  of  data. (iii) Econometric 
tools for measuring the impact of corruption at national levels, or 
at the level of an activity sector. Thus, a group of methodologies 
applied in international literature in the analysis of data series will 
be adjusted, by introduction of a new set of variables measuring 
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corruption and its characteristics, and by measuring the 
performance of a public sector.  In a classic approach, models are 
defined on the basis of variable elements and relationships between 
them, which more often than not, are submitted to apriori 
restrictions not justified from the statistics point of view (see 
Pesaran, 1988).  Because of this criticism, the paper proposes the 
use of VAR models, who were much improved and refined by the 
applications in which they were employed. Thus, models derived 
from the original model, make possible an estimation of multiplied 
instantaneous and dynamic effects for various economic 
parameters: (1) Sims (1992), Leeper, Sims, Zha (1996),  Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) are making measurements of the 
surprising effects of monetary policy on real economy; (2) 
Blanchard and Quah (1989), Gali (1999), Christiano, Eichenbaum 
and Vigfusson (2004), are making estimations on the impact of the 
technological shock on real economy;  (3) Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002), Favero (2002) and Biau, Girard (2004), are making 
estimations on consequences of taxation and budgeting policies. In 
their approach, theoretical papers on econometrics are classified as 
follows: (a) techniques and methods for analysis of stationary 
processes (self-regressive models, VAR – type models, and 
derivated models); b) econometrics of non-stationary processes 
(statistical tests, HP philters, BN philters, theory of co-integration 
and Johansen approach, theory of rational forecastings and   the 
model of correction of errors, the approach proposed by Hendry, 
and so on); c) econometrics of non-linear processes and of long 
memory processes (ARFIMA – type of processes, see Robinson, 
2004). The stochastic model of the general inter-temporal 
equilibrium conducted to a series of developments in subsequent 
econometrics studies, such as those written by Favero and Rovelli 
(2003), Del Negro (2005), ensuring a better explanation of series of 
time with macro-economic content, as well as better quality 
economic forecastings. Among latest approaches in this field, we 
quote the bayesian approach (see Favio, 2007). In this particular 
field of research, calibrating of models is a major point (see 
Dawkins, Srinivasan and Whalley, 2001). 
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The choice of the best suited informatics means for the 
creation of data bases and for the processing of these data.  Taking 
into account the specific aspects of collecting series of data 
necessary to analyses and also the characteristics of econometric 
and statistical tools, the following informatics programs will be 
used: SPSS, EViews and Statistics. 
The choice of the best techniques of consulting important 
actors in the field of interest of the project proposal. In this 
particular area of the study, the following points will be 
approached: (i) A correct choice of target-populations analysed by 
the statistical sampling. In order to measure the level of corruption, 
its causes and its consequences, several groups of people will be 
under survey. For instance, if the subject of the pilot study is the 
field of higher education, then the following target groups will be 
defined and measured: students, teaching staff and professors, 
administrators of higher education universities (chiefs of 
departments, Deans and their deputies, Rectors, other positions 
with management responsibilities); employees in ministries and 
governmental agencies with responsibilities in the area of higher 
education; representatives of some NGO-s who have higher 
education field as objective of their work. (ii) The correct choice of 
the consulting methods: In this stage, the following methods will 
be used: the statistical questionnaire, the round tables and meetings 
with important actors in public organizations, and so on. 
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Chapter 2 
 
A few Characteristics  
of the Reform Process  
in Romania’s Public Administration 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In order to be accepted into the European Union, Romania had 
to operate an important process of reforming its public administration. 
To this aim, Romania benefited of a financial and technical support 
through Phare project “Support for a project of strategy in reforming 
public administration”.   
According to the Strategy of the Reform, issued in 2004, a 
reform in administration is a process of transforming public 
administration – central and local – so as to meet the requirements 
of its customers and the requirements of the integration of Romania 
to the structures of the European Union. From this point of view, 
three components of the reforming process were identified: (i) a 
reform of the civil service, by improving the management of the 
civil service and the continuous training of civil servants; (ii) a 
reform of the local public administration, by continuing its 
decentralization process; (iii) the improvement of the process of 
defining and applying public policies.  
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The strategy of the reform was implemented from 2004 to 
2006, and for the support of the reforming actions were supplied 
financial funds from the state budget and from foreign projects, 
mainly European funded projects through Phare multi-annual 
programme, 2004-2006, or the Programme PAL of the World 
Bank. Financial resources, distributed for the three main 
components mentioned above, are: (i) 7 200 thousand € for the 
civil service reform. To this amount, we must add 13 937,6 
thousand €/per year for the training in the following three years of 
the following categories of personnel: 100 top civil servants, by 
programmes of specialization of one year; 150 young professionals 
by courses of specialization of one year or two years; 3000 persons 
already holding top management positions, in courses of 
specialization of one year and  9000 middle-management positions, 
in courses of specialization of three months each. (ii) For 
supporting local administration reform were supplied projects, 
funded either by Phare or by PAL project (the World Bank) 
amounting to 8 150 thousand €; (iii) For the third component of the 
reform process were allotted projects amounting to  8 150 thousand €.  
As a matter of fact, the financial support granted by the European 
Union for reforming public administration – central or local - from 
1992 to the beginning of Phare multiannual programme 2004-
2006,  amounts to 42 000 thousand  €. The value of Phare projects 
in multiannual programmes, supporting the implementation of the 
Strategy, amounts to  35 880 thousand €. 
2.2. Statistical data processed 
In order to measure the main characteristics of the reform in 
public administration, in May 2007, the public administration 
organized a research study using the statistical inquiries method. 
The research study defined a representative sample of civil 
servants working in public administration. In order to obtain the 
representative sample, researchers used a sampling technique in 
two stages, and the size of the sample was of  971 civil servants in 
central and local public administration. The possible error in the 
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estimation of parameters at the level of reference populations is of 
1.2%, and the probability of obtaining correct results is of 97%. 
At the level of the population under study researchers used a 
statistical questionnaire covering the following major points: type 
of organization of institutions belonging to public administration – 
central and local; the pressure put on public administration 
institutions by the political system; the process of decentralization 
in public administration, the civil service; the discrimination 
men/women at the level of obtaining a job in public administration; 
corruption and its consequences on economic and social 
development at local and national levels. The questionnaire used in 
the survey also had questions concerning personal aspects, such as: 
if the person is a man or a woman, his/her age, type of education, 
type of job and type of organization where he/she is employed. The 
persons included in the sample were staff and personnel working in 
central public administration, county councils, prefectures, and de-
centralized public services. 
2.3. Specific aspects of the reform process 
The pages below present a series of particular aspects 
reforming public administration in Romania. The next chapters 
will approach characteristics connected to reforming civil service, 
ways of carrying on the de-centralization process, and corruption 
facts in public administration. 
 2.3.1. Knowing the goals, objectives and development 
strategy of the organization 
In order to measure to what extent the civil servants are 
familiar with the objectives and the strategy of development of the 
organization where they are employed, the variable 1X  must be 
defined. This variable is calculated depending on three primary 
variables measuring to what extent employees know the goal, 
objectives and development strategy of their institution. The 
measuring scale starts from the minimum 0 − that is the situation 
where the employer considers it is not important for him to know 
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the goals, objectives and development strategy of his institution 
and measures all the values to a maximum value, 4 −most 
favorable situation, when the employee considers it is vital to him 
to know the goals, objectives and development strategy of his 
institution.  
For this variable 1X , after the processing of data series 
supplied by the sample under survey, was obtained an average of 
3.27 and a variance of 1.06. The medium level of this parameter 
shows a high degree of transparency in the public institutions, 
concerning the way civil servants are familiar with the 
development strategy of their organizations. 
2.3.2. Budget performance in public institutions 
In order to measure the budget performance in public 
institutions, a variable of second degree was defined, namely 2,X  
measuring the budget performance of the given institution, the way 
in which it observes the development programme and the budget 
allotted to it, the annual financial planning, and the efficiency of 
the activities performed by the given institution. The values taken 
by this variable are measured on a measurement scale from 0  to 4 , 
corresponding to: 0 is the situation where the budget performance 
of the institutions are completely unsatisfactory and 4 is the 
situation where the budget performance of the institution are 
excellent. The average of this variable, 2.87 shows an opinion 
relatively satisfactory from the employees interviewed, on the 
budget performance of their institutions. 
2.3.3. The capability of PA institution to maintain good quality 
relations with their beneficiaries/customers 
For an overall estimation of the quality PA institutions 
maintain with their beneficiaries, the variable 3X  is defined. This 
variable is measuring the extent at which the personnel in P.A. 
institutions is acquainted with the needs and expectations of the 
beneficiary institutions, the capability of P.A. institutions to 
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consult their beneficiaries on the quality of the service they 
provide, and their willingness to accept suggestions from the 
beneficiary institutions. The values of the measuring scale are as 
follows: 1− i.e. the situation when the relationship P.A. 
institution/beneficiary institution is very tense, up to 5− i.e. the 
situation when the relation of the P.A. with the beneficiary 
institutions is very good.  
The average level of this variable 3.77 shows a relatively 
good relationship of P.A. organizations with their beneficiary 
institutions.  
In order to obtain an overall image of the quality of activities 
performed by P.A. institutions, another variable is defined, which 
takes into account the three above-mentioned variables: 1X , 2X  
and 3.X  This variable is defined as the arithmetical average of 1X , 
2X , 3X , is symbolized as 1C  and takes values from [0 5].  
Table 1 presents average figures and standard deviations for 
elements measured in order to assess the quality of activities 
performed by P.A. institutions.  The table also presents the values 
of statistics F, calculated by ANOVA analysis, which measures the 
significant differences between various groups of employees in 
P.A. In this respect, the three following characteristics to define 
groups of P.A. employees were used: the type of institutions where 
the civil servant works, i.e.; CPA – central public administration; 
CC - county councils; P - Prefectures and DPS – de-centralized 
public services; category of personnel the person belongs to and 
his/her sex; (male/female); the position of the employee: 
management personnel (PC) or subordinated personnel (PE).  
The values of this statistics, together with the significant 
differences between groups of employees interviewed, are given 
only for the situations where differences in the response of the 
groups interviewed are significant. 
The scores obtained after the processing of data series lead 
to the following conclusions, as for P.A. institutions capacity to 
fulfill their basic functions: (i) in the opinion of the groups 
interviewed, P.A. institutions performance is good; (ii) the opinion 
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of the management personnel is better than that of the subordinated 
personnel; (iii) the male population interviewed has a much better 
opinion on their institution budget – performance, on the relation 
with beneficiary institutions, on its objectives, as compared to the 
female population; the value of the significant difference is  
p < 0.02 in all situations, less the parameter measuring the 
knowledge of the personnel on the strategy and objectives of their 
institution; situation in which the significant difference is p < 
0.09;); (iv) the best opinion on this parameter is present among the 
employees of County Councils (CJ); (v) the subordinated personnel 
have a much lower opinion on the budget performance, than the 
management staff; moreover, their opinion is totally different from 
the opinion of their chiefs of departments. The same lower opinion 
is also expressed by the subordinated personnel of Central PA and 
Prefectures, on the above mentioned point.  
As a matter of fact, the diagnosis analysis made for the 
Strategy of Reforming PA, shows the existence of financial 
restrictions in performing current activities and implementing 
measures recommended by the Strategy, an excessive concern of 
Ministries concerned for solving current activities and the lack of 
an efficient communication between Ministries; an insufficient 
planning of PA activities, since institutions are mostly concerned 
with day-by-day problems and do not spend time or resources for 
strategic, long run  planning. As a measure aiming to increase the 
planning capacity of public institutions at the central level and at 
county level, in 2004, were adopted multi annual – programmes of 
modernization.  
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Table 1 
Characteristics of variables used for assessing the quality  
of P.A. institutions performance 
 
1X  2X  3X  1C  
Type  of 
institution 
 
APC 
 
2.99(0.69)  
 
2.51(0.93)  
 
3.19(0.74)  
 
2.90(0.60)  
 CJ 3.08(0.58)  2.93(0.69)  3.45(0.55)  3.16(0.47)  
 P 2.89(0.65)  2.48(1.16)  3.39(0.64)  2.92(0.57)  
 SPD 2.99(0.70)  2.68(0.87)  3.34(0.72)  3.00(0.58)  
Statistics F and value 
of p 
- 
(0.01)
3.396  - 
(0.04)
2.540  
Male/Female  
M 
 
3.07(0.65)  
 
2.81(0.78)  
 
3.44(0.64)  
 
3.10(0.52)  
 F 2.95(0.69)  2.62(0.94)  3.28(0.73)  2.95(0.50)  
Statistics F and value 
of p (0.09)
2.389  
(0.02)
3.883  
(0.02)
4.256  
(0.01)
5.609  
Type of 
personnel 
 
PE 
 
2.90(0.70)  
 
2.56(0.95)  
 
3.25(0.72)  
 
2.90(0.59)  
 PC 3.15(0.60)  2.94(0.71)  3.48(0.63)  3.19(0.49)  
Statistics F and value 
of p (0.00)
19.764  
(0.00)
27.399  
(0.00)
14.888  
(0.00)
36.805  
 
2.3.4. The System of Performance Assessment 
In order to measure the quality of performance scored by PA 
institutions, two factors must be taken into account: the general 
characteristics of the system of evaluation of performance in the 
given institution and the evaluation of the personnel for the work 
performed in a lapse of time of 1 year. Thus, the variable 4X  is 
defined, assuming values from 0 to 4. The least value (0) shows a 
negative perception of the employees interviewed on the system 
their work is measured and 4 is a maximum value, showing full 
satisfaction of personnel on the way their work is evaluated. 
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The average score obtained by this parameter, 3.8 shows a 
good perception of the employees interviewed on the system of 
evaluation of performance in public institutions. The average 
scored for each of the two primary characteristics are 2.7, and 3.9 
respectively. The value of Pearson corelation coefficient for the 
series of data obtained by the two primary variables is 0.96. This 
score differs from 0, for a significant difference of 0.1. The results 
of the study show an improvement of the PA institutions 
functionning, viewed from the point of view of their performance 
evaluation system and from the point of view of personnel 
evaluation system, as compared to the situation of 2004, when 
results of studies showed an unsatisfactory system of measuring 
employees performance in PA institutions. The Action Plan of the 
Strategy recommended and implemented general standards of 
assesment of public employees activities, and this led to an 
improvement in their work. The same objective that is the 
improvement of civil servants work assessment was the main point 
of the Order issued by the President of the National Agency for 
Civil Servants, 206/2005, which approved a general Methodology 
and Assessment Criteria for the work of civil servants. 
2.3.5. Transparency at the level of Public Administration  
  Institutions 
In order to evaluate transparency at the level of decision 
making process in public administration institutions, the study took 
into consideration the extent at which employees in public 
administration institutions are familiar with the rules of the 
decision – making process; the extent at which civil servants have 
access at information on the functioning or strategic development 
of their institution, and the quality of communication channels 
between subordinated personnel and chiefs of departments. On the 
basis of the three primary characteristics, the variable 5X  is 
defined, assuming values from [0 … 4].  A score of 0 shows a 
completely unsatisfactory opinion of civil servants on transparency 
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in their institution, and a score of 4 shows full satisfaction of 
employees on this point.  
The average level for this characteristic, of 3.09,  shows a 
quite good opinion on this parameter, the standard deviation 
calculated for this variable is 1.169.  
Considering that the existence and the implementation, on a 
regular basis, of a system of indices evaluating performance of the 
institution, and of its employees is a factor of increasing the 
transparency of decision – making process in P.A. institutions, then 
for the estimation of this aspect of PA institutions, the variable C2 
is defined. This assumes values [0 … 4].  4 means a high level of 
transparency in the decision – making process of PA institutions. 
In order to improve the process of communication and to 
increase transparency some institutions are issuing Bulletins of 
Information. For a more comprehensive evaluation of all aspects 
connected to transparency, a second variable 2C′  is defined. This 
variable is defined depending on 2C  variable, and on a new 
variable, defined on a measuring scale assuming three values: 1, if 
the given institutions is issuing a Bulletin of information, on a 
regular basis; 2, if such a thing does not exist; and 3, if the civil 
servant interviewed knows nothing on such a Bulletin. For this 
variable, the following distribution of answers was obtained.   
 
Table 2 
Perception on issuing an Information Bulletin 
Answer -1 0 1 no answer 
Share held by answers (%) 31.3 10.0 50.5 23 
 
In a similar way, by comparison with the analysis of quality 
of PA institutions, are calculated averages and standard deviations 
for the 4 parameters used in defining perception on transparency in 
PA institutions. Indices are calculated function of the types of 
institution, of the sex of the persons under survey (male/female), 
and of types of personnel: either management staff or subordinated 
personnel. The values taken for the 2 parameters  considered, the 
value of F statistics and the significant difference are as follows. 
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Table 3 
Characteristics of variables defining quality of activities performed  
by PA institutions 
 
4X  5X  2C  2C′  
Type of 
institution 
 
APC 
 
2.86(1.07)  
 
2.99(0.89)  
 
2.93(0.89)  
 
1.90(2.52)  
 CJ 2.90(0.71)  2.86(0.80)  2.88(0.63)  2.71(2.78)  
 P 2.98(0.95)  3.14(0.84)  3.06(0.79)  2.32(3.79)  
 SPD 2.91(0.96)  2.98(0.88)  2.95(0.78)  1.91(2.53)  
Statistics F and value 
of p 
- - - 
(0.04)
2.502  
Male/Female  
M 
 
3.05(0.87)  
 
3.13(0.78)  
 
3.09(0.73)  
 
2.30(2.73)  
 F 2.83(0.97)  2.90(0.91)  2.87(0.81)  1.89(2.65)  
Statistics F and value 
of p (0.00)
6.653  
(0.00)
7.224  
(0.00)
8.957  
(0.08)
2.603  
Type of 
personnel 
 
PE 
 
2.79(0.99)  
 
2.86(0.91)  
 
2.83(0.81)  
 
1.94(2.81)  
 PC 3.14(0.81)  3.21(0.75)  3.18(0.68)  2.22(2.45)  
Statistics F and value 
of p (0.00)
29.119  
(0.00)
33.335  
(0.00)
41.788  - 
 
   
The results scored so far show the following conclusions:  
1. the opinion of the civil servants interviewed, on the 
quality of the system of performance evaluation of 
employees, and on transparency of decision making 
process in their institutions is quite similar, in all 
categories of institutions of the survey;  
2. female population interviewed has a more critical opinion 
on these aspects, as compared to male population 
interviewed;  
3. there are also significant differences of opinion between 
the management staff and the subordinated personnel ; 
the latter have a much more critical opinion on the four 
aspects taken into consideration by the study. 
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4. in most cases (over 50%),  Central Public Administration 
(APC) and Decentralized Public Services (SPD), do not 
issue Bulletins of Information.  
 
2.3.6. The pressure put by the Political System on Public 
Administration  Institutions 
On the basis of information supplied by statistical 
questionnaires, two statistical variables are defined, for estimating 
the pressure put by the political system on the public 
administration institutions. Two possible situations of interference 
of the political system on public administration are taken into 
consideration: (i) the negative aspect of the interference, that is 
pressures put by political persons on the trade – unions of PA 
institutions, on recruitment and promotion of personnel in 
management positions 6( )X ; (ii) the positive aspect of the 
interference, measured by a favorable opinion expressed by civil 
servants when political changes after local or national elections 
bring about changes in public administration 7( ).X   
The variable 6( )X is defined function of three elements 
measuring the pressure of the political system on central and local 
public administration: (i) interference at the level of trade unions in 
PA, with a  view  to  minimize  public protests  of  employees 
(strikes); (ii) interference of political persons in recruitment and/or 
promotion of personnel in management positions; (iii) either 
directly or by third persons or organizations.  The values of this 
variable are measured on a scale from [0 … 4], corresponding to:  
0 is the situation when political persons do not interfere in 
administration; 4 is the situation when political system pressure on 
administration is at a maximum point. A small figure for the 
average of this characteristic shows little influence of political 
factors on commissions of recruitment/promotion of civil servants. 
At the level of the population under survey the average scored by 
this characteristic was 1.790 and a standard deviation of 1.45. 
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These value show a significant pressure put by political factors on 
commissions of examination for civil servants employment and 
promotion.  
Results obtained after the survey are consistent with similar 
inquiries carried out at the level of public administration, by 
various national or international organizations. As a matter of fact, 
the diagnosis analyses on which the results of the Strategy for 
Reforming P.A. are based, as well as Country Reports issued by 
the Commission of the European Union pointed out major 
disfunctionalities of the system of management for civil service, 
which does not encourage the development of civil service, based 
on modern methods of recruitment, promotion and assessment of 
civil servants. More often than not, the principle of political non-
commitment and transparency rules were neglected. Among the 
main shortcomings of the system of recruitment and promotion of 
civil servants, we can mention: the lack of a national competition, 
organized each year, for employment on vacant jobs in PA 
institutions; a deficient organization of competition and 
examinations for jobs in administration; insufficient personnel 
specialized in recruitment, promotion and evaluation of civil 
servants, etc. 
As a matter of fact, the changes at Government level brought 
about changes in all technical management bodies of all 
Ministries1. This is the general rule for all the Governments that 
governed in Romania for the last 18 years of transition.  We only 
give two examples that happened after the last government 
restructuring; we specify this is not an isolated case, but many 
examples of the same kind can be given, for the successive 
Governments that ruled Romania in these years.  
The first example is the Ministry of Transports. The last 
restructuring of the Ministry, replacing the Democrat Party 
                                                          
1 Information supplied by newspaper „Cotidianul”, May 28,  2007,  in the editorial  
„Orban, the champion of purges: 11 Managers were dismissed, in  40 days”, p. 1. 
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member Radu Berceanu, by Ludovic Orban, a member of the 
National Liberal Party conducted to the replacement of no less than 
11 managers, directly subordinated to him. These managers were 
representing companies in which the volume of investments is 
substantial, that is: Romanian Company for Highways, Romanian 
Railways Company (CFR SA), Romanian Road Transporters 
Authority, the Society for Railways Tourism, the Administration of 
Harbours - Constanta, the Administration of Sailing Channels, the 
Romanian Fleet Authority, the Civil Aircraft Authority, Tarom, the 
Romanian Railways Authority, etc. According to the newspaper 
mentioned above, the managers who lost their positions had been 
recommended by the former government party, Democrat Party, 
and these who occupied their positions are either members, or 
supporters of the present government party, the National Liberal 
Party. During the lapse of his governance, Minister Ludovic Orban 
modified more than half of the structure of Boards of 
Administration and General Assembly of Shareholders for the 
main societies or companies subordinated to him. For the General 
Departments in Ministries, things were a little bit more difficult, 
since the personnel employed in these Departments are considered 
civil servants. Under these conditions, in order not to be in 
contradiction with the legal provisions of Law 161/2003, a trick 
was used, that is these administration structures were first 
demolished, and then re-created, under another name.  
The second example comes from the field of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. Thus, “a document edited by the branch of 
the National Liberal Party located in Sibiu, shows the following 
situation: in Romania, year  2007, public office can only be 
obtained on a political basis; the Minister of Economy and 
Finance, Varujan Vosganian, is blamed for this situation in the 
editorial, for the reason that he appointed the position of General 
Manager for Transgaz SA Medias,  without taking into account the 
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previous negociations for that position, which was supposed to be 
offered to the chief of the Liberals in Sibiu”2. 
Similar editorials can be seen in many newspapers, all along 
the period of time that elapsed since 1990, criticizing the 
government in place at that time. A good thing, still, is that the 
position of Prefect was professionalized, the person holding this 
position is now a high civil servant.    
The variable measuring transformations in PA, as a result of 
political changes, is defined function of variables measuring 
positive changes occuring after local or general elections at the 
level of State – budgeted managers, of public services management 
and of personnel policies.  
On the basis of data collected from interviewed public 
employees, an average level of this characteristic of 2.140 was 
calculated, for a standard deviation of 1.034. Between the two 
variables 6X  and 7X  there exists a significant linear dependency. 
The value of Pearson coefficient of correlation equals to 0.327, 
differing from 0 for a significant difference of 2%. 
Starting from the result presented in Table 4, we can make 
the following remarks: (i) the influence of the political system is 
much more obvious at the level of Central Public Administration 
(CPA), than in County Councils (CC), Prefectures (P) and 
Decentralized Public Services (DPS). The value of variable X6 for 
CPA is 1.61, this figure being much higher than in the three former 
cases; the significant difference of the test is  0.03p < ; (ii) the 
perception of the personnel in Public Administration on the 
pressure put by the political system on PA does not differ too 
much, at the level of groups interviewed, function of the sex of the 
person (male/fermale), nor function of their position in the 
institution (either management staff or simple employees); (iii) the 
personnel in County Councils (CC) has expressed the general 
opinion that political changes occurring after elections brought 
about important changes at the level of management institutions in 
                                                          
2 „The Gardian” - May 28, 2007, „Liberals are disputing their prey”. 
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State budgeted institutions, in the field of services in personnel 
employment.  
 
Table 4 
Characteristics of variables defining pressure put by political system 
on PA , 6 7(  şi )X X  and the process of de-centralization 8 8(  şi ).X X ′  
 6X  7X  8X  8X ′  
Type of 
institution 
 
CPA 
 
1.61(0.82)  
 
2.09(1.01)  
 
2.43(0.67)  
 
2.36(0.59)  
 CC 1.25(0.70)  2.24(0.93)  2.78(0.48)  2.73(0.44)  
 P 1.30(0.77)  1.88(0.82)  2.69(0.54)  2.58(0.52)  
 DPS 1.35(0.76)  1.93(0.89)  2.61(0.58)  2.56(0.53)  
Statistics F and value 
of p (0.003)
4.129  
(0.03)
2.789  - 
(0.000)
7.257  
Male/Female  
M 
 
1.37(0.78)  
 
2.04(0.95)  
 
2.65(0.54)  
 
2.64(0.54)  
 F 1.38(0.75)  1.95(0.93)  2.58(0.61)  2.50(0.53)  
Statistics F and value 
of p 
- - - 
(0.001)
7.352  
Type of 
personnel 
 
PE 
 
1.38(0.78)  
 
1.96(0.91)  
 
2.59(0.61)  
 
2.50(0.53)  
 PC 1.37(0.73)  2.00(0.90)  2.63(0.55)  2.65(0.53)  
Statistics F and value 
of p 
- - - 
(0.000)
14.279  
2.3.7. The de-centralization process  
In order to evaluate consequences of the de-centralization 
process, a variable defined function of ten characteristics, 
measuring the capability of public administration to manage public 
funds at local level, to ensure health public services, social 
assistance services, public services of education, public services of 
culture, public services of defense of public order, public services 
of civil protection, forecasting and economic and social 
development, organizational capability, is given, namely 8X ;  this  
is  defined  on  a measuring scale assuming values from [1 … 4]. 
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The bigger the value, the more administration has a better capacity 
to fulfil its basic functions. For values scored at the level of 
population interviewed, an average value of 2.610 and a standard 
deviation of 0.590 were calculatated. These figures show a poor 
capacity of public administration to fulfil its basic functions. 
Taking into consideration the importance of the system of 
financing public administration – either central or local – and its 
capacity to provide services of good quality, another variable is 
defined, namely 8X , in order to assess the quality of the de-
centralization process. This is calculated function of variable 8X  
and of the variable measuring the capability of the present 
financing system to meet the requirements of public institutions in 
central and local public administration. A small value for this 
variable shows a low capacity of the present financing system of 
local and central public administration in fulfilling its basic 
functions.   
The average value scored at the level of the group 
interviewed of  2.53 (for a square average deviation of 0.620) 
shows major disfunctionalities of PA in fulfilling its major tasks, as 
well as a poor adjusting of its financial resources to the needs of its 
institutions. As a matter of fact, The Strategy for PA reform shows 
that no adequate financial resources were transferred for the de-
centralization process, and there is not a clear delimitation of 
transferred competencies, nor the levels of decentralization. In this 
area of concerns, the Strategy recommends the reforming measures 
to reinforce local autonomy of local public authorities: increase of 
the share of incomes of local administration to over 50%; 
improvement of the system of financing local investments, 
improvement of local budget management and auditing, etc.  
In support of its de-centralization process, Romania received 
European funds, as well as funds offered by IBRD, as follows:  
(i) By programme Phare 1992, a project amounting to 1,5 
million € was carried out, with a view to improve training 
capacities for personnel in local public administration, to develop 
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local authorities and   management abilities at local level, issuing 
information bulletins and developing documentation centres. 
(ii) By Phare programme 1997, projects amounting to 5 
million € were supplied, with a view to help local administration to 
implement principles of subsidiarity and local autonomy.  
(iii) By Phare programme 2002, the project “De-
centralization and development of local public administration in 
Romania”, amounting to 4,73 million €, was carried out, with a 
view to implement a taxation reform, transferring some activities 
co-ordination from central, to local levels, and creating 
autonomous resources of financing at  local level.  
(iv) By Programme Phare 2004, the following projects are 
going to be carried out: ”The process of de-centralization and de-
concentration, under the co-ordination of central administration”, 
with a budget of 1,4 million € and the project “Reinforcing 
financial  autonomy of local authorities, by continuing taxation 
system de-centralization, with a budget amounting to 1,2 million €. 
(v) By programme Phare 2005 and 2006 two projects are 
now carried on: “Management of the Fund for Developing and 
Modernizing Local Administration” and “Fund for Developing and 
Modernizing Local Administration - model of non – reimbursable 
financing for Local Administration”. 
(vi) By programme PAL – financed by the World Bank – 
IBRD, a series of projects with a view to consolidate the 
institutional framework for de-centralization process were also 
carried out. 
2.3.8. The civil service 
In order to analyze some specific aspects of the civil service 
and to assess the impact of the civil service reforming on the 
corruption embedded in the system, we define variables that take 
into account the following aspects: evaluation of the satisfaction 
degree of people employed in P.A.; the quality of relations in the 
work-process, as well as a series of aspects strictly connected to the 
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reforming process of civil service. The next pages will treat 
characteristic components of the above mentioned parameters.  
A. For measuring the degree of satisfaction of civil 
servants, a variable is defined, which measures the satisfaction of 
the employees on their monthly incomes, the esteem that their 
colleagues, chiefs and the public show for the quality of their work, 
and the conditions in which they perform their activities. More 
specifically, in order to define this variable, the following 8 aspects 
describing the level of satisfaction of civil servants at their work are 
given: the average monthly income of the employee, the esteem 
showed to him/her by colleagues, by the direct chief, by the 
management of his/her institution and the conditions at work, that is: 
the quality of the work place, of his computer and of his connection 
to the Internet. This variable is defined on a measuring scale from 1, 
(the person is totally dissatisfied with the working conditions) to 5 
(the person is perfectly content with his situation at work. After 
processing series of data, the averages and the standard average 
deviations for the parameters measured above are obtained. 
 
Table 5 
Average and square standard deviations for variables measuring the 
degree of satisfaction of PA employees  
at their work 
Variable  
9X  10X  11X  3C  
Average scored 2,30 3,59 3,43 3,108 
Standard 
deviation 
1,003 0,756 1,016 0,678 
 
Results obtained bring into relief a moderate degree of 
satisfaction of PA employees, function of the three parameters 
mentioned above. The most negative parameter is the present – day 
remuneration system of the civil servants in administration. Also, a 
negative perception, but with a moderate level, is the factor 
measuring working conditions. A positive aspect, still, is the degree 
of satisfaction civil servants express, for the respect shown to them 
by colleagues, chiefs and management and by citizens as such. 
Chapter 2 
 
45 
B. The quality of relations set up in the work process  
represents a major point in civil service assessment. The present 
study evaluates this parameter, considering the following aspects: 
the quality of working relations with colleagues within the same 
compartment, with colleagues of other compartments, with the 
manager of the institution, and with persons working in similar 
institutions. The evaluation of the satisfaction degree of civil 
servants, taking into account the quality of relations in their work 
process, was made on a scale from 1, to 4. 1 is the situation when 
the person is totally dissatisfied with the quality of relations at his 
office, 4, the maximum value, signifies he/she is perfectly content 
with the quality of relations in his daily activities. In order to 
measure the quality of work relations, considering all the six types 
of parameters, the variable C4   is calculated. 
At the level of the sample under study, an average level for 
this parameter of 3,31 was calculated, and a standard deviation of 
0,51. The two figures show a good quality of relations, in the work 
process of civil servants interviewed.  
 
C. Reforming civil service is one of the major priorities of 
public administration reform in Romania, this being achieved by 
improving management of civil service and continuous training of 
civil servants. The major disfunctions at the level of civil service 
fall into the following five categories:  
(i) the same rules and regulations for all personnel employed 
in public administrations;  
(ii) a stable and efficient system of remuneration, on long 
term, of the civil servants;  
(iii) the management of civil service does not ensure a fair 
process of recruitment/promotion/evaluation of personnel employed;  
(iv) the training and development courses for civil servants: 
(v) mobility of civil servants. 
The questionnaire used in the survey included questions 
measuring the opinion of groups interviewed on important issues 
connected to the reform of civil service. On the basis of responses 
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to questions were defined variables defining some aspects on the 
reform, viewed from this point of view.  
To measure the quality of organizing competitions for 
employment/promotion in public administrations, variable C9 is 
defined, on a measuring scale from 1 to 4. This variable evaluates 
specific aspects the groups interviewed expressed, on the way 
competitions for employment in public administration are 
organized, on the way promotions are obtained, and also describes 
particular aspects occurring in the practice of promotion on civil 
service positions, as well as the degree of interference of persons 
within the organization, at the moment when new people are 
employed, or promoted; it also describes the extent of political 
persons influence, the practice of offering presents or money to 
decision making factors, in order to obtain a job, or a biased 
organization of competitions. For this variable, a measuring scale 
of values from 1… 4 is used; 1 means there is no outside influence 
in getting the job; 4 means the job or promotion are obtained by 
decided on other criteria than the value of the candidate.  
At the level of populations of the groups interviewed, after 
the processing of data series for the five variables taken into 
consideration, were obtained averages and squares average 
deviations, as follows in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Measurements of interferences in organizing competitions  
for employment in civil service 
 Pressures exerted by networks 
 Inside the organization Political 
Presents 
offered 
Unfair 
organization 
of competition 
For obtaining a job in civil service 
Average 2,11 1,90 1,40 2,47 
Standard 
Deviation 
0,991 1,040 0,765 1,197 
For promoting in civil service 
Average 2,35 1,92 1,41 2,38 
Standard 
Deviation 
1,037 1,033 0,780 1,218 
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A new variable of level 3 is given, for describing at what 
extent reforming public administration encourages those factors 
contributing to modernizing, in a short lapse of time. Among 
aspects  concerned, we mention: employment of young persons in 
civil service; a better mobility at the level of civil service; the 
improvement of continuous education process (training and 
development of civil servants); the extent at which reforming civil 
service leads to diminishing corruption levels; a better 
transparency; a better use of the potential of people working in 
public administration; this variable, 10C  is defined on a measuring 
scale from a minimum of 1,  (the reform of civil service encourages 
modernization) to 5,  that is the reform does not lead to 
improvements and modernization of civil service as such.  
 
Table 7 
Defining variables that describe aspects connected to civil service 
 
9X  3C  4C  9C  10C  
Type of 
institution 
 
CPA 
 
2.51(1.07)  
 
3.21(0.66)  
 
3.29(0.51)  
 
2.11(0.75)  
 
2.74(0.95)  
 CC 2.31(0.98)  3.20(0.59)  3.31(0.48)  1.93(0.67)  2.69(0.85)  
 P 2.68(0.96)  3.41(0.61)  3.43(0.49)  1.05(0.60)  2.56(0.90)  
 DPS 2.16(0.96)  3.00(0.67)  3.28(0.52)  1.99(0.70)  2.64(0.92)  
Statistics F and 
value of p (0.00)
6.588  
(0.00)
8.264  - - - 
Male/Female  
M 
 
2.39(1.00)  
 
3.15(0.66)  
 
3.32(0.49)  
 
1.96(0.66)  
 
2.64(0.94)  
 F 2.22(1.01)  3.06(0.67)  3.30(0.51)  2.02(0.71)  2.67(0.90)  
Statistics F and 
value of p 
- - - - - 
Type of 
personnel 
 
PE 
 
2.15(1.00)  
 
3.01(0.69)  
 
3.27(0.51)  
 
2.05(0.70)  
 
2.68(0.90)  
 PC 2.54(0.97)  3.28(0.59)  3.37(0.49)  1.92(0.66)  2.60(0.93)  
Statistics F and 
value of p (0.00)
26.770  
(0.00)
29.953  
(0.01)
6.453  
(0.01)
6.454  - 
General figure for 
all PA 
2.29(1.01)  3.10(0.68)  3.30(0.51)  2.00(0.69)  2.66(0.91)  
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After processing data series collected from people 
interviewed, results were obtained – averages and square average 
deviations – for primary an aggregated variables used in 
characterising major aspects of civil service in Romania. Indices 
are calculated for all public administration, and for each group of 
employees, defined according to specific criteria.  
 
Table 8 
Characteristics of primary variables and of aggregated variable used 
in describing specific aspects of reforming civil service 
 
4.81Q  4.82Q  4.83Q  4.84Q  4.85Q  4.86Q  
Average 2,98 2,86 2,36 2,68 2,56 2,50 
Standard 
Deviation 
1,162 1,033 1,032 1,209 1,132 1,076 
 
The high values of averages scored for the two variables 
calculated show an inefficient reforming process, viewed from the 
point of view of modernizing civil service. 
2.4. Analysis of corruption facts in public administration   
Economic literature grants a special attention to studies 
connected to measurements of corruption and its impact on 
economy (as a whole) or on a few sectors of activity (more 
specially). Thus, studies estimating the impact of corruption on 
economic growth (Schleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995), on 
military expenses (Gupta, Mellon and Sharan, 2001), on public 
systems for health and education (Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson, 
2000), on development of industry in less developed countries 
(Emerson, 2002), studies on direct foreign investments (Wei, 
1997), studies on the quality life and level of poverty (Gupta and 
others, 1998), etc.  
With a view to analyzing phenomenon of corruption, the 
questionnaire comprised a series of questions measuring the 
opinion of civil servants in P.A., referring to corruption levels, to 
factors causing corruption to appear, and to economic and social 
consequences of this phenomenon.  
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2.4.1. Levels of corruption in various sectors of activity 
For evaluating the opinion of civil servants and employees 
on the magnitude of the corruption phenomenon, we consider 
variable 5C , measured  on a scale from [1 … 5] ; 1 is the value a 
low level of corruption, 5  for the situation when corruption 
became general. In order to define this variable, the opinion of P.A. 
officers on levels of corruption in public health, public education, 
in political area, local public administration, central public 
administration and corruption in their own institution, is asked.  
The average level of this parameter, estimated on the basis 
of data collected from civil servants interviewed is 3.20, for a 
standard deviation of 0.80.  Transforming this value on the scale of 
Transparency index (TCI), we score a value of 3.6, showing 
relatively similar results on the two types of measurings. As a 
general rule, the values scored for this particular index for 
Romania range between 3.0 and 3.4, which places Romania among 
countries with very high scores of corruption, at European level.  
For transforming scale of measurements used by our study, to scale 
of corruption TCI, the following formula of calculation was used: 
10(5 3.2) 3.6.
5
− ⋅ =  
2.4.2. Consequences of corruption on economic and social  
 environment  
For evaluating opinion of employees in PA on negative 
effect of corruption in economic and social domains, the 
questionnaire included a series of questions on the basis of which 
were defined primary variables for measuring the negative impact 
of corruption on local development, on national development, on 
the quality of education, on the public health system, on the quality 
of the political environment, on the quality and image of local and 
central public administration. The variable measuring negative 
effects of corruption on economic and social domains is 6.C  This 
variable is measured on a scale from 2,−  (very negative 
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consequences of corruption) to 2  (the persons interviewed consider 
that phenomena of corruption can have a series of positive effects 
on economic and social domains).  
The average level of the aggregated variable, of -1.06 shows 
the perception of a negative effect of corruption phenomena on 
economic and social domains in Romania. The standard deviation 
for this variable is 0.91.  
2.4.3.  Contribution made by some factors, for reducing 
corruption phenomena 
With a view to diminish corruption levels in a country, 
various strategies can be designed, by creating new institutional 
structures, improving the legal framework for fighting corruption, 
making state structures more efficient, by creating - at local and 
central level - efficient institutions, by modernizing civil service, 
re-shaping the political parties, creating, at the level of the civil 
society, non-governmental organizations supporting efforts against 
corruption, and so on.  
An important role in diminishing corruption levels is played 
by mass-media, which, more often than not, contribute to a better 
transparency of decisions made at public levels.  Cultural factors, 
as well as mentality of a given population in a county or a 
geographical area, have a direct contribution on maintaining a 
certain level of corruption. In order to measure the influence of 
some factors to diminishing corruption levels, the civil servants 
interviewed were asked to tell their opinion on the influence of the 
media, of the education system, of the Church, of the political class 
– at central and at local levels – representatives of the State/ civil 
servants in local and central public administration, and of simple 
citizens, in reducing levels of corruption. For measuring primary 
variables mentioned above, we used a scale of measurement with 
five integer numbers in the interval 2− (case in which the effect of 
the factor does not diminish corruption, but on the contrary, it 
encourages the phenomenon), to 2  (value attributed to the case 
when the respective factor has a major contribution to diminishing 
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corruption). On the basis of the above mentioned variables, an 
aggregate variable measuring efficiency of factors diminishing 
corruption, C8, is given. 
The average level of this characteristic is 0.22, and the 
standard deviation is 0.82. The medium value for this characteristic 
shows an insignificant influence of factors fighting corruption, in 
the Romanian society. For the eight factors taken into 
consideration, the average values and square standard deviations 
were calculated.  
 
Table 9 
Characteristics of factors contributing to diminishing levels  
of corruption 
Variable 
5.61Q  5.62Q  5.63Q  5.64Q  5.65Q  5.66Q  5.67Q  5.68Q  
Average 0,89 0,68 0,74 -0,43 -0,29 -0,02 0,13 0,17 
Standard 
deviation 
1,072 0,890 0,940 1,356 1,280 1,241 1,191 1,185 
 
The media has a positive significant value in reducing 
corruption levels, while the behaviour of the political class at 
central level does not encourage diminishing of corruption levels. 
On the contrary the behaviour of the political class encourages 
corruption phenomena. The behaviour of civil servants in central 
and local public administration in reducing corruption phenomena, 
is situated in a neuter area.  
2.5. Conclusions    
We conclude this chapter of the present study, presenting the 
following conclusions, on the basis of results scored until now. 
These results can be used in defining econometric models that can 
be used in analyzing public administration capability to fulfil its 
basic functions, to reduce corruption phenomena, to be transparent 
and to satisfy the needs of its employees: 
(i) For most variables used in the study, there exist 
significant differences at the level of the four types of institutions 
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working in public administration. Taking into consideration 
conclusions obtained by using ANOVA analysis, these differences 
are obvious, at the level of aggregated variables of third degree, 
which were given to measure the quality of activities performed by 
public administration institutions; (variable 1C , for which the 
significant difference of test F is 0.04),p <  transparency at the 
level of public institutions 2( , 0.04),C p′ <  satisfaction of employees 
in this area of activities 3( , 0.00),C p =  level of corruption phenomena 
5( , 0.00)C p =  and perception of the persons interviewed on 
consequences of corruption in economy and social life 
6( , 0.07).C p <  This remark recommends a requirement of defining 
models of regression, for all public administration domain, as well 
as for the four types of institutions functionning within public 
administration. 
 
Table 10 
Characteristics of variables defining aspects connected  
to civil service 
 
5C  6C  8C  
Type of 
institution 
CPA 3.36(0.82)  1.08(0.97)−  0.22(0.82)  
 CC 2.97(0.74)  0.87(0.95)−  0.30(0.75)  
 P 2.98(0.75)  0.99(0.88)−  0.88(0.78)  
 DPS 3.19(0.80)  1.13(0.86)−  0.21(0.81)  
Statistics F and value of p 
(0.001)
4.863  
(0.07)
2.241  - 
Sex of person  
M 
3.09(0.74)  1.04(0.88)−  0.25(0.84)  
 F 3.24(0.83)  1.09(0.92)−  0.20(0.78)  
Statistics F and value of p 
(0.03)
3.496  - - 
Category of 
personnel 
PE 3.22(0.83)  1.10(0.90)−  0.80(0.81)  
 PC 3.11(0.74)  1.02(0.92)−  0.27(0.79)  
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Statistics F and value of p 
(0.06)
3.544  - - 
Reform of 
public office 
1 (3.67 5.00]GR =  3.71(0.93)  1.35(0.99)−  0.20(0.73)  
 2 (2.33 3.67]GR =  3.44(0.82)  1.07(0.95)−  0.03(0.80)  
 3 [1.00 2.33]GR =  3.02(0.75)  1.05(0.88)−  0.31(0.79)  
Statistics F and value of p 
(0.00)
28.107  - 
(0.00)
10.062  
Transparency 
in PA 
1 [0.00 1.33]GT =  3.89(0.63)  1.38(0.94)−  0.23(0.98)−  
 2 (1.34 2.67]GT =  3.47(0.71)  1.12(0.92)−  0.05(0.73)  
 3 (2.68 4.00]GT =  3.00(0.80)  1.03(0.89)−  0.32(0.81)  
Statistics F and value of p 
(0.00)
41.875  
(0.09)
2.470  
(0.00)
13.731  
For all PA 3.172(0.81)  1.07(0.91)−  0.22(0.81)  
 
(ii) The same remark is valid for defining groups of 
employees in public administration function of the sex of the 
person, male, or female. Thus, the difference appears for the 
variable of 2-nd degree, used in measuring budgeting performance 
of the institution 2( , 0.01),X p < the pressure exerted by the political 
system on the institution of public administration 6( , 0.03),X p <  
transformations occurring in the system as a result of political 
changes after local and national elections 7( , 0.03)X p <  and the 
degree of satisfaction  of civil servants in connection with their 
monthly remuneration 9( , 0.00).X p =   
(iii) Intensifying reform processes at the level of public 
office brings about diminishing of corruption levels. The highest 
level of corruption is shown by a group of employees who 
considered that the lack of a reform process in public 
administration is the cause of corruption. As a matter of fact, 
between groups of employees, 1 2 3( ,  şi )GR GR GR  defined 
according to their perception on corruption levels, there exist 
significant differences in the estimation of the degree of corruption 
in the system ( 0.00).p =  Studies carried out in public 
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administration institutions show the fact that small monthly 
remunerations, discretionary standards in the work of 
administrative institutions, and the lack of other types of incentives 
in the work of civil servants, are important factors augmenting 
corruption levels in the system. 
(iv) Another important factor in causing corruption 
phenomena in the system is the lack of transparency in institutions 
belonging to public administration. Thus, as it can be seen in data 
presented by Table 10, the more decision-making process is 
transparent, the lower the level of corruption.  Size of corruption 
perception differs for each group of employees interviewed (GT1, 
GT2, GT3), each group is defined according to a level of 
transparency. In this particular case, the value of the significant 
level of the test is 0.00.p =  The Strategy for Reforming Public 
Administration recommends, as a major objective for medium 
term, “The Improvement of the Image of Public Administration, by 
increasing Transparency of Administrative Activities and Taking 
Firm Measures against Corruption, obvious for the Public 
Opinion”3. 
(v) The level of satisfaction of civil servants can be 
improved by motivating rules of employment and stable incomes 
for a longer lapse of time. As a matter of fact, among the three 
parameters describing the degree of satisfaction of the public 
officer, the income, the respect showed by the public for their 
work, and the conditions at work, the first has the lowest score. 
The average for this variable is only 2.30, as compared to the 
averages scored by the other two variables, of 3.59, and 3.43 
respectively.  
(vi) The financing system of public administration 
institutions does not meet the requirements of P.A. 
 
                                                          
3 Updated Strategy of Government for Accelerating Reform of Public 
Administration,  2004-2006,  Bucharest, p.  6. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Models of Quantitative Analysis  
of Corruption in Public Administration 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Analysis of corruption is an important field of contemporary 
economic research. In the recent years, researchers and university 
professors, as well as international organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), have been particularly 
concerned with the study of corruption levels, trying to identify its 
causes and the mechanisms of transmission of corruption through a 
system, the measuring of corruption consequences on economic 
and social facts in a country or in a region of development. Among 
the most important classical studies in this field of research, we 
mention A. Krueger [1974], S. Rose-Ackerman [1975], Mauro 
[1995], Tanzi [1998], and so on. The lapse of time following 
economic and political changes in Eastern Europe, after the fall of 
the socialist system, brought about new means of corruption 
formation, as well as ever more sophisticated ways of transmitting 
it through the new social systems, in full process of transformation.  
The new situation also stimulated development of research 
studies in the field. The more so as the IBRD (2001), identified 
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corruption facts as being “the only serious obstacle in the way of 
economic and social development”. During this lapse of time, a 
series of outstanding studies analysing the economy of corruption 
were published, more exactly the quantitative analysis of 
corruption. Among the most important books published in the 
nineties, we mention: P. Mauro [1995], P. Bardhan [1997], V. 
Tanzi [1998], Shang-Jin Wei (1997), and so on. 
An important issue in analysing corruption is to identify 
causes making it appear in a public system. The speciality studies 
identify four categories of factors with direct influence on 
corruption in a system: political and legal factors, historical, social 
and cultural factors, and economic factors. Within the first 
category of factors, we include the quality of the political system, 
the particular features of the legal system (see Leite and  
Weidmann (1999)); especially the legislation and the institutions 
having the mission to fight corruption in a given country; the 
quality of the democratic system, the features of the election 
system in a given country, the type of administrative institutions, 
the degree of de-centralization of the system, and so on. A series of 
studies, such as those written by  La Porta (1999), Treisman (2000) 
show that traditions and historical factors of a country have a 
strong impact on the level of corruption phenomena and on 
mechanisms enabling its transmission throughout the system. 
Social and cultural factors play a special part in revealing 
corruption characteristics in a given country (La Porta (1999), 
Treisman (2000), Alesina (2003). Equally, religious factors play an 
important role in propagating corruption within a social system. 
Economic factors, such as the level of openness of an economy 
(see Dreher (2003), Treisman (2000), Wei (2001)), the size of the 
public sector (Tanzi (1998), Treisman (2000)), the size of 
remunerations in public sector (van Rijckeghem (1997)), and so 
on, all have their influence on corruption in a country. 
Another important aspect in studying corruption is the 
choice of the most adequate econometric models for estimating its 
consequences on some sectors of activities. Among the most 
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important fields of research, studying consequences of corruption 
on economic and social environments, we mention:  
(i) models referring to general economic growth (Mauro 
[1995], Abed and Davoodi [2000], Krueger [1974]);  
(ii) models on development of only a few sectors of 
national economies; (Tanzi [1998], Shang-Jin Wei [2001]);  
(iii) models on consequences of de-centralization processes 
on the level of corruption and on mechanisms of transmitting it 
through the system (Shah [2006]);  
(iv) models on the quality of financing systems for some 
sectors of activities, such as the military system (see Gupta [2001]; 
systems of remuneration in public sector (van Rijckeghem and 
Weder [1997]);  
(v) models on industrial policies in a country (Emerson 
[2002], Bhagwati [1982]) and on investments projects efficiency 
(Sarkar [2001], Mauro [2002]).  
 
Most of the above mentioned studies use, in order to 
estimate the impact of corruption on economic and social life, at 
national, sectorial or regional levels, models of regression, VAR 
type models, and the analysis of co-integrated series. Kaufman 
(1999) and Andrei (2008) propose the use of models with 
simultaneous equations, for estimating corruption consequences on 
public administration activities within a country. In this particular 
case, variables of the model are either endogenous or exogenous, 
and parameters are estimated by method of two stages least squares 
(TSLS) and by the General Method of Moments (GMM). This 
particular method takes into account the endogenous or exogenous 
type of each variable within the model. As far as this method is 
concerned, we should nevertheless specify that there is not yet a 
precise choice of the variables that must be chosen in the process 
of estimation of parameters for models with simultaneous 
equations, used in analysis of corruption in a public system  (see 
Bai and Wei [2000];  Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 
[1999]). In Romania, a series of estimations of corruption 
consequences in public administration were made in studies written 
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by Andrei [2007], Profiroiu [2005], Teodorescu [2007a]; also, 
studies signed by Teodorescu [2006, 2007b] on consequences of 
corruption in universities; studies on consequences of corruption, 
on the quality of financing in some sectors of activities were also 
written by  Andrei [2002] and Matei [2007].   
3.2. Defining the model 
In the present study, in order to define the model of analysis 
for the quality of the reforming processes in public administration, 
the model used is proposed by Becker [1968], similar to 
approaching a crime/punishment situation. Thus, the option of a 
person to commit a crime is in fact a ratio between the profit 
obtained by committing a crime and the losses or penalties that he 
must suffer, if he doesn’t commit the crime, or if the crime is 
discovered. 
In defining the model of analysis of the quality of reforming 
process, the aim is a quantitative analysis of results obtained after a 
series of reforms. This is why, the present study presents the 
reform in public administration according to criteria set up by the 
Strategy of Reforming Public Administration, 2004. We specify 
that the reforming of Public Administration in Romania was 
recommended by internal requirements, but also by the 
prerequisites of Romania’s integration to the structures of the 
European Union. This is why the draft for this document was made 
with the direct support of the  Commission of the  European Union, 
which granted Romania financial and technical support through 
Phare 2001 programme, “Support for a project of reforming 
strategy for public administration”.   
According to the 2004 Strategy, the reform is a process of 
transforming local and central public administration institutions, in 
order to meet the requirements of their beneficiaries and the 
requirements of the process of integration of the country in the 
structures of the European Union. From this point of view, three 
components of the reform process were identified:  
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(i) the reform of the civil service, by improving the 
management of civil service and improving the courses of training 
for civil servants;  
(ii) the reform of local public administration, by continuing 
the de-centralization process;  
(iii) improvement of the process of defining a precise 
framework for public policies.  
Under these conditions, we define the model of analysis of 
the reform process in public administration, starting from the 
following three work-hypotheses: 
 
[Hypothesis 1]. For reforming public administration, there 
exist a strategy and an action plan.  
Within this plan, a series of actions grouped in the following 
three objectives are included:  
O1 - actions in the area of civil service, with a view to 
develop management of change, on the short term, and to stabilize 
and consolidate the system of civil service, on the long term;  
O2 - second objective, in the field of reforming local public 
administration, with a view to bring public administration closer to 
the citizen, and to create mechanisms through which central 
government can communicate better with local public 
administrations;  
O3 - actions with a view to improve the process of defining 
specific national public policies and local public policies, that 
should support the managerial capability of the Government, of the 
County Councils and of Local Councils to fulfil objectives and to 
meet the requirements of national and local development.  
 
[Hypothesis 2] For meeting the specific objectives, the 
Action Plan accompanying the „Strategy for Reforming PA” 
provides precise activities. In order to measure positive 
consequences of reforming PA, the following three functions are 
defined: 
1( ,... ), 1,2,3ii i i ipR R A A i= =  
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where ijA , with 1,..., ij p= , represents the whole set of 
actions meant to be carried out for fulfilling specific object Oi. ip  
represents the number of actions to be taken for fulfiling each 
specific objective.   
With a view to reforming Civil Service, 17 actions must be 
performed, with the following objectives:  
(i) creation and implementation of a unique system of 
recruitment, promotion and evaluation, based on personal merit; 
(ii) creation and implementing of a unique system of 
remuneration of civil servants;  
(iii) creation of the profession of public manager and 
developing the required competencies for supporting the reforming 
process and the process of integration to EU structures;  
(iv) reinforcing the capabilities of the National Institute of 
Administration to implement strategic components of continuous 
training-development of civil servants.  
In the field of local public administration the Strategy  
comprises 25 actions with a view to:  
(i) define mechanisms and necessary structures to co-
ordinate the above mentioned actions;  
(ii) to reform public sectors of Education, Health and Social 
Assistance;  
(iii) to improve local budgets funding;  
(iv) to increase incomes of public organizations and to make 
clear issues concerning public institutions ownership;  
(v) to improve the system of transferring money;  
(vi) to design a new legal framework for activities of 
Prefectures and for training and developing civil servants working 
in the Prefectures;  
(vii) to develop the capacity of local authorities to implement 
reform, by training/development of human resources, by new 
standards and by managing the newly created decentralized 
organizations.  
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For the improvement of the process of defining public 
policies, the Strategy recommended 11 actions, with the following 
objectives:  
(i) reinforcing governance capability at central and local 
levels, with a view to support the process of defining public 
policies; 
(ii)  to increase the part played by high civil servants in 
defining and assigning public policies; 
(iii) To improve the process of defining public policies, as 
such;  
(iv) To improve co-ordination actions in between 
institutions at central and local levels, in the process of defining 
public policies. 
 
[Hypothesis 3]. On long term, and on medium term, the 
reforming actions recommended by the Strategy, will assure an 
improvement of public administration institutions, by providing 
better quality services to their customers, diminishing the costs of 
public institutions functioning, increasing the contribution made by 
public administration to local and national development, lowering 
corruption levels, and so on.  
Under these conditions, we shall see that each function that 
measures positive consequences of the reforms made in the three 
domains mentioned above is an increasing function, as compared 
to the volume of activities allocated to each action recommended 
by the Strategy: 
0i
ij
R
A
∂ >∂  i = 1,2,3 and 1,2,..., .ij p=  
 
[Hypothesis 4]. For the support of the reform process, 
adequate financial resources were provided.  
These financing sources were supplied from the State budget 
and from foreign investments, mainly European projects in the 
Phare Multiannual Programme 2004-2006 or PAL Programme, 
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financed by IBRD Financial resources, distributed for the three 
main priorities, are as follows: 
 For Civil Service, 7 200 thousand €. To this amount, we 
should add 13 937.6 thousand € per year, for the training - in the 
next three years, of the following categories of personnel: 100 high 
civil servants, by courses of specialization of one year each; 150 
young professionals, by specialization courses of one year, or two 
years; 3000 civil servants (top management) by courses of 
specialization of one year, and 9000 middle management 
personnel, working in public administrations, in three months 
specialization programmes. 
 In support of reforming local public administration, 
projects financed by Phare Programme, and by  PAL  Programme 
of the IBRD, amounting to 8 150 thousand €, were supplied. 
 For the third component of the reforming process projects 
amounting to 8 150 thousand € were planned.  As a matter of fact, 
the financial support granted by the European Union for public 
administration reforming, from 1992 until the start of Multiannual 
Programme  Phare 2004-2006, amounts to  42 000 thousand €. The 
value of Phare projects in the multiannual programme of support of 
the Strategy amounts to  35 880 thousand €.   
 
In our model of analysis of the reforming process, the costs 
are calculated for each activity necessary in supporting the reform 
process, also by taking into account the positive response of the 
public administration system to changes recommended by the 
Strategy, as well as by the evaluation of losses suffered by the 
system if no reform of administration is done, because of the lack 
of political factors will to do it. Under these conditions, we 
calculate  the costs of the reforming processes, for each priority 
component of the reform, by the following formula: 
1( ,..., , , ) 1,2,3ii i i ipC C A A i= =B P  
The vector variable 1( ,..., )qB B=B  measures the positive 
response of the system to reforming measures, and vector variable 
1( ,..., )mP P=P  defines the capacity of the political system to 
Chapter 3 
 
65 
support reforming processes in public administration. Vector 
variable B  measures the influence exerted on public 
administration by a variety of different factors, such as: mobility of 
employees in public administration, capacity of public 
administration institutions to organize fair and transparent 
competitions for getting jobs and promotions in public 
administration, the endowment of PA institutions with computers, 
and so on. The vector variable P  measures direct or later 
consequences for public administration institutions of the actions 
of political factors, such as: indecision in promoting active 
measures of reforming PA, pressure exerted by political system 
through various decision-making channels, in order to obtain 
privileges for persons or organizations, corruption activities 
penetrating PA institutions, caused by local or central political 
authorities.  
In the case of a normal response of PA system, we shall see 
that functions ( ) 1,2,3i iC C i= ⋅ = ,  satisfy the following 
properties:  
(P1). The more significant reforming processes, the higher 
the costs of the reforms funded by national or international 
programmes according to the formula: 
( ) 0.iij
j
CC A
A
∂′ = >∂  
(P2). The reforming measures recommended by the 
Strategy document ensure positive changes at the level of the 
system, with a given probability level.  Thus, there are incurring 
risks that can slow down the pace of reforming public 
administration, as well as there are positive responses, unforeseen 
at the moment when the Strategy was designed, which could lead 
to diminishing the costs of the reform and obtaining positive results 
in a shorter lapse of time than that initially planned. Under these 
circumstances, we shall see that the function measuring the costs is 
a decreasing, concave function: 
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2
2( ) 0 ( ) 0.
i i
ij ij
j j
C CC B C B
B B
∂ ∂′ ′′= < = >∂ ∂  
(P3). For vector variable ,P  that measures the political will 
of political class to support the reform, we can have one of the 
following two situations:  
( ) 0iij
j
CC P
P
∂′ = >∂  
if there is no political will to reform public administration 
institutions, and in this situation costs of PA functioning are much 
higher than foreseen, and a second situation, 
( ) 0,iij
j
CC P
P
∂′ = <∂  
if the political factors have the will to make the necessary 
changes and to communicate effectively and efficiently with the 
technical levels of local and central PA, to implement the 
reforming measures. 
 
[Hypothesis 5]. The net profit obtained after the reform is 
evaluated on the basis of the function: 
1 1( ( ,..., ) ( ,..., , , ))ii i ip i i ip
i
CN R A A C A A= −∑ B P  
Viewed from a material point of view, the net profit 
resulting if measures of reforming are implemented, is the 
following: 
(E1). Increase of PA capacity to fulfil its basic functions. 
(E2). Lowering levels of corruption in PA and at national 
level. 
(E3). Increase of transparency in CPA and LPA institutions. 
(E4). Increase of the satisfaction degree for employees who 
work in PA institutions. 
Each of the four endogenous variables are depending on a 
series of factors. Within this study, taking into consideration the 
series of data collected from the PA employees interviewed, the 
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parameters of the regression models used to analyse the four 
endogenous variables will be estimated. The major objectives of 
the study are to identify factors influencing on the four 
characteristics and the possible differences existing in reforming 
processes at various levels of PA institutions 
3.3. Statistical data used by the study 
In order to define pertinent features of the PA reform, a 
research based on statistical sampling was organized in May 2007. 
The researchers defined a representative sample for PA employees. 
In order to make up a representative sampling, the researchers 
interviewed 971 civil servants, in two stages, in local and central 
public institutions. The error of estimating parameters for the target 
groups is of 1.2%, with a probability of getting correct results of 
97%. 
The people selected for the sample were interviewed, by a 
statistical questionnaire comprising questions referring to the 
following issues: the internal organization of public administration 
institutions, the pressure exerted by the political system on their 
institutions, the way de-centralization process in administration 
goes on, their opinion on reforming civil service as such, 
discrimination male/female in their institution, corruption and its 
consequences on economic and social development at local level 
and at national level. The questionnaire also comprised questions 
connected to personal aspects, such as the sex of the person, 
male/female, the age, the type of education, the institution where 
he/she is working, and other questions of this nature.  
According to the structure of the questions comprised in the 
questionnaire, three categories of variables were defined, 
depending on their degree of aggregation.  
 
1. Variables of level 1, with the lowest degree of 
aggregation. Each variable in this category describes a certain 
aspect of the reforming process. 
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The values of these variables are calculated on the basis of 
data collected from the sample, marked by ....Q  For instance 5.22Q  
measures to what extent corruption in the system is induced by 
small remunerations of the personnel employed. Beside this 
variable, on the same level of aggregation, some other variables are 
calculated, such as the deficiency of legislation encouraging 
perpetration of corrupted facts, the quality of the economic and 
political environment, as well as the behaviour of the citizens, who 
may encourage or dissuade facts of corruption. Making exception 
of those variables expressing personal features, the variables at this 
level of aggregation and defined on the basis of four or five values. 
For instance, the above specified value assumes figures in the 
range { }1,2,3,4,5 . These variables do not appear explicitly in 
econometric models, but they can be seen through aggregated 
variables of level two and three. For defining and expressing 
questions of the questionnaire and therefore of variables of level 
one, the following sources were used:  
(i) Available similar studies written by  Kaufman [2002], 
Profiroiu [2005], and other studies in the same field;  
(ii) The diagnosis analysis and reforming measures 
recommended by the Strategy of reforming PA, 2004-2006;  
(iii) The contents of Phare Multiannual Programme 2004-
2006, which supported the implementation of the reform processes 
in PA;  
(iv) PAL programme of the IBRD.  
 
2. Variables of second degree are calculated by aggregating 
variables of first degree and describe only a certain component, not 
very general, of the reform process as compared to variables with 
first degree of aggregation. These variables are symbolized in our 
model by letter X. 
 
3. Variables of third degree measure a certain general aspect 
connected to the functioning of public administration and to the 
consequences of the reform process on PA. These variables have 
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the highest degree of aggregation and depend on variables of first 
and second degree. In our models, they are symbolized by letter C. 
 
Variables of second and third degree are defined so as allow 
the estimation of the parameters of regression models used in the 
study of PA capability to fulfil its basic functions, recommended 
by its legislation, to analyse aspects connected to evaluating 
corruption consequences in this field of activity, to measure the 
results of the reform process on transparency in institutions 
belonging to central PA or local PA, and to analyse influencing 
factors on satisfaction of employees at their work. 
The most important variables of the research study are given 
in Appendix 1. For each variable a short definition of the variables 
of first and second degree is given, as well as the codes for each 
variable. 
3.4. Models of regression 
3.4.1. Models of analysis of performance for institutions  
in CPA and LPA  
On the basis of variables in Appendix 1 two models of 
regression for analysing performance of PA institutions are 
defined.  In both models, the variable measuring the quality of 
activities carried out in PA institutions is considered to be an 
endogenous variable.  In both situations, parameters taken into 
consideration are referring to Public Administration (PA), to 
Prefectures (P), to County Councils (CC) and to de-centralized 
services (DS). 
The first model of regression defines performances of public 
institutions function of the corruption levels and of the quality of 
organization of competition for getting jobs and promotion in civil 
service: 
 
1 1 5 5 9 9 1C a a C a C u= + + +                                                  [M1] 
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For the estimation of parameters OLS (ordinary, least 
squares) method was used, and the survey only took into 
consideration the questionnaires that answered all the questions 
referring to the definition of variables belonging to model of 
regression [1]. We should mention that, out of the total of 971 
persons in the interview, only 813 specified the organization where 
they were employed. On the basis of these data, were estimated the 
parameters of the above mentioned model, at the level of PA. If 
answers of these people who hadn’t specified their employer had 
been taken into consideration, then the data series would have 
comprised 873 answers, and estimations wouldn’t have been very 
different. Result of these estimations are given in Table 1, column 
2, and their values are marked by letter T. 
The second model of regression takes into consideration, 
beside the variable measuring corruption level, other variables 
which describe the transparency of decisions in PA institutions, the 
pressure exerted by the political system on PA, the degree of 
satisfaction of personnel employed in public administration, and 
the influence of internal and external factors diminishing 
corruption levels, on PA institutions: 
 
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 2C a a C a C a C a C a X a C u= + + + + + + +    [M2] 
 
In the two models 1u  and 2u are residual variables of 
average 0 and constant variance. They are measuring the influence 
of other factors, which, because of objective reasons, are not 
included in the model estimating performance in central and local 
public administration institutions. 
Estimation of parameters of this model was made in the 
same circumstances as for the first model. Because of this reason, 
the initial number of the values of data series used in estimating the 
model at the level of public administration was reduced from 953 
people interviewed, to 878. Results of estimations are given in 
Table 2. 
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3.4.2.   Models of analysis of corruption phenomenal 
A model of regression for the analysis of corruption levels, 
is defined, comprising the following three categories of factors, 
classified function of their influence on the corruption levels:  
(i) Factors that make corruption levels increase. In this 
category we include: fraud on competition for getting jobs or 
promotions in civil service FP 9( )C  and the pressure exerted by the 
political system on public administration institutions 6( ).X   
(ii) Factors that make corruption levels decrease, such as: 
good quality of the work performed in  PA institutions 1( ),C  
transparency in the activities of  PA 2( ),C  the level of satisfaction 
of employees in PA for the work they perform 3( ),C  the quality of 
relationships in the process of work, between people and 
institutions PA 4( ),C  the present capacity of PA to fulfil its main 
functions 8( ),X  the capability of the present financing system to 
sustain public services 3.21( )Q  and the quality of the reforming 
processes of public office, 10( ).C   
(iii) A description of persons working in public 
administration institutions.  
Among all these factors, we include in the models three 
variables, describing the sex male/female of the employee 11( ),C  
the position of the person, management or subordinated personnel 
12( )C  and the type of education of the person (studies, degree 
obtained, a.s.o) 13( ).C  The regression model is defined by the 
following formula: 
 
5 0 1 1 2 2 3 3
4 4 5 3.21 6 6 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 13 12 14 2
C b b C b C b C
b C b Q b X b X b C b C b C b C b C u
= + + +
+ + + + + + + + + +             
[M3] 
where 2u  is the residual variable measuring the influence of 
other factors, not included in our model, on the levels of 
corruption.  
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In estimating parameters, only the questions with valid 
answers for the variables pertinent to the model were taken into 
consideration. For an estimation of parameters, we used OLS 
method (ordinary least squares); results of the survey are given in 
Table 3. 
3.4.3. Models of analysis of transparency in PA institutions 
For defining the regressive model used in analyzing 
transparency we can choose as an endogenous variable, either 
variable 2C or 2.C′  Explanatory variables used for defining the 
model, are grouped in the following four categories:  
(i) Corruption, as   a   factor which  reduces transparency  
in  decision-making processes in public institutions;  
(ii) Variables directly connected to the behaviour of 
employees in PA institutions, that is: the degree of satisfaction of 
civil servants at their work, the quality of work relations within 
their institutions, the fairness in organizing competition for getting 
jobs or promotions in PA; 
(iii) Variables measuring certain components of reforming 
processes in PA. These last variables measure the action of factors 
that have a positive impact on increasing transparency in public 
institutions decision making, if the process is felt as changing the 
whole system, or a negative impact, if public employees in the 
survey have a negative perception on processes of reform in PA;  
(iv) Personal characteristics, such as the sex of the person 
male/female, the age, the position of the person in the given 
organization, the education of the person, etc., all this being 
elements that bring differences in the manner civil servants 
perceive transparency in their institutions. Under these conditions, 
we define the regressive model for analyzing transparency as 
follows: 
 
2 0 1 1 2 5 3 3 4 4 5 8 6 10 7 12 3C c c C c C c C c C c X c C c C u= + + + + + + + +                     
[M4] 
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Estimation of parameters was made by the method of 
ordinary least squares (OLS), and results are given in Table 4. For 
each type of institution, we took  into consideration only those 
questionnaires that had valid answers to all variables included in 
the regressive model. 
3.4.4.  Model of analysis of satisfaction of civil servants  
at their work 
The level of satisfaction of civil servants at their work 
depends on the conditions at their work place, the size of their 
monthly remuneration as compared to their responsibility, the 
consideration shown to him/her by the people whom he serves, and 
by the results of the reforming processes in public administration 
institutions. Equally, perception of the satisfaction can be 
differentiated function of the sex of the person, male/female, by the 
position of the person, either management or subordinated 
personnel, and function of the level of education. Under these 
conditions, the regression model used for analyzing satisfaction of 
employees at their work is defined by the following: 
 
3 0 1 2 2 4 3 9 4 10 5 11 6 12 7 13 4C d d C d C d C d C d C d C d C u= + + + + + + + +                   
[M5] 
Estimation of parameters, for the four types of institutions 
(Public Administration, Prefect, County Councils, Decentralized 
Services) is made by applying the three methods used for the other 
three models of regression described above, and results are given 
in Table 5. 
3.5. Model with simultaneous equations for analysing 
facts occurring in P.A.  
Taking into consideration the manner of defining each 
variable, the series of data collected, the descriptive analyses made 
here above, the models of regression used until now and the similar 
approaches in studies written by  Kaufmann [2002], Bai and Wei 
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[2000], Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton [1999], we designed 
a model with simultaneous equations for analysing four important 
components of PA institutions: performance, levels of corruption, 
transparency, and level of satisfaction of employees at their work. 
For the definition of the four equations of this model, we shall take 
into consideration the following parameters: 
Performance of institution = f1(.) 
Corruption level = f2(.) 
Transparency level = f3(.) 
Level of satisfaction of employees at their work = f4(.) 
 
The model with simultaneous equations defined for the 
analysis of significant aspects in P.A. institutions is written, in an 
explicit form, as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)C c c C c C c C c C c X c C ε= + + + + + + +          [M6] 
 
5 1 2 3 4 3.21 6 8
9 10 11 2
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(16) (17) (18)
C c c C c C c C c C c Q c X c X
c C c C c C ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + + +          
[M7] 
2 1 5 3 4 8 6
8 10 10 11 12 3
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
(26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
C c c C c C c C c C c X c X
c X c C c C c C c C ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + +    [M8] 
 
3 2 4
9 10 11 12 13 4
(31) (32) (33)
(34) (35) (36) (37) (38)
C c c C c C
c C c C c C c C c C ε
= + +
+ + + + + +                 [M9] 
 
The endogenous variables of the model are those that 
measure transparency level, changes brought about in P.A. after 
political replacements, the degree of satisfaction of personnel in 
PA at their work, and the influence or extent at which other 
institutions can lead to diminishing corruption levels. The other 
variables appearing into the model are considered to be exogenous 
variables. The model with simultaneous equations described here 
above can be identified, because, in each equation, the number of 
excluded variables is bigger than the number of endogenous 
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variables. Parameters of the model described here above are 
calculated by the method of ordinary least squares in two stages 
(TSLS) and by the General Method of Moments (GMM). Thus, the 
two methods take into consideration the type of every variable 
within the model, whether it is an endogenous or an exogenous 
variable. Yet, mention should be made of the fact that this is not 
yet a generally agreed approach in selecting the list of pertinent 
variables for the models with simultaneous equations, used in the 
analysis of the four features of PA institutions; (Bai and Wei 
[2000] and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton [1999]).  
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Chapter 4 
 
Non Academic Behaviour  
in the Public Health System 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Owing to their importance in ensuring political stability and 
economic development of a country, quantitative studies in the 
field of corruption hold a special place in contemporary economic 
research. Among the most important issues of research studies 
made in the field, we should mention:  
(i) estimation of corruption facts at national level or for 
certain sectors of activity;  
(ii) identifying causes of corruption and ways of 
transmitting it within an economic and social system;  
(iii) measuring the impact of corruption on economic 
activities and social life. 
The scientific community and researchers use a list of 
indices measuring corruption facts, each of them expressing 
various aspects of corruption. Among these, we mention types of 
indices used by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), or by 
Transparency International (TI), such as the index of corruption, 
calculated by ICRG, or the index of corruption perception, used in 
TI analyses.  
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Among the most prominent studies, identifying causes and 
mechanisms of transmission of corrupted activities throughout the 
economic and social systems, we should mention research studies 
written by A. Krueger [1974], S. Rose-Ackerman [1975], Mauro 
[1995], Tanzi [1998] and so on. Speciality studies have identified 
four categories of factors with a direct influence on corruption 
level in a system: political and legislation factors, historical, socio-
cultural factors and economic factors. Within the first category, we 
include the quality of the political system, the description of the 
legislation and institutions specialized in fighting corrupted 
activities, (see Leite and Weidmann (1999)), the quality of the 
democratic system, the particular aspects of the elections system in 
a country, the type of administrative system, the extent of 
decentralization of administration, and so on. A series of studies, 
such as those made by La Porta (1999), Treisman (2000), show the 
influence that traditions and historical events may have, on 
corruption level of a country, as well as on the ways in which 
corrupted events appear and are transmitted through various 
channels throughout the system. Social and cultural factors play a 
special part in corruption occurrence (see La Porta (1999), 
Treisman (2000), Alesina (2003). Equally, religious factors may 
have important contribution in propagating corrupted activities in a 
social system. Economic factors, such as the degree of openness of 
an economy, (see Dreher (2003), Treisman (2000), Wei (2001)), 
the size of the public sectors in an economy (see Tanzi (1998), 
Treisman (2000)), the size of remuneration in the public sector (see 
van Rijckeghem (1997)), all the above mentioned factors have a 
direct impact on level of corruption in a country. 
Another important factor in studying corruption facts or 
activities is to choose the best suited econometric models for 
measuring their consequences on various sectors of activity. 
Among the most significant trends of research studying impact of 
corruption on economic and social environments, we should 
mention:  
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(i) measuring corruption consequences on economic 
growth, (see Mauro [1995], Abed and Davoodi [2000], Krueger 
[1974]);  
(ii) consequences of corruption on development of a series 
of sectors in national economies, (see Tanzi [1998], Shang-Jin Wei 
[2001]). 
(iii) effects of decentralization process on the level of 
corruption and on the ways of transmitting it throughout the system 
(see Shah [2006]);  
(iv) consequences of corruption on systems of financing 
various sectors of activity, such as the military sector, Gupta 
[2001], and on public remuneration system (see van Rijckeghem 
[1997]);  
(v) Impact of corruption on industrial policies of a country 
(see Emerson [2002], Bhagwati [1982]) and on the efficiency of 
investments projects (see Sarkar [2001], Mauro [2002]).  
Most of the studies quoted hereabove, analysing impact of 
corruption on economy and on social life, at national, sectoral or 
regional level, use models of regression, models with simultaneous 
equations, VAR models and techniques of analysis of co-integrated 
series.  
For instance, Kaufman (1999) and Andrei (2008) propose 
the use of models with simultaneous equations for estimating 
consequences of corruption on public administration reforming 
processes. In this particular case, variables under study are 
endogenous and exogenous variables, parameters examined are 
estimated through TSLS method (two stages least squares method) 
and by the general method of moments (GMM). The advantage of 
this last method as compared to regression models is the fact that it 
also makes estimations on the relation cause-effect, between 
various variables analysed.  
In Romania, a series of estimations of corruption and of its 
effects on the reforming of public administration were made by 
Andrei [2008], Profiroiu [2005], Teodorescu [2007a]; also, studies 
on corruption in Romanian Universities were signed by 
Teodorescu [2006, 2007b]; analyses of corruption effects on the 
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quality of financing in a few activity sectors were signed by Andrei 
[2002] and Matei [2007], and by Andrei, Matei and Roşca [2008]. 
Identifying corruption as „non-academic behaviour” the 
present chapter describes a series of aspects perceived by the 
medical community (physicians with higher education), on a few 
aspects concerning level of corruption in the medical profession, 
and on the part played by some factors or institutions enabling 
penetration of corruption in the public health system. The chapter 
presents the methodology applied and a series of results obtained 
by using descriptive methods of analysis. An econometric analysis 
of the data series referring to corruption in the public health system 
is given in the next pages. All calculations are made by using SPSS 
statistics programme. 
By using this approach, a series of channels through which 
corruption propagates throughout the system are identified. Among 
the most important channels, we should mention:  
• The general practice of replacing managers and Boards of 
Directors in the public health system on political criteria. 
• Existence and implementation of a wrong legal 
framework, which enables and allows occurrence of corrupted 
activities in the public health system. 
• Defficiencies in the remuneration system of the medical 
profesion, which does not motivate doctors and medical personnel 
to perform a work of quality. 
• Pressures put by the economic environment and by the 
business environment, on hospitals administrators or managers. 
• Behaviour of the patients, who encourage a non-
academic behaviour of doctors and medical personnel. 
Our study estimates a series of aspects connected to 
corruption facts in the public health system, such as: trends in 
corruption during the lapse of time that elapsed from the elections; 
the optimism showed by the medical personnel on reducing 
corruption levels after Romania’s integration to the EU; the 
opinion of physicians on the contribution made by some 
institutions to reducing levels of corruption. 
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4.2. Non-academic behaviour in the public health system 
4.2.1. Series of data used in the research  
In order to collect data necessary to the survey, the sampling 
was done in two stages: first interviews were conducted in the 
public health units in Bucharest (hospitals, health centres) 
considered as primary sampling units. The second step was a 
sample of doctors, selected from each primary sampling unit.  
The volume of interviewed persons in the capital Bucharest 
was of 407, accuracy of the results of the survey is of 95%, if we 
take into consideration an error of ±2.5% in the correctness of the 
sampling.  
The sample comprised three categories of medical personnel, 
as follows: family doctors – 75, doctors working in hospitals – 279 
and doctors working in health centres – 53. 
4.2.2. Defining aggregated variable of first degree 
A mechanism of corruption in a public institution has in its 
structure, among other elements, the personnel employed in that 
institution. This is why, in a corrupted system, where State 
budgeted institutions react to the pressure put on them by the 
political and economic environment, political changes resulting 
after changes made by elections bring about important changes of 
the technical personnel working in the administration of State – 
financed institutions.  
We are sure that in a corrupted system, changes of 
management personnel in public institutions are very frequent. 
Appointment of high-position jobs on political criteria is a factor of 
corruption, but also a measure of the corruption of the system in a 
given society. 
Because of these reasons, the questionnaire included a few 
questions estimating the opinion of doctors on replacement of 
hospitals and health centres management on political criteria. This 
section of our study presents three aggregated variables of first 
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degree, used to measure specific aspects of corruption in the 
medical profession, but also in the whole Romanian society. The 
three aggregated variables make estimations on the following 
points: replacement of management boards in hospitals and health 
centres, because of political changes; describing changes in the 
whole public health system, after political changes; assessing the 
opinion of the medical profession on the level of corruption in their 
system.  
A. Replacement of management boards in hospitals and 
health centres on political criteria 
In order to estimate at what extent political factors interfere 
in replacing management boards on political criteria, the primary 
variable SCP was defined, based on the following formula: 
 
]4,1[: →PSCP  
 
Primary information used in this case are obtained after 
processing the data series obtained by answers to section 4.1.  
For the definition of this parameter a measuring scale of four 
values is used, as follows: 1 is the situation when the person 
interviewed considers that in his institution there were no 
replacements made on political considerations, in the board of 
management; 2 is the value given when the person interviewed 
considers that such changes occurred indeed, but they are not a 
current practice; 3 is the value given when changes on political 
criteria, of the management board are quite frequent; 4 is the value 
given when the person interviewed considers that the replacement 
of the management board, on political criteria is the general rule. In 
this last case, any political change in the society causes a change of 
the management boards in public health institutions. 
A value higher than 3 of the average scored by this variable 
shows a significant instability of management boards of public 
health institutions, after political changes in the Romanian society. 
This situation can lead to augmenting corruption levels and to bad 
management of public health institutions.  
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B. Changes in the system caused by political replacements  
For estimating changes in public health institutions, resulting 
after general elections, the next 5 aspects were considered: 
Management of the public health system, a general overview 
(A23_1); System of remunerating personnel working in the public 
health institutions (A23_2); The budgetary management of the 
institution (A23_3); The management of services within the 
institution (A23_4); Ways of recruitment of personnel working in 
the system (A23_5). 
For measuring the opinion of doctors on each of the above 
mentioned criteria, a scale of measure with five values was used, as 
follows: 1 is given for the situation when the person interviewed 
considered that there were no changes in the system; 2 is given 
when the person interviewed considers there were minor changes; 
3 is given if the changes were significant; 4 if changes were 
important; value 5 is given when the person interviewed 
considered that changes in the system were essential. 
For an overall estimation of changes in the public health 
system, after local elections in 2004, an aggregated variable of 1st 
degree is defined, based upon the following formula: 
 
]5,1[: →PSSS , ).5_23,...,1_23( iii AAESSS =        [1] 
 
C. Evaluation of the corruption levels 
In order to evaluate perception of doctors on corruption 
levels of certain systems, a measuring scale in five steps was used, 
defined as follows: value 1 is given if the person interviewed 
considers there is no corruption in the system under study; value 2 
is given if the person considers corruption is insignificant; value 3 
is given for the case the person interviewed considers that 
corruption exists, at moderate level; value 4, is given if the person 
interviewed considers corruption level is high; value 5 if the person 
perceives corruption as a general and essential practice in the 
system under study. 
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The questionnaire included in section 4.3, five questions 
measuring corruption levels in the following fields: public 
education; public health; politics; public administration; in the 
institution where he/she is working. 
For an overall estimation of corruption levels, an aggregated 
variable of 1st degree is defined, measuring the levels of corruption 
in public education, public health, public administration and in the 
institution where he/she is working; the variable measuring 
political behaviour is not taken into consideration, since it is 
presumed from the very beginning that inadequate behaviour of the 
political parties is inducing corruption in all the other systems 
under study.  
If we had included in the structure of corruption index 
(COR), the value of the data series measuring corruption of the 
political parties, (value of the primary variable A24_3), this would 
lead to an overestimation of the levels of corruption, because of the 
following points : 
− political parties are able to induce corruption in the four 
systems under study, and the four primary variables are measured 
by answers to questions included in the questionnaire; 
− the perception of the society on the quality of political 
parties is completely negative. 
In this situation, the variable used for measuring the level of 
corruption in the Romanian society, in the opinion of the medical 
profession (doctors with higher education), is calculated as 
follows: 
]5,1[: →PCOR ,   
).5_24,4_24,2_24,1_24( iii AAAAECOR =    [2] 
 
4.2.3. Descriptive analysis of the data series 
Distribution of answers to the question of section 4.1 is 
given in the table below. The histogram defined for the series of 
data of variable SSS is given in Fig. 1. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
97 
Table 1 
Distribution of value for variable SSS (%) 
Answers Frequencies Frequencies cumulated ascending 
 10.6 10.6 
Never 33.2 43.7 
Sometimes 28.5 72.2 
Often 14.0 86.2 
Always 13.8 100.0 
Total 100.0  
 
 
Fig. 1. Histogram of the series of data for variable SSS 
 
The average value calculated for a number of 364 question-
naires that gave correct answers to question in section 4.1 equals to 
2.09 (for a square standard deviation of 1.066). Results hereabove 
show a relatively moderate trend in replacement of management 
boards in public health, on political criteria. Among persons answer-
ring that question, 31% considered that replacement of managers on 
political criteria is really a problem (we included here persons that 
answered “often” and “always” to question of section 4.1).  
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Perception on replacement of management boards in 
hospitals and health centres does not differ for groups of doctors 
defined function of sex, age, or university degree. But it differs 
function of the personnel category (perception of executives differs 
from perception of subordinated personnel). Using an analysis of 
dispersion of doctors in the survey - ANOVA, we calculated a 
value for statistics F= 3.63 for a significant difference of 0.003. 
Average values and standard deviations of parameter SSS, function 
of categories of personnel are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Analysis of opinion concerning replacement of management boards, 
function of personnel category 
 
Total Executives 
Specialist 
doctor 
Primary 
doctor 
Resident 
doctor 
Other 
category 
Statistics 
F 
2.09 
(1.066) 
1.96 
(1.126) 
1.83 
(0.991) 
2.29 
(1.144) 
2.22 
(0.832) 
1.40 
(0.699) 
3.63 
(0.003) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Histogram of data series for variable SSS  
 for executives 
 
Distribution of answers for doctors holding managerial 
positions is given in fig. 2. For this particular category of 
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personnel, dispersion of answers is the following: 15.6% didn’t 
answer the question; 43.8% consider that they never knew a case of 
replacement of an executive for political reasons; 9.4% considered 
that such changes happened sometimes; 21.9% considered such 
changes are frequent; 9.4% considered that replacement of mana-
gement boards on political criteria is the general rule. Distribution 
of answers to questions of section 4.3 is given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3  
(%) 
 No ans-wer 
There is 
no 
corruption 
Corruption 
exists, but is 
not significant 
Moderate 
level of 
corruption 
High level 
of corrup-
tion 
Corruption 
is general 
in the 
system 
1.Education 3.9 2.5 21.4 41.5 20.1 10.6 
2. Public health 3.4 1.7 20.9 36.6 25.6 11.8 
3. Political parties 4.2 1.2 2.0 9.8 36.6 46.2 
4. Public 
administration  
4.2 1.2 4.4 14.7 46.4 29.0 
5. Corruption in 
your institution 
5.4 17.0 37.6 24.1 10.8 5.2 
 
Table 4  
 (%) 
 No answer 
There 
were no 
changes 
Changes 
were 
moderate 
Changes 
were 
significant 
Changes 
were 
important 
Changes 
were 
essential 
1. Management 
of public health 
system. in 
general lines 
5.9 21.4 42.3 18.7 7.9 3.9 
2. System of 
remuneration of 
personnel in 
public health 
6.1 45.9 40.3 5.4 1.7 0.5 
3. Budgetary 
management in 
the institution 
7.1 39.1 41.5 9.1 2.7 0.5 
4. Management 
of services within 
the institution 
7.1 39.3 39.8 10.3 2.2 1.2 
5. Employment of 
personnel 7.1 47.2 35.1 6.9 1.5 2.2 
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 Levels of corruption for various sectors, in the opinion of 
doctors working in the public health system is given in Table 5. 
Only those questionnaires which gave valid answers to the 5 
questions were taken into consideration in data processing, that is 
375 valid answers, as follows. 
 
Table 5 
Levels of corruption for sectors of activities 
Education Health Political activities 
Public 
administration 
Institution 
where he/she 
is employed 
3.16 
(0.975) 
3.28 
(0.992) 
4.29 
(0.840) 
4.02 
(0.866) 
2.47 
(1.081) 
 * Figures in round brackets beneath represent the square standard 
deviation. 
 
For ensuring comparability of data obtained by our analysis, 
with data used by Transparency International - Corruption 
Perception Index, we used the following transformation of data: 
 
Index of corruption (TI) = 2(5 – Index of corruption)  [3] 
 
A low value for TI index means a high level of corruption 
within the system. The domain of values of this index is from 1 to 
10. When processing the data, we should bear in mind that for year 
2007, corruption level in Romania, measured by the methodology 
proposed by Transparency International is 3.7, which means that 
Romania is on place 30, in European countries. The reliability 
interval for these figures is (3,4  4,1). In a world wide 
classification, Romania is on place 69. 
If we made the above transformation, we obtained results in 
the table below, for each sector of activity considered. 
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Table 6 
Levels of corruption on Transparency International scale 
Education Health Political Public Administration 
Institution 
where he/she 
works 
3.78 3.44 1.42 1.96 5.06 
 
Index of corruption, calculated considering data collected 
from the sample under survey, presents the following 
characteristics: 
• Value of corruption index, calculated as an average of the 
aggregated variable COR, defined as shown in application [2], 
equals to 3.23, and the standard deviation is 0.759. For calculating 
the medium level were used the results of the questionnaires, 375 
of them giving valid answers to all 5 questions that described 
variables. 
• Index of corruption, calculated after transformation [3] 
equals to 3.52, value that can be placed in the range of confidence 
of the Index of Corruption Perception, calculated according to the 
methodology used by Transparency International.  
• Distribution of corrupted activities, defined by the data 
series of the variable COR, is symetric. 
• Figures show significant disparities between the 
distribution curves of variable COR (see graphs in figure [3]). 
Quite similar profiles are scored for series of data in public 
education and public health system, and administration and 
political domain, respectively. As a matter of fact, for health and 
education systems, and public administration and political 
activities, value scored by the processing are almost equal. 
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Fig. 4. Distribution of data series for variable COR 
 
Analysis of corruption perception for groups of persons 
defined according to various criteria of classification leads to the 
following conclusions: 
• Corruption perception differs for various groups of 
doctors, defined function of their sex, male or female. Male 
population considers lower levels of corruption than female 
population. Results scored for the two groups interviewed (doctors 
- men; doctors – women) are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Indices of corruption for groups of doctors (men; women) 
 Men Women Total of population Statistics F 
COR 
(second 
relation) 
3.11 
(0.876) 
3.29 
(0.690) 
3.23 
(0.759) 
3.23 
(0.03) 
Index of 
corruption (TI) 
3.78 3.42 3.52 - 
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• For groups of doctors described function of other criteria 
(age, category of personnel, and university degree) there are no 
significant differences on perception of corruption facts.  
4.3. Factors leading to lowering corruption levels 
4.3.1. Defining aggregated variable of 1st degree 
For estimating which factors contribute to maintaining 
corruption within the system, our questionnaire included five 
questions, for section 4.4. The following five factors are taken into 
consideration: the legal framework (A25_1); the system of 
remuneration (A25_2); the pressure put on the profession by the 
environment (A25_3); the pressure put on the profession by the 
political system (A25_4); the behaviour of the patients (A25_5).  
An important component of studies on corruption is to 
identify those factors that maintain corrupted activities within the 
public health system, and the measuring of their proportion.  
For measuring the opinion of doctors on the influence played 
by each of these five factors in propagating corruption within the 
public health system, we used a measuring scale in five steps, as 
follows: 1 is given when the factor considered has a major 
influence in propagating corruption within the system; 2 is given if 
the factor considered has a quite important influence in 
propagating corruption; 3 is given if the influence of the factor is 
moderate; 4 is given when the factor considered has very little 
influence on propagating corruption throughout the system; 5 is 
given when the factor considered has no influence at all, on 
propagating corrupted activities throughout the system.  
Our study took into consideration only these 5 factors, for 
the following reasons:  
- Specialized studies in the field consider that these factors 
are the most important, in evaluating corruption within a public 
health system;  
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- The same factors are used in evaluating institutions and 
for public education. Under these circumstances, results obtained 
can be compared for each domain of activity. 
For a global analysis of the influence played by these factors 
in fighting corruption, we defined variable FLC (factor fighting 
corruption), on the basis of the following application: 
 
]5,1[: →PFLC , ).5_25,...,1_25( iii AAEFLC =       [4] 
 
An important aspect in analysing corruption facts is the 
perception of its progress in the lapse of a given governance 
period, or the comparison made between corruption levels for two 
governance periods. While analysing corrupted activities, we took 
into account the fact that index of corruption shows the way in 
which corruption is perceived by a certain population or by a 
profession. Level of corruption perceived by a person is based on 
the person’s experience, in the society where he/she is living and 
working, but also this perception can be modified by factors such 
as: the media, the behaviour of responsible political representatives 
of organizations fighting corruption and ensuring social justice, 
and so on.  
Our questionnaire included two questions measuring perception 
of doctors on corruption levels in their profession, in the most recent 
period (question of section 4.5) and their opinion on corruption after 
Romania’s integration in the EU (question of section 4.6).  
On the basis of answers to these two questions, we 
considered two primary variable symbolized by ECU and CPA. 
These two variables were defined on the basis applications below: 
 
]5,1[:, →PCPAECU                 [5] 
 
For measuring the two primary variables, we used a 
measuring scale in five steps, as follows: value 1 is given if the 
people interviewed consider the level of corruption has 
increased/will increase significantly; value 2 is given if the person 
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considers corruption has increased/will increase; value 3 is given if 
the person considers corruption hasn’t changed essentially/will not 
change essentially; value 4 is given if the person considers 
corruption level has decreased moderately/will decrease 
moderately; value 5 is given if the person considers level of 
corruption has decreased significantly/will decrease significantly.  
Institutions such as media, schools and educational system, 
the Church, can play an important roll in augmenting or decreasing 
corruption levels within a society. Because of this reason, our 
questionnaire included in section 4.7, six questions that measure 
the opinion of doctors on a few factors that could reduce levels of 
corruption, in the last period of time. Therefore, our study took into 
consideration the following elements: Media (A24_1); Schools 
(A24_2); the Church (A24_3); the political parties (A24_4); Civil 
servants  (A24_5); Citizens, when they are patients for the medical 
care (A24_6).  
For measuring the opinion of doctors interviewed, on the 
role played by each of the six elements in reducing levels of 
corruption, we used a measuring scale in five steps, defined as 
follow: 1 is given if the factor analysed plays a negative role in 
fighting corruption; 2 is given if the factor analysed has a 
moderately negative role in fighting corruption; 3 if the factor 
considered has no influence in reducing corruption in the system; 4 
if the factor considered has a moderately positive role in fighting 
corruption; 5 if the factor considered has a positive role in fighting 
corruption.  
In order to define an overall assessment of the role played by 
all the 6 elements mentioned above in reducing corruption levels 
(RCO,) we defined the variable RCO, based on the application 
below: 
 
]5,1[: →PRCO , ).6_24,...,1_24( iii AAERCO =  [6] 
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An average value of this parameter higher than 4 on our 
scale, proves an active role of the elements mentioned above in 
reducing corruption levels. 
4.3.2. Descriptive analysis of data series 
Factors influencing corruption 
There is no a general model of facts causing corruption to 
appear, and the contribution of various factors to making 
corruption appear differs very much from one field to another. For 
the public health system, we took into consideration five important 
factors.  
A first major factor is the legislation and the legal standards 
of the medical profession, which allow corruption to appear at all 
levels of the hierarchy in the public health system. Lack of 
consistency and confusion in the legislation allow for developing 
corrupted mechanisms in the Ministry of Public Health, in 
agencies, hospitals and departmental health care institutions.  
An important element in maintaining corruption in a public 
system is the lack of a motivation system for the profession, and 
especially the poor quality of remuneration of the medical 
profession.  
The pressure put by the economic environment and by the 
political environment are also important factors that cause 
corruption to appear at all levels of the public health system. 
Among the most important channels propagating corruption 
throughout the system, caused by the above mentioned two factors, 
we mention: biased competition between providers of medical 
services, allocation of public funds only in certain preferred 
directions of health-care programmes, promotion of personnel on 
executive positions, and so on. 
Another important element connected especially to 
corruption in hospitals, dispensaries and health centres is the habit 
of offering presents to medical personnel and, in our case, the fact 
that some questionnaires do not answer the question regarding 
satisfaction degree of personnel interviewed.  
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Table 8 presents relative frequencies of answers referring to 
contribution made by these elements to augmenting corruption in 
the public health system. The questions do not focus on corrupted 
events occurring at a given level of the system; for the five 
distributions we made estimations on indices that measure the 
average level of corruption, the variance, the asymmetry and the 
leveling of the curves. Values scored on the basis of our data are 
presented in Table 9. For each particular case we also specified the 
number of values in the data series. 
Table 8 
Distribution of answers on contribution of factors that allow 
corruption occurrence (%) 
 No answer 
At a 
large 
extent 
Quite 
much 
Modera
te 
Insignific
ant 
Not at 
all Total 
1.Legal 
framework 
5.7 22.9 18.2 25.3 20.4 7.5 100.0 
2. Remune-
ration system 
2.9 64.9 21.6 6.6 2.2 1.7 100.0 
3. Pressures 
put by the 
economic 
environment 
5.4 
33.7 29.2 19.9 9.3 2.5 
100.0 
4. Pressures 
put by the 
political system  
6.4 
24.6 22.1 20.6 19.4 6.9 
100.0 
5. Behaviour of 
patients 
4.9 16.7 19.4 26.8 20.9 11.3 100.0 
 
Table 9 
Distribution of answers on contribution of some institutions in 
reducing corruption levels (%) 
 No answer Negative 
Moderately 
negative 
No 
influence 
Moderately 
positive Positive Total 
1. Media 3.2 12.3 9.8 17.9 44.5 12.3 100.0 
2. Schools 3.4 5.4 5.7 38.3 35.4 11.8 100.0 
3. Church 3.9 4.2 3.7 50.1 26.3 11.8 100.0 
4. Political 
representatives 
3.2 42.8 25.6 10.6 9.8 8.1 100.0 
5. Representatives 
of the 
Government/civil 
servants 
3.2 
34.6 29.0 12.8 11.8 8.6 
100.0 
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Table 10  
Characteristics of distributions of factors contributing  
to corruption occurrence 
Variable Number  of observations Average 
Standard 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
A25_1 384 2.70 1.271 0.101 -1.092 
A25_2 395 1.50 0.859 2.056 4.375 
A25_3 385 2.13 1.087 0.694 -0.344 
A25_4 381 2.59 1.275 0.246 -1.096 
A25_5 387 2.90 1.264 0.015 -1.003 
 
For the global analysis of the role played by the five factors 
in contributing to augmenting corruption in the public health 
system, we defined the aggregated variable of first degree, FLC, 
based on formula [4]. After processing data series defined for this 
variable, we obtained the following results: 
• The histogram of data series is presented in Figure 6.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Distribution of values for variable FLC 
 
• Indices calculated for measuring distribution of the data 
series are given in Table 11. 
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Table 11 
Indices calculated for defining the distribution of data series FLC 
Number of 
cases Average 
Standard 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
371 2.38 0.701 0.276 0.239 
 
We applied the student test in order to find out if the average 
level of variable FLC differs in a significant way from 2, 
respectively 3. The values of statistics t-Student equal to -17.10 
respectively 10.39 (0.00) prove this, and consequently, we can see 
that factors taken into consideration have a major contribution to 
increasing corruption in the system. Among these factors, the most 
important is the remuneration system of doctors working in the 
public health system and the pressures put on it by the economic 
environment and by the political environment. The other factors 
taken into consideration by our statistics have a more than 
moderate contribution to increasing corruption of the system. Also, 
the behaviour of the patients has its role in allowing corruption 
throughout the system  
• When analyzing group of doctors defined function of 
their sex, male/female, age of the person, category of personnel 
and university degree, there are no significant differences on 
perception of the factors inducing corruption through the system.  
 
Elements contributing to reducing corruption levels 
Table 12 
Characteristics of distributions for factors contributing to corruption 
occurrence 
Variable Number of observations Average 
Standard 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
A28_1 394 3.36 1.205 -0.716 -0.477 
A28_2 393 3.44 0.973 -0.541 0.401 
A28_3 391 3.39 0.908 -0.219 0.634 
A28_4 394 2.12 1.304 0.963 -0.285 
A28_5 394 2.28 1.304 0.763 -0.594 
A28_6 394 2.90 1.179 0.029 -0.972 
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Fig. 7. Contribution of factors to reducing corruption levels 
 
Results in Table 12 and Figure 7 prove the following: 
• Three institutions, schools, the media and the Church 
really contribute to reducing corruption within a society. The 
averages obtained for variable FLC, for the three institutions under 
survey differ significantly from value 3.  
• The behaviour of the political representatives and of civil 
sevants has a moderately negative influence on reducing corruption 
levels within the system. We must specify that the average value 
calculated for the political class differs significantly from 2 (value 
of statistics t-Student is 3.79, for a significant difference of 0.00).  
• The behaviour of citizens, when they become patients of 
health care institutions, cannot influence the trends of corruption in 
a significant way. Under these circumstances, the citizen as such 
either loses, when corruption increases, or is well treated, when 
corruption levels decrease. 
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Fig. 9. Opinion of doctors on corruption trends in the last period of time 
and after integration to EU 
 
For the two variables ECU and CPA that we used for 
measuring the opinion of doctors in the last period, and in the 
period after Romania’s integration to EU, we calculated average 
values. For interpreting the two values, we must take into account 
the measuring scale used for defining the two variables. The 
following lines show a series of characteristics of the two 
variables. Our study used only the 388 questionnaires that gave 
valid answers to the two questions asked:  
• The average level of the two variables considered is: 2.72 
(the standard deviation is 0.887) for ECU and 3.26 (standard 
deviation of 0.843) for variable CPA. The two variables differ 
significantly of 3. Under the circumstances, we can conclude that 
lately, corruption increased moderately, and for the next period of 
time, it will decrease moderately; 
• The linear coefficient of correlation, calculated for the 
two data series corresponding to each variable, equals to 0.638 and 
differs significantly from 0, for a significant difference of 0.01.  
No  
answer 
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Chapter 5 
 
Simultaneous Equations Models 
used in the Study of some Issues Related  
to the Corruption and Performance of Services 
in the Public Health System 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Reform of public health is a complex and lengthy process, 
which involves different types of institutions and individuals. 
During the transition, actions undertaken by all governments have 
pursued solving the current problems and not to define a new 
philosophy of the public health system. Under these circumstances, 
public health system has become expensive and often 
nonfunctional. Not a few times, inefficient solutions have been 
chosen for solving problems in the health system, both in terms of 
professional, but also economically. The networks of health 
services providers from Romania, currently do not respond to most 
needs to improve the health of the population. 
In the past eighteen years, a series of measures have been 
undertaken to decentralize the system and to the privatization of 
medical services. However, currently we assist to a fragmentation 
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of the system, which emphasize the inequality in the distribution of 
medical personnel and a reduction of it to certain types of medical 
services. We note that the number of doctors per capita in the rural 
area is now only 20% of those in urban areas. Another major 
shortcoming is related to the financing and linking it with the 
strategies of decentralization. Not a few times, decentralization 
appeared as a way of placement of the tasks from the central level 
to local administrations. 
5.2. Model definition 
General Presentation 
In the economic literature there are a number of applications 
of the simultaneous equations models for the analysis of the 
phenomena in the social field, under the condition that estimates of 
the parameters are obtained using data series from the application of 
statistical surveys. We mention in this regard (Kaufmann, 2002), 
(Bai and Wei, 2000), (Kaufmann, et al., 1999), (Andrei, 2008), etc. 
For example, the last paper quoted defines a simultaneous equations 
model for the analysis of some phenomena at the level of public 
administration. By this model four important aspects of the 
functioning of public administration are analyzed: the performance 
of institutions of central and local administration, corruption, 
transparency of decisions and satisfaction of employees.  
The major problem using simultaneous equations models, 
which use data from a sample, is related to the definition of the 
instrumental variables list used in estimating the model parameters 
by applying the two stages least squares method. We point out that 
in the economic literature there is no uniform approach in choosing 
the list of instrumental variables in the simultaneous equations 
models used to analyze certain aspects of public administration 
(Bai and Wei, 2000) and (Kaufmann et al., 1999). 
In the following, starting from a set of assumptions, we 
define the equations of the simultaneous equations model used to 
analyze some important issues related to the progress of the reform 
process in the public health system.  
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Model assumptions 
For the simultaneous equations model used to analyze the 
process of reform of the public health system we will take into 
account a series of working hypotheses, defined as follows. 
Hypothesis 1. The perception of the reform by the medical 
staff with higher education in the public health system is viewed 
from the perspective of the following aspects: quality system of 
funding public health system, measures taken to reform the 
medical institutions, the quality of the decentralization of the health 
system, the characteristics of the medicines procurement system 
and the quality of employment and promotion of staff in the public 
health system.  
Hypothesis 2.  The reform process in the public health 
system will determine, in an average time horizon, changes in 
national policy of public health system viewed from the 
perspective of increasing the volume of public expenditure for 
health, the policy of national programs carried out by the health 
ministry and the increase of the transparency in the usage of public 
funds for compensate and free drugs in the primary medicine. 
Hypothesis 3. The reform process should support measures 
increasing the public health education to prevent illness and 
aggravation of a disease. 
Hypothesis 4.  The results of the reform process are perceived 
by reducing the level of the corruption in the public health system. 
Hypothesis 5.  The process of reform should be transparent. 
Hypothesis 6.  Statistical data used to estimate the model 
parameters are obtained from the application of a questionnaire to 
statistical medical personnel sample. 
 
Model equations 
The models equations are defined using the above 
assumptions and the structure of the questionnaire applied to 
medical personnel. 
The first equation describes the quality of reform in the 
public health system (RSS) depending on various characteristics 
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which are grouped as follows: characteristics of the functioning of 
the institutions, such as the quality of the factors affecting the 
achievement of a quality medical act (CF) and the assessment of 
the institution and employees (CSE); ministry transparency in 
making decisions related to the progress of the reform process 
(TMS); ministry policies in the field (PDS); health education of the 
population (ESP); personal characteristics of the person 
interviewed, including the gender, age and category of medical 
staff. Personal characteristics are defined on the basis of variable 
vector VP. We define the first equation as follows: 
11 ),,,,,( ε+= VPESPPDSTMSCSECFfRSS                          [1] 
The 1ε  variable is uncorrelated with explanatory variables in 
the regression model, being homoscedastic. The 1f  function is a 
linear combination of explanatory variables. Under these 
conditions the regression model used to analyze the quality of the 
process of reform in the public health system is defined as follows: 
iiiiii ESPaPDSaTMSaCSEaCFaaRSS 1543210 ε+++++++= VPa7  
[2] 
 
where 7a is a line vector with the three elements, and VP  is 
a column vector with three elements. 
The second equation estimates the role played by different 
factors in increasing the transparency of decisions in the public 
health system (TMS). Moreover, the increase of the decisions 
transparency plays an important role in the progress of the reform 
process. The second equation of the model analyzes the influence 
of some factors in the public health decisions on transparency in 
the system. The following factors are taken into consideration: 
factors related to ministry policy in the field (PDS); the quality of 
the reform process (RSS); the level of corruption at the national 
level (COR); a series of personal characteristics of the person, such 
as the gender, age and category of staff (VP). The second equation 
is: 
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22 ),,,( ε+= VPCORRSSPDSfTMS                                       [3] 
The 2ε  variable is uncorrelated with explanatory variables in 
the regression model, being homoscedastic. The 2f  function is 
defined as a linear combination of explanatory variables. The 
regression model for the analysis of the quality of the reform 
process in the public health system is defined based on the 
relationship below: 
iiiii CORbRSSbPDSbbTMS 243210 ε+++++= VPb               [4] 
 
where 4b  is a line vector with the three elements, and VP is 
a column vector column with three elements. 
The third equation estimates the influence of some factors 
from the public health system in increasing health education of the 
population. In defining this equation we start from the fact that 
optimizing the costs of health is not possible without direct 
participation of the beneficiary who is the citizen. Under these 
conditions, to obtain positive results and a sustainable development 
a national strategy is necessary to ensure public health education to 
prevent illness and aggravation of a disease, to request a new 
medical check at the end of medical treatment, etc. 
This equation examines the health education of the 
population (ESP) depending on various factors, such as factors 
related to direct the behavior of patients, including a number of 
variables, such as the frequency of the application of a new 
medical control at the end of a period of treatment (PCS) and the 
extent to which people give sufficient importance to their health 
(PAC); factors related to the accessibility of the citizens to the 
primary, secondary and tertiary health care (ACS); factors related 
to decisions of the management of the Ministry of Health regarding 
education programs for the health of the population: the 
contribution of institutions such as Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Education, medical units, the media, to the development of the 
health education and prevention of illnesses among the population 
(DPE); the usefulness of the development of health education and 
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prevention programs among the population (UDP). The third 
equation is: 
33 ),,,,( ε+= UDPDPEACSPACPCSfESP                             [5] 
 
The 3ε  variable is uncorrelated with explanatory variables in 
the regression model, being homoscedastic. The 3f  function is 
defined as a linear combination of explanatory variables. The 
regression model for the analysis of the quality of the reform 
process in the public health system is defined based on the 
relationship below: 
iiiii UDPcDPEcACScPACcPCSccESP 3543210 ε++++++=          [6] 
 
The fourth equation.  The corruption and nonacademic 
behavior from the public system in general and in the public health 
system  in particular have an important contribution in the 
implementation of the reform process in the system and in the 
improving the quality of the medical act. This equation estimates 
the contribution of some factors in reducing the corruption (COR), 
such as the features of the reform process (RSS); the system for 
evaluating the quality of services (CSE); the transparency of the 
decisions, the accessibility of citizens to health care (TMS); 
changing based on the political criteria of the management 
personnel (SCP); the satisfaction level of the medical personnel 
(GSM); personal characteristics of the interviewed person ( VP ). 
The fourth equation is: 
44 ),,,,,( ε+= VPGSMSCPTMSCSERSSfCOR                      [7] 
 
The variable 4ε  is uncorrelated with explanatory variables in 
the regression model, being homoscedastic.  The 3f  function is 
defined as a linear combination of explanatory variables. In these 
circumstances, the regression model is defined as: 
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iiiii GSMdSCPdTMSdCSEdRSSddCOR 46543210 ε+++++++= VPd
[8] 
 
6d  is a line vector with three parameters and VP  is a 
column vector for the three variables used to evaluate certain 
personal characteristics. 
5.3. Simultaneous equations model for the reform 
process 
The general form 
The simultaneous equations model is defined is the structural 
form as follows: 
iii εCxBy =+                                                               [9] 
where residuum vector has a normal repartition 
,,...,1),( GiNi =→ Ω0,ε  and Ω  matrix is defined as: 
11 12 1
21 22 2
1 2
G
G
G G GG
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥Ω = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
L
L
L L L L
L
 
  
The equations defined in our model rises a number of 
important issues from the public health system: 
• quality of the reform of the system and its implications 
on the quality of medical services offered to citizens;  
• the government policy in the health system and its 
implications on the development on medium and long term of the 
system; 
• the level of the health education of the population in the 
prevention of illness and aggravation of a disease;  
• the level of the  nonacademic behavior in the public 
health system and its implications on the progress of the reform 
process and the quality of medical services offered to citizens. 
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For the estimates of the model parameters we used series of 
data form a statistical sample. The features of this sample are 
presented in the following. 
 
Data sample 
For data collection we used a two stage poll. The first stage 
was represented by public health units from Bucharest (hospitals, 
health centers, polyclinics) who were treated as primary sampling 
units. The second stage was represented by doctors in each primary 
sampling unit. 
The representative sample from Bucharest consisted in 407 
people, and the survey results are guaranteed with a 95% 
probability in circumstances where there is an error of 
representative ness of ± 2.5%. 
The sample was divided in three categories of staff, as 
family doctors - 75, doctors in hospitals - 279 and doctors in 
polyclinics - 53. 
The period of recording the information in the sample was 
about 2 weeks, these weeks being in June 2007. Thus the 
comparability of such responses from the individuals included in 
the sample was ensured, meaning that during this period were not 
taken any major decisions at the Ministry of Health to change the 
opinion of respondents, while most people were present at the 
workplace. 
During the research we designed a questionnaire which was 
structured according to eight themes presented in Table 1. For each 
theme of the analysis the number of primary variables is specified 
in the table below. Based on the 52 questions in the questionnaire, 
of which 49 have been closed, were set 177 primary variables. 
Using primary characteristics a series of aggregated characteristics 
have been defined to be used in the simultaneous equations model. 
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Table 1 
Primary and aggregated variables grouped on themes 
No. The theme 
The number of 
primary 
variables 
The number of 
aggregated 
variables 
1. General issues concerning the reform of 
the public health system 
41 14 
2. Ministry policy in this area 18 5 
3. Health education of the population 18 4 
4. The analysis of  the nonacademic 
behavior 
24 7 
5. The research capacity of the public health 
system 
24 2 
6. Characteristics of current activities 6 2 
7. Personal aspects 32 1 
8. General data 14 - 
9.  Total 177 35 
 
For questions definition of the questionnaire we took into 
account the following issues: the reform measures undertaken by 
the ministry on health reform, the European models used in the 
field of performance analysis for public health systems; application 
of the questionnaire developed in a first form at a pilot stage; the 
definition of the responses to closed questions on the basis of scale 
of measurement correctly specified. Table 2 gives the variables 
used in the model. 
Table 2 
Synthetic description of the aggregated variables used for the 
simultaneous equations model 
No. Code Aggregated variable description 
Primary 
variable 
number. 
 
 
1. 
 
 
RSS 
The variable is defined to measure the medical staff opinion on the 
quality of reform in the public health viewed from the perspective of 
six components: system funding, procurement of medicines, the 
process of decentralization, the employment and promotion of staff 
with medium and higher medical studies and reform measures 
applied to the units in which they are employed. Range of values: 1 - 
very poor, 2, 3, 4, 5-very good. 
 
 
6 
2. CF Measures the quality of the factors that contribute to a good quality 
medical act in the public health units. Range of values: 1-very poor, 2, 
3, 4, 5 - very good. 
5 
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3. CSE Estimates the quality of the assessment system of health services 
provided to beneficiaries.  
Range of values: 1 - unsatisfactory, 2, 3, 4 - very good. 
3 
4. TMS It is an aggregate variable used to estimate the ministry transparency 
in decision-making in the reform process. Range of values: 1 - 
unsatisfactory, 2, 3, 4 - very good. 
2 
5. PDS Aggregated variable used to asses the quality of government policy in 
the field of public health from the perspective of the volume of public 
expenditure health, the quality of national health programs run by the 
ministry and the transparency of funds usage for compensated and 
free medicines in primary medicine. Range of values: 1 - 
unsatisfactory, 2, 3, 4 - very good. 
3 
6. ESP Aggregated variable used to measure the level of public health 
education to prevent illness and aggravation of a disease. Range of 
values: 1 - most people do not give importance to prevent the 
occurrence or aggravation of a disease, 2, 3, 4, 5 - most of the people 
give importance to this. 
2 
7. COR Aggregated variable used to measure the level of corruption at the 
national level in the opinion of medical staff with higher education. 
Range of values: 1 - there is no corruption, 2, 3, 4, 5 - there is 
generalized corruption. 
5 
8. PCS Quantifies to what extent patients who have followed a treatment 
requires a new specialized consulting. Range of values: 1 - a small 
part of them, 2, 3, 4, 5 - with few exceptions, all patients. 
2 
9. PAC Variable used for an overall assessment of the extent to which people 
give sufficient importance to their health. Range of values: 1 - do not 
give sufficient importance to their health, 2, 3, 4, 5 - give great 
importance to health. 
2 
10. ACS Quantifies what is the degree of accessibility of the citizen  primary, 
secondary and tertiary health care. Range of values:1- reduced 
accessibility, 2, 3, 4, 5 – high degree of accessibility 
3 
11. DPE Aggregated variable used for an overall assessment of the 
contribution of public institutions to develop programs of health 
education and prevention of illnesses among the population. Range of 
values: 1 - unsatisfactory, 2, 3, 4 - very good. 
4 
12. UDP Primary variable used to assess the usefulness of health education 
programs and prevention among the population. Range of values: 1 - 
are not useful, 2, 3, 4, 5 - are very useful. 
1 
13. SCP Primary variable used to assess to what extent the political change of 
management personnel on political criteria. Range of values: 1 – 
changes in the leadership have not been made based on political 
changes, 2, 3, 4 - changing the technical staff  on political criteria of is 
a practice. 
1 
14. GSM Aggregated variable defined to assess the satisfaction degree of the 
medical personnel. Range of values: 1 - are not happy at all, 2, 3, 4, 5 
- fully satisfied 
5 
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The models’ equations and variables 
Taking into account the manner of the definition of each 
variable and the series of data available we define the equations of 
the simultaneous equations model as: 
1. Regression models’ equations: 
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
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⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
++++
+++++=
+
+++++=
+++
++++=
+++
++++++=
iiii
iiii
i
iiii
iiii
iiii
iiii
iiiii
PERcANIcGENcGSMc
SCPcTMScCSEcRSSccCOR
UDPc
DPEcACScPACcPCSccESP
PERCANIcGENc
CORcRSScPDSccTMS
PERcANIcGENc
ESPcPDScTMScCSEcCFccRSS
4
3
2
1
)31()30()29()28(
)27()26()25()24()23(
)22(
)21()20()19()18()17(
)16()15()14(
)13()12()11()10(
)9()8()7(
)6()5()4()3()2()1(
ε
ε
ε
ε
             
[10] 
 
In the above model, GEN is a variable for the gender of the 
person, ANI for the age of the person and PER for the category of 
staff.  All other variables are presented in Table 2. 
2. The four residual variables satisfy the assumptions made 
for the structural form of simultaneous equations model. 
3. The variables of the simultaneous equations model are 
divided into endogenous and exogenous, according to Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Endogenous and exogenous variables of the simultaneous equations 
model 
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables 
RSS, TMS, ESP, COR CF, CSE, PDS, GEN, ANI, PER, PCS, PAC, ACS, DPE, 
UDP, SCP, GSM, CSE 
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Hausman test 
If the estimates of the models parameters is made using the 
two stage least squares method, the list of instrumental variables 
plays a unique role. In these circumstances the analysis of the 
exogenousness of the models’ variables represents an important 
step. An important tool in this approach is the Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978). The aim of this test is to verify the effectiveness 
and consistency of the estimators. In this sense there are defined 
the following two assumptions. 
The first is the case when the list of instrumental variables is 
properly specified. The estimators for the parameter obtained by 
OLS, denoted by ,ˆ 0β  is efficient and consistent. In this case the 
explanatory variables in the regression model uXβy +=  are not 
correlated with residual variables, so that 0Xu, =)cov(:0H . 
In the second case, the list of instrumental variables is not 
properly specified. The estimator for the parameter β  obtained by 
OLS, denoted by ,ˆ1β  is effective and inconsistent. Residual 
variables are correlated with one or more explanatory variables, so 
that 0Xu, ≠)cov(:1H . 
The difference between the two estimators is  01 ˆˆˆ ββd −=  and 
the Hausman test statistics is: 
)(ˆ))ˆvar()ˆ(var(ˆ 2101 rH χ→−′= − dββd                                   [11] 
 
where r  is the number of the endogenous variables from the 
list of the explicative variables, thus of the variables riX i ,...,1, =  
that  satisfies .0),cov( ≠iXu  
If the statistics is greater than a predefined value, then null 
hypothesis is rejected, considering that in this case the second 
estimator gives more appropriate results. 
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5.4.  Parameter estimates 
We present the following parameters estimates for the above 
defined simultaneous equations model obtained by EVIEWS 
procedures. By applying Hausman test we compare the results for 
the simultaneous equations model for cases in which the 
parameters are estimated by the least squares method (OLS) and 
the two stages least square method (TSLS). 
 
RSS equation 
Any reform is a complex and lengthy process. At the system 
level there are a number of factors acting to carry out in good 
conditions, but there are a number of other factors that reduce the 
effectiveness of measures to reform the system. To analyze the 
characteristics of the reform process we propose a regression 
model without free term, with eight-explanatory variables. 
Parameters estimates are achieved through the least squares 
method (the results are presented in Table 4), in which case it is 
considered that all explanatory variables are exogenous, and the 
two stages least squares method, in which a series of explanatory 
variables are likely to be endogenous nature. To compare if the 
results are significant different between the two approaches we 
recourse to the Hausman test. 
Table 4 
Regression model [2] features 
Dependant variable: RSS 
Explanatory 
variables Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
T-student statistics 
and the significance 
threshold 
CF 0,309 0,035 8.784 (0,000) 
CSE 0,017 0,042 0,406 (0,635) 
TMS 0,041 0,040 1,010 (0,313) 
PDS 0,393 0,058 6,746 (0,000) 
ESP 0,141 0,035 4,024 (0,000) 
GEN  - 0,027 0,050 0,539 (0,590) 
ANI 0,047 0,023 2.074 (0,039) 
PER - 0,042  0,026 1.649 (0,100) 
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The results from the above table emphasize the existence of 
three categories of explanatory variables included in the model: 
(1) First there are the variables that explain with certainty the 
quality of the process of reform in the public health system. Included 
here are: the quality of the factors that compete to achieve a good 
quality medical act - CF, the quality of government policy in the 
public health system - PDS, the quality of the assessment system of 
the health services – ESP, the age of person interviewed - ANI.  
(2) The second category includes a number of variables that 
are likely to explain RSS. We include here the transparency of the 
decisions in the health system - TMS and the category of medical 
staff - PER. 
(3) The third category is represented by variables that can not 
explain this structure of the RSS model. We include here the 
gender of the interviewed person - GEN and the quality of the 
evaluation system of health services provided to beneficiaries – 
CSE. 
The results from the application of the two methods to the 
situation in which the RSS is explained in terms of explanatory 
variables CF, PDS, ESP, ANI and TMS are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
RSS regression model on the following variables: CF, PDS, ESP, TMS 
and ANI 
Dependant variable: RSS 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Square sum 
1897,9 
117,7 
2015,6 
Degrees of 
freedom 
5 
402 
407 
Observations number      
407 
F                         
1296,9 
Prob>F                    
0,000 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Standard deviation 
T-student statistics and 
level of significance 
CF 0,336 0,029 11,490 (0,000) 
PDS 0,407 0,058 7,051 (0,000) 
ESP 0,170 0,033 5,208 (0,000) 
ANI 0,055 0,022 2,470 (0,014) 
TMS 0,045 0,040 1,112 (0,260) 
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After applying the method of the two stages least squares to 
estimate the parameters of regression model we obtained the 
results below. 
 
Table 6 
RSS regression model on the following variables:  
CF, PDS, ESP, TMS and ANI 
Dependant variable: RSS 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Square sum 
1871,4 
134,3 
2005,7 
Degrees of 
freedom 
5 
402 
407 
Observations number     
407 
F                     
11120,5 
Prob>F                
0,000 
Explanatory 
variables Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
T-student statistics and 
the level of significance 
CF 0,463 0,136 3,408 (0,001) 
PDS 0,549 0,299 1,836 (0,067) 
ESP 0,178 0,070 2,536 (0,012) 
ANI -0,094 0,128 -0,736 (0,462) 
TMS -0,058 0,102 -0,572 (0,568) 
Instrumental 
variables list 
CF, CSE, PDS, ANI, PER, PCS, PAC, ACS, DPE, UDP, SCP, 
GSM, CSE, COR, FLC, RCO, GSM, FMM 
 
To determine if there are significant differences between the 
two results we applied the Hausman statistics test based on 
equation [11]. Hausman statistics test value equal to 25.8 shows 
that there are significant differences between the two categories of 
estimates. In these circumstances, the results presented in Table 6 
are validated. 
 
TMS equation 
Ensuring transparency in carrying out decisions during the 
reform process in any field of activity is an important factor for its 
success. To analyze the transparency of the health system we take 
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into consideration factors related to characteristics of the reform 
process, the quality of government policy on health, the level of 
corruption and nonacademic behavior inside the system, and 
personal characteristics such as age, staff category, etc.  We 
present in the table below the results from the OLS estimates of the 
parameters model used for analyzing TMS variable: 
 
Table 7 
Regression model [4] characteristics 
Dependant variable: TMS 
Explanatory 
variables Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
T-student statistics and the  
significance threshold 
PDS 0,758 0,067 11,359 (0,000) 
RSS 0,131 0,053  2,468 (0,014) 
COR 0,045 0,032  1,412 (0,159) 
GEN 0,043 0,066  0,645 (0,520) 
ANI 0,018 0,028  0,623 (0,533) 
PER 0,013 0,033  0,396 (0,692) 
 
These results show three categories of  factors: 
(1) First there are the variables which certainly explain the 
transparency of decisions in the public health. We include here the 
quality of government policy in health system - PDS and the 
quality of reform in the public health - RSS. 
(2) The second category includes a variable COR - 
corruption in the system, which is likely to be included in the 
model with a large extent. 
(3) In the third category we include a number of variables 
which does not explain the transparency of decisions on the 
system. In this category there are personal characteristics of the 
medical staff included in the sample: the gender of the interviewed 
person - GEN, the age of the person - ANI and the category of the 
staff - PER. 
The second regression model is defined solely on the basis 
of the explanatory variables of the first and second categories of 
variables defined above. In the table below we show the 
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characteristics of this model for the case when the parameters 
estimates are achieved through the least squares. 
 
Table 8 
TMS regression model depending on PDS, RSS and COR 
Dependant variable: TMS 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares sum 
1131,4 
270,2 
1401,6 
Degrees of 
freedom 
3 
404 
407 
Observations 
number      407 
F                   
563.86 
Prob>F              
0,000 
Explanatory 
variables Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
T-student statistics 
and the level of 
significance 
PDS 0,764 0,066    11,562  (0,002) 
RSS 0,160 0,047      3,395  (0,001) 
COR 0,068 0,024      2,896  (0,004) 
 
After applying the two stage least squares method to 
estimate the parameters of regression model to obtain the results 
below. 
 
Table 9 
TMS regression model depending on PDS, RSS and COR 
Dependant variable: TMS 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares sum 
1131,4 
270,2 
1401,6 
Degrees of 
freedom 
3 
404 
407 
Observations 
number      407 
F                   
563.86 
Prob>F              
0,000 
Explanatory 
variables Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
T-student statistics 
and the level of 
significance 
PDS 1,672 0,537    3,111  (0,0020) 
RSS -0,372 0,383   -0,971  (0,332) 
COR 0,024 0,072    0,332  (0,740) 
Instrumental 
variables  
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Using the Hausman test, whose statistics is calculated on the 
basis of the relationship [11], we determined if between the two 
estimates are significant differences. We mention that the results 
presented in the last two tables show a number of significant 
differences. If in the first case all the three variables are significant 
in defining the model, in the second case we found out that the 
parameters that correspond to the variables RSS and COR are not 
significantly different from zero. Hausman statistics value equal to 
5.28, indicates that between the two categories of estimates there 
are significant differences. These results confirm the endogenous 
character of the variables RSS and COR. 
 
ESP Equation 
An important aspect of increasing the efficiency of using 
financial, material and human resources in the public health system 
is to improve the health education of the population. Therefore, in 
the reform process of the public health system an important issue 
should be the development of programs that increase health 
education of the population and illnesses prevention among the 
population. To analyze the variable used to measure the level of 
health education of the population we made use of a regression 
model with a series of explanatory variables that refer to attention 
given by population to the health (PAC), the practice of patients to 
ask for a new medical investigation at the end a period of treatment 
(PCS), the extent to which different institutions or organizations 
are involved in developing programs for health education among 
the population (DPE), the accessibility of public healthcare 
services (ACS) and the usefulness of these types of programs 
(UDP). 
The table below shows the results from the application of the 
least squares method to estimate the models’ parameters defined 
above for the analysis of the variable used to measure the level of 
health education of the population (ESP). 
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Table 10 
ESP regression model characteristics 
Dependant variable: ESP 
Explanatory 
variables Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
T-student statistics and 
the level of  significance 
PCS 0,084 0,038 2,200 (0,028) 
 PAC 0,520 0,046 11,188 (0,000) 
ACS 0,040 0,035 1,123 (0,262) 
DPE 0,204 0,045 4,513 (0,000) 
UDP 0,009 0,025 0,373 (0,709) 
 
Results from the table 10 show three categories of 
explanatory variables included in the model: 
(1) First there are the variables that certainly explain the 
level of health education of the population. Variables included here 
are CAP, DPE and PCS. 
(2) The second category includes a variable that is likely to 
be included in the model - ACS. 
(3) The third category includes the UDP variable that does 
not explain the health education of the population. 
The results obtained by the application of the two methods to 
the situation in which the ESP is explained in terms of explanatory 
variables CF, PDS, FSP, ANI and TMS are presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 
ESP regression model depending on PCS, PAC, ACS and DPE 
Dependant variable: ESP 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares sum 
1834,2 
167,0 
2001,2 
Degrees of 
freedom 
4 
4032 
407 
Observations number      
407 
F                      
1106,3 
Prob>F                 
0,000 
Explanatory 
variables Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
T-student statistics and 
the level of significance 
PCS 0,086 0,038 2,288 (0,023) 
  PAC 0,523 0,046 11,437 (0,000) 
ACS 0,046 0,031 15,467 (0,110) 
DPE 0,207 0,044 4,718 (0,000) 
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After applying the two stages least squares method to 
estimate the parameters of regression model we obtained the 
results presented in Table 12. 
Table 12  
ESP regression model depending on PCS, PAC, ACS and DPE 
Dependant variable: ESP 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares 
sum 
1871,4 
134,3 
2005,7 
Degrees of 
freedom 
5 
402 
407 
Observations number     
407 
F                     
11120,5 
Prob>F                
0,000 
Explanatory 
variables Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation 
T-student statistics and 
the level of significance 
PCS -0,079 0,123 -0,648 (0,517) 
  PAC 1,025 0,460 2,228 (0,026) 
ACS -0,132 0,237 -0,557 (0,578) 
DPE 0,021 0,137 0,151 (0,880) 
Instrumental 
variables CF, CSE, PDS, ANI, PER, UDP 
 
Table 12 shows inconclusive results for this model if the 
parameters were estimated by the two stages least square. 
 
COR Equation 
The quality of the reform in the public health system directly 
affects the nonacademic behavior and the corruption in the system. 
The existence of mechanisms that generate corruption in the 
system is a brake on the progress of the reform process. The 
regression model without the free term presented here evidence a 
number of factors which directly influence corruption in the 
system. To define the model we envisaged results from the 
descriptive analysis of the data series on corruption and intensity 
factors acting to reduce it. We took into account a number of 
factors, such as: the defective or incorrectly applied legal 
framework, the wages of medical personnel that encourage the 
nonacademic behavior, the pressure from the political and 
economic environment, the behavior of the patients, etc. 
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Table 13 shows the results from the application of the least 
squares method for the estimates of the parameters of the model 
used to analyze the COR variable which is defined by [8]. 
 
Table 13 
Regression model [8] characteristics 
Dependant variable: COR 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares 
sum 
43917,20 
386,96 
4778,16 
Degrees of 
freedom 
8 
399 
407 
Observations number      
407 
F                      
566,0 
Prob>F                 
0,000 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Standard deviation 
T-student statistics and 
the level of significance 
RSS -0,028 0,079 -0,354 (0,725) 
CSE 0,029 0,071 0,415 (0,679) 
TMS 0,125 0,064 1,939 (0,053) 
SCP 0,186 0,061 3,043 (0,002) 
GSM 0,758 0,091 8,357 (0,000) 
GEN 0,061 0,043 1,418 (0,157) 
ANI 0,155 0,049 3,195 (0,002) 
PER 0,320 0,040 8,021 (0,000) 
 
The results from table 13 show three categories of 
explanatory variables included in the model: 
(1) First are the variables TMS, SCP, GSM, ANI and PER 
whose parameters significantly differ from zero in the regression 
model defined above. 
(2) The second category includes the variable GEN which is 
likely to be included in the model. 
(3) The third category includes variables RSS and CSE 
whose parameters do not significantly differ from zero in the 
current regression model. 
The results from the application of the two methods to the 
situation in which the RSS is explained in terms of explanatory 
variables TMS, SCP, GSM, GEN, ANI, PER are presented in 
Tables 14 and 15. 
 
The Corruption. An Economic and Social Analysis 
 
138 
Table 14 
Regression model COR depending  
on TMS, SCP, GSM, GEN, ANI, PER 
Dependant variable: COR 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares 
sum 
4390,9 
387,2 
4778,1 
Degrees of 
freedom 
6 
401 
407 
Observations number      407 
F                                   747,9 
Prob>F                         0,000 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Standard deviation 
T-student statistics and the 
level of significance 
TMS 0,123 0,060 2,040 (0,042) 
SCP 0,320 0,040 8,043 (0,000) 
GSM 0,187 0,053 3,556 (0,000) 
GEN 0,761 0,088 8,615 (0,014) 
ANI 0,060 0,042 1,413 (0,150) 
PER 0,154 0,048 3,188 (0,002) 
 
After applying the two stages least squares method to 
estimate the parameters of regression model we obtained the 
results presented in Table 15. 
 
Table 15 
Regression model COR depending  
on TMS, SCP, GSM, GEN, ANI, PER 
Dependant variable: COR 
Source model 
characteristics 
Regressors 
Residuum 
Total 
Squares 
sum 
4365,8 
1200,7 
5566,5 
Degrees of 
freedom 
6 
401 
407 
Observations number      407 
F                                   243,0 
Prob>F                         0,000 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Standard deviation 
T-student statistics and the 
level of significance 
TMS 0,369 0,253 1,459 (0,001) 
SCP 0,612 0,235 2,607 (0,009) 
GSM 0,384 0,313 1,226 (0,221) 
GEN 1,802 1,037 1,738 (0,083) 
ANI -1,085 0,477 -2,272 (0,024) 
PER 0,062 0,469 -0,132 (0,895) 
Instrumental variables 
list RSS, CF, CSE, PDS, ESP, PCS, DPE, FMM, ACS 
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To determine if the two results are significant different, we 
calculated the Hausman statistics test on the basis of the relation 
[11]. Hausman statistics value equal to 9.86 indicates that between 
the two categories of estimates there are significant differences. 
5.5.  Conclusions 
Starting from a set of assumptions, we define the equations 
of the simultaneous equations model used to analyze some 
important issues related to the progress of the reform process in the 
public health system. 
The equations defined in our model rise a number of 
important issues from the public health system: 
• quality of the reform of the system and its implications 
on the quality of medical services offered to citizens;  
• the government policy in the health system and its 
implications on the development on medium and long term of the 
system; 
• the level of the health education of the population in the 
prevention of illness and aggravation of a disease;  
• the level of the  nonacademic behavior in the public 
health system and its implications on the progress of the reform 
process and the quality of medical services offered to citizens. 
By applying Hausman test we compare the results for the 
simultaneous equations model for cases in which the parameters 
are estimated by the least squares method (OLS) and the two stages 
least square method (TSLS). 
For the first equation, that describes the quality of the reform 
process, the Hausman statistics test value equal to 25.8 shows that 
there are significant differences between the two categories of 
estimates. In these circumstances, the results presented in Table 6 
are validated. 
For the second equation, the one that describes the 
transparency of the decisions in the reform process, after we 
estimated the parameters using OLS and TSLS we computed the 
Hausman statistics test value which is equal to 5.28. The results 
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indicate that between the two categories of estimates there are 
significant differences. These results confirm the endogenous 
character of the variables RSS and COR. 
To analyze the variable used to measure the level of health 
education of the population we made use of a regression model 
with a series of explanatory variables that refer to attention given 
by population to the health (PAC), the practice of patients to ask 
for a new medical investigation at the end a period of treatment 
(PCS), the extent to which different institutions or organizations 
are involved in developing programs for health education among 
the population (DPE), the accessibility of public healthcare 
services (ACS) and the usefulness of these types of programs 
(UDP). The results obtained in this case shows inconclusive results 
for this model if the parameters were estimated by the two stages 
least square. 
To define the equation describing corruption and 
nonacademic behavior influence we envisaged results from a 
descriptive analysis of data series on corruption and intensity 
factors acting to reduce it. In this case too, we estimated the 
parameters by OLS and TSLS methods and Hausman test statistics 
calculated on the basis relation [11]. Hausman statistics value equal 
to 9.86, indicates that between the two categories of estimates there 
are significant differences. 
 
References 
 
1. Alesina A., Perotti R., “The Politics of Economic Growth”, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Working Paper, No. 4341, Cambridge, 1993. 
2. Andrei T., Bourbonnais, R., “Econometrie”, Editura Economica, Bucureşti, 
2008. 
3. Andrei, T., Matei, A., Rosca, I., “Corupţia - o abordare socio-
economică”, Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2008. 
4. Baltagi, B.H., “Econometrics”, 4th Edition, Springer, 2008. 
Chapter 5 
 
141 
5. Bardhan P., “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No.  3, 1997. 
6. Emerson, M., P., “Corruption and industrial dualism in less developed 
countries”, The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 
2002, pp. 63-76. 
7. Gupta S., Luiz de Mello, Sharan R., “Corruption and Military Spending”, 
European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 17, 2001, pp. 749-777. 
8. Hausman, J., „Specific Tests in Econometrics”, Econometrica, 46, 1978. 
9. Lambsdorff, J. G., “Transparency International Corruption Index. Responding 
to the Challenges of Corruption”, Act of the International Conference, Milan, 
19-20 November 1999, pp. 257-277. 
10. McCabe, D.L, Trevino, L.K., “Individual and contextual influences of academic 
dishonesty”,  Research in Higher Education, 38, 1997, pp. 379-353.  
11. McCabe, D.L., and Trevino, L.K., “Academic dishonesty: Honor codes and 
other contextual influences”, Journal of Higher Education,  65, 1993,  
pp. 520-538.  
12. Mauro P., “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, 
no. 3, 1995. 
13. Mauro P., “La corruption: causes, conséquences et recommendations”, 
Finance et developpement, volume 35, no. 1, mars, 1998. 
14. Pulvers, K., & Diekhoff, G.M.  “The relationship between academic dishonesty 
and college classroom environment”, Research in Higher Education, 40, 
1999, pp. 487-498. 
15. Rumyantseva, N. L., “Taxonomy of Corruption in Higher Education”, Peabody 
Journal of Education, 80(1), 2005, pp. 81-92. 
16. Rumyantseva, N. L. “Higher Education in Kazakhstan: The Issue of 
Corruption.” International Higher Education, 37, 2004, pp. 24-25. 
17. Schleifer, A., & Vishny, R., “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 59, 
1993, pp. 599-617. 
18. Teodorescu, D., Andrei, T., “Faculty and peer influences on academic 
integrity: college cheating in Romania”, Higher Education, accepted, to be 
published, 2009. 
The Corruption. An Economic and Social Analysis 
 
142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
A Model of Social  
and Economic Analysis of Corruption 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The study starts, on one hand, from the statement 
unanimously accepted, that corruption exists in all societies, 
and on the other hand, from the preoccupations existent in the 
international literature about proving scientifically the models 
of analysis of corruption and determining on this basis some 
relevant corruption indicators. 
In essence, the study focuses on the sphere of the theoretical 
preoccupations, trying to offer an interpretation based on extended 
social and economic analysis that structures and describes the 
mechanisms of a genuine system of the corruption actions. Most 
frequently, corruption occurs in the common public-private 
activities and it has determinations in the central or local 
governmental structures. The binom corruption - anticorruption has 
its origin in distinct social actions, with different actors and 
different logic constructions, aiming to destroy or strengthen the 
systems of public integrity. 
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In the context of the theoretical approaches, this study 
presents for exemplification relevant aspects concerning social 
perception on corruption and comparisons of the situations in 
Romania with those in Central and Eastern Europe or the states 
newly acceded in the European Union. 
The study aims a new way for approaching the nonlinear 
relationship between political stability/instability and corruption. 
An extended space is granted to the model of corruption market, 
conditions of balance within its framework, as well as the intrinsic 
link with the political stability/instability. 
As it is conceived, the study enables the enlargement of the 
theoretical and empirical researches concerning the corruption 
phenomena. 
6.2. Premises of the model 
Our approach starts from the necessity to enlarge and 
diversify the instruments and methods for corruption analysis. The 
specialized literature and the reports of various organizations with 
preoccupations in the fight against corruption reveal the systemic 
feature of the corruption activities. Herewith, we refer to an open 
system, with profound social, economic and political connections. 
The dynamics of the system under discussion has got specific 
determinations and developments for each country, embracing 
sophisticated forms that, sometimes reach to have the dimension of 
a governmental policy. 
The social reality has identified a series of methods for the 
fight against corruption, transposed in good practices, whose 
application depends essentially of the public integrity systems from 
each country.   
“While there is no blueprint for an effective system to 
prevent corruption and for the fight against corruption, there is a 
growing international consensus as to salient features of 
anticorruption systems that work with best results. “ 1 
                                                          
1 “National Integrity System. Romania 2005”, (Country Study), 
www.transparency.org.ro, p. 2.  
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6.2.1.   Social and political determinations 
The studies on social perception concerning corruption have 
extended in the latest years, getting more professionalism and 
broader scope. 
The areas and institutions most affected by corruption 
remain the political parties (4.0), parliaments (3.7), police (3.6), 
and judiciary (3.5). 2 
The overwhelming majority (45) from the 69 countries 
surveyed, confirmed this reality. The points inscribed near each 
area are on a scale from 1 to 5.5, meaning that for the respective 
areas the qualificative “extremely corrupt” is significant. 
The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)3, initiated in 2002 
by Transparency International reflects the fact that “the country to 
which belongs the respondent is more relevant for the answers 
given concerning the corruption level”4. 
From this perspective, our study will focus on the situation 
in Romania, trying to state adequate judgments, based on the 
consideration that a series of conclusions are relevant also for 
another country. 
In Romania, the perception is that the most corrupt sectors 
are those of political parties and customs system, followed by 
judiciary, legislature, police and medical system (Appendix 1). 
The eventual progress in the anticorruption activities is not 
yet reflected in the public opinion. 
For Romania, the conclusions concerning the perspectives of 
the next three years are as follows:5 
9 37% of the population believes that corruption has 
increased and only 19% that it has decreased, and 34% have 
perceived no difference; 
                                                          
2 Transparency International, “Global Corruption Barometer 2005”, p. 6. 
3 www.transparency.org/policy_reaserch/surveys_indices 
4 Transparency International, “Report on the Transparency International Global 
Corruption Barometer 2005”, p. 2,  
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb 
5 Idem, p. 4. 
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9 At least one third from the respondents expresses the 
opinion that the situation will improve. However, 36% do not 
believe that the corruption level will change during the next three 
years; 
9 It is maintained the perception that the bribery prevails 
and at least 11% of the respondents answered that they had to offer 
bribe during the last year. The estimated level of the bribe for the 
members of a family in the last 12 months is of 56 USD, equivalent 
to 154 USD related to the purchasing power of 2003.6 
6.2.2. The National Integrity Systems: Corruption profile 
In Transparency International (TI) conception, the National 
Integrity Systems (NIS) comprise “key institutions, laws and 
practices (the ‘pillars”) that contribute to integrity, transparency 
and accountability in a society. “ 7 
The perspectives of the analysis and modeling the corruption 
phenomena, aimed by our study, are supported by the country 
studies that provide both an overview on NIS, the indicators for 
measuring the subsequent progresses from those countries, as well 
as a basis of comparisons among states. 
The above mentioned country study asserts: “when it 
functions correctly, NIS fights against corruption as part of a 
broader fight against the abuse of power, breaking the law and 
fraud under all its forms”. 
Referring to Romania, the country study in 2005 reconfirms 
a profile, somehow improved related to the previous years, but it 
remains the perception of “endemic and systemic corruption at 
almost all institutional levels”.8 
According to TI evaluations, Romania recorded in 1997 a 
corruption index of 3.47, in the following years registered a 
                                                          
6 Indicators of Online Development of the World Bank, http://publications. 
worldbank.org/WDI/. 
7 “National Integrity System.  Country Study. Romania 2005, Transparency 
International Romania, p 1. 
8 Idem, p. 5. 
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negative trend, reaching in 2002 the lowest score of 2.6; afterwards 
it started to increase, reaching in 2005 the score of 3. 
Appendix 2 presents the developments of the TI and GRICS 
(Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot)9 indices.  
Figure 1 presents a more suggestive image about the 
development of TI corruption perception index during 1997-2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ww.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb 
 
Fig. 1. The development of corruption perception  
index during 1997-2005 
 
At the same time, other sources indicate the fact that the 
corruption phenomena persist and amplify a lot above the average 
of other European countries. 
Further the negotiations of accession into the European 
Union, the Government of Romania required in 2000 from the 
World Bank a diagnostic of corruption. The study identified the 
sectors perceived to be the most corrupt: customs, courts and 
prosecutor offices, privitising institutions, ministries etc. 
                                                          
9 http: //info.worldbank.org/governance/khz 2004/indicator_report.asp 
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In 2002, a survey achieved by Gallup shows the fact that the 
Romanians perceive corruption as the most important problem and 
a social illegitimate act. 
The perspective of Romania integration into the European 
Union has determined major reforms in the judiciary aimed to 
make secure its independence. In 2005, the Government of 
Romania adopted a new strategy, a new anticorruption plan, with 
the declared aim to fight against great corruption. 
In the context of the Central and Eastern European countries, 
the comparative situation regarding the corruption perceptions 
index is presented in Figure 2. 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ROMANIA - - 3.44 3.00 3.30 2.90 2.80 2.60 2.80 2.90 3.00 
Bulgaria - - - 2.90 3.30 3.50 3.90 4.00 3.90 4.10 4.00 
Turkey 4.10 3.54 3.21 3.40 3.60 3.80 3.60 3.20 3.10 3.20 3.50 
Poland - 5.57 5.08 4.60 4.20 4.20 4.10 4.00 3.60 3.50 3.40 
Czech 
Republic - 5.37 5.20 4.80 4.60 4.30 3.90 3.70 3.90 4.20 4.30 
Slovak 
Republic - - - 3.90 3.70 3.50 3.70 3.70 3.70 4.00 4.30 
Hungary 4.12 4.86 5.18 5.00 5.20 5.20 5.30 4.90 4.80 4.80 5.00 
Slovenia - - - - 6.00 5.50 5.20 6.00 5.90 6.00 6.10 
Cyprus - - - - - - - - 6.10 5.40 5.70 
Greece 4.04 5.01 5.35 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.20 4.20 4.30 4.30 4.30 
 
Fig. 2. Comparative evolution of the corruption perception index between 
1995 – 2005 for countries of the Central and Eastern Europe 
(Source: http://www.transparency.org.ro/) 
 
From the view point of Romania’s accession to the European 
Union, a significant comparison is presented in Figure 3 – a clear 
reference to the average of old E.U. members, that of the new 
members and of course, of Romania. 
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Fig. 3. Comparative situation Romania – European Union 
of Corruption Perception Index 
(Source: http://www.transparency.org.ro/) 
6.3. The political stability and corruption  
Recent studies have put into discussion and modeled the 
relation between the political stability / instability and corruption. 
The most relevant and usually quoted paper is the one that belongs 
to Campante, F., Chor, D., Do, Q.A. (2005). Using relevant and 
recent information from different countries, the mentioned authors 
manage to show the existence of a non-monotonous relation between 
the political stability/instability and corruption.  
The most comprehensive definition for political stability 
sees the concept in question as “a probability that all in power are 
able to implement their projects on time”10.  
                                                          
10 Campante, R. F., Chor, D., Do, Quoc-Anh, 2005, Instability and the Incentives 
for Corruption, Harvard  University, p. 2. 
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The proposed model emphasizes two effects: 
 the time horizon effect, which stipulates that, during their 
mandate, greater instability generates higher corruption among the 
holders of power; 
 the demand effect, through which the private sector is more 
eager to bribe the politicians who are politically more stable. 
The first effect is predominant for low values of stability, 
while the second prevails in the most stable political regimes. The 
conclusion of the theoretical and practical investigation already 
employed by the mentioned authors, states: corruption is higher at 
low and high levels of stability, and lower, at intermediary levels. 
The above study uses the aggregated corruption perception index 
presented by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004). 
The study of the numeric values and their interpretations 
lead to the idea that there is a variation of corruption in form of a 
U. For the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, and 
especially for Romania, the time frame included between 1990 and 
2005 has emphasized other elements to be taken into account when 
discussing about the political stability/instability.  
In a Romanian perspective, the leading characteristics 
consist of: 
• The persistence of a political instability as an effect of the 
fluidity of the political life and lack of maturity of the political 
options; 
• The existence of electoral cycles for both central and local 
administrations; 
• The alternation in governance of power holders and 
opposition, usually structured from different coalitions, factions or 
parties.  
In this context, the present study proposes a simplified 
model of the evaluation of stability/instability, by means of a 
stability index (IS), calculated for each electoral cycle. The 
elements aggregated in this index are: 
• The probability for the same government to hold the power 
within an electoral cycle. In fact, this probability will be calculated 
indirectly, with the help of a random variable (AS); 
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• The forces ratio between power holders and opposition 
(RF), expressed by a sub-unitary coefficient that stands for the 
number of parliamentary mandates of the opposition / the number 
of parliamentary mandates of the power; 
• The structure of the power, expressed by the number of 
political entities which participate to governance (SP).  
In the attempt to modeling the statements already made for 
the Romanian case, three electoral cycles are to be taken into 
consideration: (1): 1992 – 1996; (2): 1997 – 2000; (3): 2001 – 
2004. The probability to hold the power in these three periods will 
be found in a random variable shaped as follows:  
 
 
 
and the stability index will be given by the expression: 
 
( )1
2
+= nnISi .  ( )ii
i ASM
SP
RF
                           (2) 
 
where  M (AS) is the average of random variable AS. 
 
In Romania’s case11 we will have: 
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11 National Institute of Statistics, Permanent Electoral Authority, Jan. 2005, 
“Electoral statistics. Parliamentary and presidential elections”, Bucharest,  
pp. 24-48. 
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Thus we obtain, 
 
47.0;08.0;29.0 321 === ISISIS             (6) 
 
By correlating the above findings with the data presented in 
Appendix 2, if we consider a medium corruption index, for each 
electoral cycle, we will have relevant images as shown in Figure 4 
and Figure 5. 
 
Fig. 4. The relation between the political stability and corruption  
(using TI index) 
1,3,3
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Fig. 5. The relation between the political stability and corruption  
(using GRICS index) 
 
It was impossible to draw a more pertinent image and closer to 
the reality, due to the lack of some empirical statistical data. In our 
opinion, this new approach to the relation between political stability 
and corruption confirms the results mentioned at the beginning of this 
section. Using them as a starting point, the statistical experimental 
studies may offer also a possible prognosis to the corruption level. A 
more detailed discussion and analysis can be accomplished if we will 
concentrate upon a certain type of corruption. 
6.4. The corruption market 
6.4.1. Introduction 
Regarding the relation between the political stability and 
corruption, other papers also confirm the non-linear character of 
this relation and the fact that “at low or high levels of performance 
of a ruling party or politician, the corruption is more intense, while 
at intermediate levels, is weaker”12. 
                                                          
12 Gamboa – Cavazos, M., Garza-Cantu, V., Salinas, E. (2006), “The Organization 
of Corruption: Political Horizons and Industrial Interests", Harvard University,  
pp. 1-3. 
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Moreover, the above study discovers that the firms that 
accumulate more incomes from their industries are those willing to 
offer more bribery, fact also directly related to the political 
stability. The relation between the corrupted and the corruptor is 
bivalent in the sense that each of the two actors may be an active 
actor. As such, the reality confirms that for instance, in the case of 
the firms in economic decline, the public persons pretend higher 
payments for corruption. In a mutual way, the entrepreneurs have 
the impulse to bribe the civil servants with stable and long term 
political horizons. For them, the supply for corruption is increasing 
both as number and effective value.  
Most of the times, in the relation established between the 
corrupted and the corruptor, negotiation and intermediation usually 
occur under the form of traffic of influence where public or private 
persons are involved.  
As such, we can talk of a corruption market which may 
appear at the interface between the public and private. The 
dimensions of this market differ from one country to other and 
depend on different factors, amongst which we found the ones 
described in the previous sections.  
The corruption market bases itself on several principles to 
which one can add or further detail: 
• The existence of a demand and supply of corruption. 
Usually, goods that are offered or requested are public goods, 
public services, or different forms for facilitating access to the 
ownership of public goods or services (usually described by 
obtaining licenses, approvals, etc.). Even though they do not 
explicitly imply the existence of a market for corruption, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) analyze corruption in the context offered by the 
demand and supply of public goods. They suggest that there is a 
competition between a seller and a buyer which favorites the 
extension of corruption.  
• The mechanisms that regulate the functioning of the 
corruption market  are not legal or visible and generally, refer to 
law imperfections, lack of control from courts and of course, 
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favorable attitude to corrupt or being corrupted adopted by public 
or private persons; 
• In relation to the intensity of the ratio between the 
demand and supply of corruption, there is a price of corruption 
expressed, usually, by bribery. The appearance of such a price 
differs from the one to be found in economic theory and it grounds 
itself upon factors related to economic circumstances, opportunity 
of public interventions, etc., as well as power and political and 
administrative position of the one corrupted.  
The above principles have been taken into account, even 
though, not explicitly, by other authors, as well. We refer here to 
Campante (2005) or Gamboa – Cavazos (2006). 
As in any other market, the actors try to maximize their 
profits. As such, for the offer of corruption where the actor is a 
public person, politician, governmental official, etc., the evaluation 
trend will increase, while for the demand, having as an actor a 
private person, an entrepreneur, owner of private employee, the 
evaluation trend of the opportunity of corruption will decrease.  
6.4.2. The balance of the corruption market 
Starting from a simple analysis of the demand and supply on 
the corruption market, Gamboa – Cavazos (2006) assume linear 
relations between the two, using the price c. So, the mentioned 
authors consider13: 
 For the supply: 
 ( ) ccS δγ +=               (7) 
 For the demand: 
 ( ) ccD βα −=               (8) 
 
where c is the price of corruption and 0,, 〉βαδγ  are 
parameters.  
                                                          
13 Idem, p. 9. 
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The interaction between the demand and supply determines 
the level of balance of corruption and their price (c*), that is: 
δβ
γα
+
−=*c                (9) 
and ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]δβγαδγ +−+= /*cS          (10) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]δβγαβα +−−= /*cD          (11) 
 
Of course, the model formulated by Gamboa – Cavazos is 
simple. However, it allows a certain connection with the political 
stability. Firstly, an observation should be made: from (10) and 
(11), the parameters α and γ  intervene and they are connected to 
the structure of the governmental agencies [Schleifer and Vishny 
(1993), Fredriksson and Svensson (2003), Campante (2005)], while 
the second set, β and δi is connected just to the structure of the 
market where the firms operate [Ades and Di Tella (1999), Laffont 
and N’Guessan (1999)]. Bearing these definitions in mind, we 
continue with an extension of the model of corruption market and 
determination of more complex balance conditions. 
First, we suggest accepting the idea according to which the 
corruption market behaves as a system with self-regulation. The 
analyses made in the previous sections claim this very thing. At the 
same time, the same system represented by the corruption market 
or, better said, the corruption economy records a very high pressure 
coming from the environment; a pressure that varies as degree in 
direct connection to the intensity of the anticorruption measures.  
The economics of corruption represents, in the broad sense, a 
“relation state - society” and it conceives and describes the 
“deviations” from the ideal state that occur as effects of corruption.14 
                                                          
14 Karasulu, A. (2003), “The Economics of Corruption: Causes, Consequences 
and Extent”, Journal of Historical Studies, No. 1 (2003), p. 61.  
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As such, we will presume the existence of more 
opportunities for corruption, n, for each being settled a price, 
respectively, c1,  c2, … ,  cn. 
The line of supply as the line of demand will have vectorial 
expressions, as follows: 
 ( ) cδγcS •+=            (12) 
 
( ) cβαcD •−=            (13) 
where  
 ( ) ( ) ,α,.......,α,αα,γ...γγγ tm21tm21 =>=   
 ( ) ( ) 0β0,δ,ββ,δδ ijij
nj1
m,i1ij
nj1
m,i1ij ≥≥== ≤≤ ≤≤≤≤ ≤≤
     and 
( )tn21 c....,c,cc=  
 
Following the procedure used in determining the balance 
expression (9), we will find a balance condition, of a matrix shape: 
 
( ) γαcδβ * −=•+                          (14) 
 
A qualitative analysis of the relation (14) and its 
interpretation in the light presented in this study lead us to the 
following conclusions: 
1) ( ) 0δβdetn,mγ,α ≠+== , the balance price of corrupttion 
is zero and, practically, the corruption market does not exist. 
2) ( ) 0δβdetn,m,γα ≠+=〉 , there is a system of prices of 
balance for the opportunities for corruption, given by the expression: 
( ) ( )γαδβc 1* −+= −           (15) 
The supply of corruption will be: ( ) ( ) ( )γαδβδγcS 1* −+•+= −          (16) 
and the demand of corruption becomes: ( ) ( ) ( )γαδββαcD 1* −+•−= −         (17) 
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Similar to the interpretations presented in the paper by 
Gamboa – Cavazos (2006), the structure of the market where 
public agents operate will be determined by vectorial parameters: α 
and γ, while the structure of the market where the firms operate 
will be connected to the matrix shaped parameters  β and δ.  
 
3) ( ) mranknm =+〈〉 δβγα ,,  
 
In these conditions, the balance price is not unique and, in 
certain conditions it may raise the problem of determining an 
optimum for the corruption market. 
 
4) ( ) nranknm =+〉〉 δβγα ,,  may appear in non-
balance situations, when there is not a balance price or a unique 
one. The variety of situations that may be taken into account may 
substantiate other types of relations possible to influence the 
corruption market balance.  
6.5. Conclusions 
The social and economic analysis of corruption presents a 
multitude of aspects and approaches, each one closer or not to 
reality, more theoretic or empiric etc. 
As a final conclusion, we may state that undoubtedly a 
corruption market exists, with its own mechanisms, and whose 
legitimacy is not integrally discovered. The methods of social and 
economic analysis can be extended, with the adequate precautions 
also on this market. In fact, the specialized literature raises into 
discussion and achieves the concepts of corruption as well as its 
connections with the material and human development. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Romania: Areas/sectors perceived to be corrupt 
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2004 4.2 4.0 3.8 4.1 2.9 3.7 4.2 3.9 2.5 3.3 2.5 3.4 2.4 2.7 2.2 
Ro
ma
nia
 
2005 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.7 2.4 3.4 3.8 3.6 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.5 2.1 
max 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.3 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.8 3.1 3.6 3.5 3.4 2.7 
min 3.1 2.5 1.9 3.0 2.4 3.0 2.7 2.9 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.4 1.2 2.2 1.6 
Ce
ntr
al&
 
Ea
ste
rn
 E
ur
op
e 
ave-
rage 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.5 2.9 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.3 
max 4.2 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.7 2.7 3.3 3.5 2.9 2.7 3.2 
min 2.7 2.5 1.7 2.0 1.8 2.8 1.8 1.9 2.8 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.7 
W
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n 
 E
ur
op
e 
ave-
rage 3.7 3.3 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.3 2.7 2.7 3.3 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 
2004, 2005 
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Romania: Development of Corruption indicators 
 
      Year 
 
Indicator 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
IT* 
 
- 
 
3.44 
 
3.00 
 
3.30 
 
2.90 
 
2.80 
 
2.60 
 
2.80 
 
2.90 
 
3.00 
 
GRICS** 
 
51.3 
 
- 
 
44.3 
 
- 
 
39.8 
 
- 
 
45.4 
 
- 
 
49.3 
 
- 
Source: *    www. transparency.org.ro 
** http://info.worldbank.org / governance / khz 2004 / 
indicator_report.asp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
The Implications of Corruption  
on the Economic Activities  
and the Public Sector Financing 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Corruption has been throughout the ages a widely spread 
phenomenon of all societies. The global development and 
globalization process have determined a closer analysis of 
corruption from the perspective of its evaluation and its 
consequences on economical and social process and political 
stability of a nation. Known sources have failed to give a unitary 
vision in defining the phenomenon of corruption. Yet, a series of 
aspects regarding this phenomenon has been unanimously 
accepted. The corruption is a phenomenon generated from the 
sphere of governance which appears mainly linked to monopoles 
of a product or service (Kligaard, 1998). Corruption is an abuse of 
civil servants for private advantages (World Bank); corruption that 
not manifest itself solely in the public sector. There has been a 
growing interest of the academic and research environment and 
international organizations (International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank) over the past few years to estimate the level of corruption 
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and underground economy of every nation. Some of the most 
important works on corruption levels in each nation and its 
implications on economic growth are: A. Krueger [1974]1, S. 
Rose–Ackerman [1975]2, P. Mauro [1995]3, P. Bardhan [1997]4, V. 
Tanzi [1998]5, Shang-Jin Wei [2001]6 etc. The effects of the two 
phenomena represent a strong reduction of each nation’s own 
available funds and a reduction in the efficiency of using funds as 
well. In order to evaluate the corruption level of a nation, 
corruption indicators like international risk index for a country,  
calculated within the international country risk guide, based on 
“experts’ opinions”, corruption index calculated within the global 
competitiveness report and the world development report based on 
investigations on companies and citizens, the corruption perception 
index by Transparency International based on several “strong 
objectives or facts7”. Values for the above mentioned indices do 
not offer significant differences. The value of the linear correlation 
coefficient for pairs of data series for nations over one year lies 
over 0.75. 
The calculation of the corruption index of a nation is based 
on the answers of foreign businessmen who have businesses within 
that country. The most important of the indices used in the 
evaluation of the corruption level is Transparency International 
                                                          
1  Krueger, A., The political economy of rent-seeking society, American Economic 
Review, vol. 64, No. 3, June 1974. 
2  Rose-Ackerman, R., The economics of corruption, Journal of Public Economics, 
no. 5617, June 1975. 
3  Mauro, P., Corruption and growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, 
no. 3, 1995. 
4 Bardhan, P., Corruption and development: a review of issues, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 35, no. 3, 1997. 
5 Tanzi, V., Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and 
Cures, IMF, 1998. 
6 Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in economic development: grease and sand?, 
Economic Survey of Europe, no 2, United Nations, 2001. 
7 Shang-Jei Wei, Corruption in Economic Development: Grease or Sand?, 
Economic Survey of Europe, no 2, United Nations, 2001. 
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Corruption Index8 (TICI). The values for this index vary from 1, 
for very corrupted nations, to 10, awarded for a nation which has 
no corruption. There is a strong dependence between the 
Transparency International Corruption Index (TICI) and the 
Human Development Index (HDI). Developed nations recorded 
low levels of corruption whilst for developing nations, corruption 
is a generalized phenomenon for the whole society. For example, 
regarding the data series of the TICI and HDI variables recorded in 
2001 for the world nations, the value of the linear correlation 
coefficient is 0.77. The same index calculated for both data series 
in 2005 is 0.78. 
Underground economy and corruption have existed in 
Central and Eastern European countries before 1989 taking several 
forms. Later transition processes towards a market economy have 
been accompanied by the development of new corruption 
mechanisms and the development of an underground economy. 
The privatization process during transition has determined 
important sources for the growth of corruption and underground 
economy. In 2001 in Romania almost 30%  inhabitants lived in a 
state of poverty.  In the same year, the corruption index places this 
nation within the group of East European countries of the highest 
corruption level.  
In conclusion, “in the poorest nations, even though the 
underground economy has permitted the creation of a certain 
amount of jobs, in view to maintain a certain solidarity and family 
union, their excessive development represents a real hazard for the 
economy and the political system of that nation as well.”9       
                                                          
8  In order to see the calculation of the indicators methodology: Lambsdorff 
Johann Graf, Transparency International Corruption Index, Responding to the 
Challenges of Corruption, Act of the International Conference, Milan, 19-20 
November 1999, pp. 257-277. 
9  Germanangue-Debare, M., Les pieges de l’economie souterraine, Le Courrier 
de l’UNESCO, Juin 1996, pp. 22-24.   
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7.2.  An analysis model of corruption impact 
In macroeconomic studies dedicated to measuring the 
corruption impact on economic and social processes, the use of 
data and statistic analysis methods is inevitable. An efficient tool is 
given by macroeconomic models. Most popular are the models of 
Barro and Levine – Renelt. We will present some aspects of the 
two models as well as several derivate models in which a variable 
has been introduced in order to emphasize the impact of corruption 
on economic growth in general and on some special aspects of the 
economy like the evolution of investments, net exports and so on. 
In this chapter some results obtained from applying the two models 
for evaluating the losses of the economies from the old socialist 
block are presented.  
7.2.1. The general model     
The model developed by R. Barro10 has been used to 
evaluate the losses of the economy of Eastern European countries 
during the period of planned economy. This model starts from the 
equation of economic growth proposed by the American economist 
R. Barro (1991). Within this model,  GDP per capita (GDP_C) is 
determined as a measure of the development level of an economy 
depending on four factors:  
i) The initial level of the index (GDP_CI), showing the  
 initial development level of a nation; 
ii) The primary training coefficient (PT);  
iii) The secondary training coefficient (ST); 
iv) The weight of government expenditure within the GDP  
 (W_G). 
This model gives a growing importance in determining the 
growth rate (second and third variable) and the fourth variable is 
used for control. In IMF simulations, a level of the weight of 
government expenditure within the GDP of 10% has been used.  
                                                          
10  Barro, R., Economic growth in a cross-section of countries, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, vol. 106, pp. 407-443, 1991. 
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The Levine – Renelt model to evaluate the loss of ex-
socialist nations in communist years is an econometric model 
developed by the economists Levine and Renelt (1992). This 
model differs from the first model by considering as a fourth 
variable the weight of investment within the GDP set by default at 
30%.  
Initial models can be used to evaluate the impact of 
corruption on a nation’s economic and social environment, which 
can be defined using the regression model bellow:  
 
Yi = a0 + a1Y0i + a2X’1i + a3Ci + a4X’2i + a5D’i + εi      
 i= 1,….N                     [1] 
 
The following symbols have been used:  
• Yi is a macroeconomic index globally characterizing the 
performance of economic activity of a nation (Gross Domestic 
Product per capita) or some special aspects of economy 
(Investment Volume, Net export per capita and so on). For a 
broader definition of economic and social performance of nations, 
the Human Development Index (HDI) is being used. 
• Y0i represents the initial level of GDP_C. 
• X’1i is a column vector which defines the initial 
characteristics of the human capital (for example, we can include 
here the primary training rate and secondary training rate and  
so on). 
• X’2i is a column vector which defines the characteristics of 
economic policies at national levels (the weight of government 
expenditure within the GDP as in Barro model, the weight of 
investments within the GDP as in Levine – Renelt model and  
so on). 
• Ci is the corruption level of a nation using a certain index 
from the ones introduced above. 
• D’i is a set of dummy variables used to emphasize a series 
of regional characteristics. 
• N represents the number of nations analyzed. 
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Using the above model, the following category of factors on 
economic and social processes of a nation are being shown: initial 
development level, the quality of the human capital of the initial 
period, the quality of decisions concerning economic policy, 
corruption and the regional characteristics defining the position of 
the nation. 
7.2.2. Special models 
Using two regression models based on panel data, the positive 
effects of membership to the E.U. structures are shown from the 
perspective of reduction of corruption. Reducing corruption 
determines a growth in quality of the economic environment and a 
growth of efficiency of public funds. 
The particularities of regression models are linked to the 
following aspects: the dependent variable is the Human 
Development Index (HDI); the variable for measuring corruption 
index is TIC (Transparency International Corruption); estimating 
parameters data from 58 countries; the dummy variable has a value 
of 1 for an EU member and 0 for a non-EU country. Using the 
following regression models, the HDI growth is quantified further 
the reduction of the corruption level. 
The regression model is defined by one of the following 
relations: 
• When defining the model for all countries  
 
HDIi = α0 + α1* ICi + εi                                                                                   [2] 
where: HDI is the Human Development Index, IC is the Corruption 
Index determined by TI11 and εi  → N (0, σ2ε). The parameters of 
this model are estimated for data gathered between 1995 and 2006. 
Results are presented in Table 1, columns 1 and 2. Graphical 
representation for data series of 2 years is shown in Figure 1. 
                                                          
11  Is an index measuring the corruption of a nation perceived by foreign investors. 
It varies between 0 (highest level of corruption) and 10 (lowest level of 
corruption). This index is calculated yearly by Goettingen University and 
Transparency International. 
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of HDI depending on COR 
(IC) for 1995 and 2006 
 
• For emphasizing the influence of EU membership, a 
dummy variable D is introduced. 
HDIi = α0 + α1* ICi + α2 * Di + εi                                                   [3] 
D takes the value 1 for EU membership and 0 for non-EU 
membership. Estimation for the parameters of the two years is 
presented in Table 2, columns 3 and 4. 
Table 2 
Characteristics of the regression models 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 1995 2006 1995 2006 
C *
(0,018)
0,680  *
(0,017)
0,7111  *
(0,017)
0,672  *
(0,016)
0,707  
COR *
(0,028)
0,0280  *
(0,003)
0,0270  *
(0,003)
0,0254  *
(0,003)
0,025  
D   ***
(0,014)
0,039  **
(0,014)
0,035  
R2 0,62  0,64  0,66  0,68  
D-W 1,97  2,1  1,87  1,97  
AIC 3,00−  3,105−  3,100−  3,18−  
 
* α < 0.01;  ** α < 0.02;  *** α < 0.06. 
The Corruption. An Economic and Social Analysis 
 
168 
Conclusions on the above obtained results are as follows: 
• For both periods, a strong correlation between the 
development level of a nation measured by HDI and the corruption 
level can be observed, the linear correlation coefficient calculated 
for both years on the basis of data series takes the values 0.800 and 
0.785. 
• Corruption is weaker in EU countries (the parameter 
corresponding to the dummy variable is positive significantly 
differing from 0). 
• Differences are relatively insignificant in regard to both 
periods if taking into consideration the four regression models and 
the values of the correlation coefficients calculated for data series 
of the same index for both periods. For HDI this value is 0.963 and 
0.932 for IC. 
We present a series of results obtained by estimating the 
above regression parameters for other two intermediate years, 
namely 2000 and 2002. In this case, emphasize is put on the lower 
corruption level of NATO countries which determines a higher 
level of development estimated by HDI. Graphical representations 
in Figure 2 show positive linear dependences between development 
level and corruption level for 78 NATO members. 
Countries with a low level of living standard are 
characterized by a high level of corruption. Results of the 
estimations are being shown in Table 1. The positive non-zero 
value of the α2 = 0.071 estimator shows a positive influence of the 
low corruption level in NATO countries on the development level 
of that nation. 
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Fig. 2.  Graphical representation of HDI depending on COR 
for 2000 and 2002 
 
Table 3 
Characteristics of models M1 and M2. 
Model Free term IC D R2 e’e 
2000 0.485 (0.031) 
0.052 
(0.006) 
0.071** 
(0.0034) 0.78 1.040 
2001 0.461 (0.031) 
0.058 
(0.006) 
0.083* 
(0.044) 0.77 1.051 
* The parameter does not significantly differ from 0 for α = 10%; 
** The parameter significantly differs from 0 for α = 5%; 
 
The corruption level measured by IC for NATO aspiring 
countries is higher in comparison to NATO members. The 
following reasons support this statement: 
1. The mean value of IC index is much lower for aspiring 
countries12 compared to NATO members. Table 2 shows mean 
values of the index for two groups of countries and the average 
level of the national ranking that established nations by their 
corruption level (top position indicating the lowest corruption 
level) for the period 1998 – 2001. 
 
                                                          
12  In the group of aspiring nations, countries have been included for which the 
corruption index has been regularly calculated: Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia and Romania. For Albania the index value for 1999 
was 2.3. 
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Table 4  
Characterization of corruption for the two groups of countries 
1998 1999 2000 2001  
ci r ci r ci r ci r 
7 22 7 22 7 22 7 23 NATO 
membership 7.31* 19.1* 7.35* 18.3*     
Aspiring countries 3.6 54.2 4 52 4 44 4 47 
ci mean value of CI for groups of nations. r mean rank. * if 
excluding the three countries, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic 
which became NATO members in 1999. 
 
2. No country from the group of aspiring countries is 
situated at mean level of the index calculated for NATO countries. 
The lowest corruption level has been measured in Estonia (mean 
value over the four years being equal to 15.7) and Slovenia (5.6). 
Romania has the lowest value of the index of the above nations. 
The mean values are: Lithuania (4.2), Bulgaria (3.6), Croatia (3.4) 
and Slovakia (3.4). 
7.3. Components of the model of cost analysis  
of defence systems 
In this part, the components of the costs of national defence 
systems for new NATO countries are being described. An 
economic approach on the national and regional defence system is 
used as basis in defining the analysis model rather than quantifying 
the cost of the defence system in an accounting manner as the total 
expenditure of the state to meet current demands for military 
equipment. Costs of the defence system are defined in a broader 
sense as economic losses due to instability within the national 
defense system derived from certain disfunctionalities and the lack 
of accession to mid-term and long term viable military structures. 
In the economic literature, studies for evaluating the losses 
due to these disfunctionalities and inadequate function of any 
economic and military system have been made. It is worth to 
mention Barro [1989], Barro [1991], Barro & Lee [1993], Alesina 
& Perotti [1993a], Alesina & Perotti [1994], Gupta [1990], Gupta 
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[2001], Azam [1995], Varoudakis [1995], Levine & Renelt [1992], 
Grigorov [1999] and so on. Equally, the EU enlargement process 
and the process of adaptation of the single currency in some 
Western European states have stimulated several studies for 
evaluating the costs of these processes. The evaluation of economic 
and military costs of any conflict taking place on the territory of a 
country or near its borders is difficult to realize. Yet some 
estimation can be made13. For the estimation of losses during the 
wars of ex-Yugoslavia, a series of studies has been realized, mainly 
by Balls [1999], Lehman Brothers14,  Merrill Lynch15 and so on. 
7.3.1. Cost estimation for the NATO and EU enlargement 
The beginning of Eastern Europe transformations was 
euphoric but soon difficulties began to emerge. While economic 
theories concerning the transition to a market economy based 
capitalist society from the socialist system were well-known, the 
political, economic and academic fields were taken by surprise by 
the radical changes in Eastern Europe. At that time there was no 
coherent theory or another example for the rapid transformation 
from a state economically governed in each country solely by the 
structures of the communist party towards a market economy 
system.  
The economic reformation process of integration in Western 
military structures and EU economic structures has caused and will 
further determine considerable costs. To reach the three goals, 
                                                          
13 The International Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated the costs of the 
main partners which have participated in the most important conflicts of the last 
century, namely World War I – 2850 billion dollars, World War II - 4000 billion  
dollars, Korean War - 340 billion dollars, Iran and Iraq War - 150 billion dollars, 
Gulf War -  102 billion dollars.  
14 The American Bank estimates by using a series of hypotheses that the minimum 
amount spent over one month of military action in Kosovo raised up to three 
billion dollars. 
15 This study estimates a daily cost of military actions of 200 million dollars. It is 
estimated that the cost of military actions in Kosovo raised up to 0.1% of the GDP 
of all NATO members put together. 
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candidate nations need and will further need considerable financial 
support from developed countries. On short term, the costs that are 
being covered by developed countries seem inefficient, but on long 
term the financial support given by the EU and NATO members 
represents an investment in a stable Europe. Looked upon from 
European perspective, taking into account the European 
development model, the integration of some nations or all Central 
and Eastern European Nations in the economic and military 
structures presents considerable advantages. 
If the consolidation of the European model depends greatly 
on the success of the military and political integration, European 
problems are much more complex. That’s why considering that 
Eastern and Central European countries act as a buffer between 
Europe and Russia, we underline the double importance of the 
accession of these countries to economic and military structures in 
the region. The accession to the EU represents a way of improving 
economic performance, by defining in each country economic 
structures that are able to ensure over a long period  the compliance 
with economic performance criteria. 
When elaborating a quantitative model for the evaluation of 
accession costs in NATO structures of nations from the old 
socialist block, an important element is defined by the level of 
economic development of each nation. Implicitly costs of each 
country accession into the EU economic structures and global 
accession costs will be taken into consideration. The costs for 
military accession will be supported only to the amount that each 
country can cover on medium and long term. 
For determining the costs of accession to the EU, several 
different calculation methods have been accepted. 
 For example, in the field of agricultural policies, the 
following estimations on the costs of extending the structural funds 
have been made for member countries of the Visegrad Group, 
Bulgaria and Romania. These estimations are very important 
because agriculture represents a very important sector for these 
countries. For example, in Bulgaria, 22% of the active population 
works in agriculture while 36% in Romania. 
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 Estimation for the cost of Romania and Bulgaria, Visegrad 
Group has been made considering the following hypotheses: 
treatment of these 6 countries on the same level as some cohesion 
countries (Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal). These countries 
received on average a mean value of 212 ECU per capita out of 
which 36 ECU were coming from the cohesion fund. When 
applying this amount on the population of the 6 countries, a  total 
of almost 14.4 billion ECU emerges. This amount is over evaluated 
by comparison to the total activity volume of these countries,  
measured by the GNP (Gross National Product). 
 In this case the ratio between the allocated fund and the 
GNP is 14.8%. The cost covered by the EU is for some countries 
greater than the contribution of this branch to the GNP. Given this 
over evaluation, another hypothesis was used, which took into 
account the distance between the economic performance of the two 
groups of nations. In this situation the allocated fund is reduced by 
2.3% of the GNP. The cost level covered by the EU is 3.2 billion 
ECU,  much lesser than the first scenario. 
7.3.2. The components of the quantitative model  
  for determining accession costs into NATO structures  
  for candidate nations 
The following types of costs have been identified in order to 
build the model for determining the cost of recent NATO 
members: 
• Level I cost (the cost of maintaining a defense system at 
NATO standards); 
• Level II cost (reconverting cost of economic system for  
armament production); 
• Level III cost (cost associated with neutral position or 
non-accession into NATO structures); 
• Level IV cost (neighborhood cost in times of peace). 
Each cost is estimated using an ensemble of factors which 
directly contribute to its definition. The main reasons leading to 
this model definition are as follows:  
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• While a person is living in a “short time”, the positioning 
and development of a nation or an economic region is judged over 
a long period of time. That is why designing a fragile, less costing 
defense system is in present times an added factor of economic and 
social instability for that nation or region on medium or long term. 
• The cost of the defense system has to be approached in a 
global context of national economic stability. Not being a direct 
producer of national wealth, it contributes to it indirectly by 
favourising a stable social and economic environment. 
• In the context of globalization, the national defense 
system contributes both directly and indirectly to the growth of 
opportunities for the integration in the EU economic structures. 
Although Romania has acceded on the 1st of January 2007, the 
integration process will be a long one. 
The security cost is not a simple total of expenses in order to 
keep a functional national defense system but is a broader concept 
with has to be approached economically by looking at the positive 
and negative externalities, propagated in the economy and society. 
Starting from this observation, defense costs of the nations located 
in this region are regarded upon from the point of view of the 
integration process in NATO structures. From this perspective the 
following costs of the defense system of ex-socialist NATO 
members are defined: 
1. Level I cost or the cost of the national defense system in 
this narrow sense. 
2. Level II cost or the cost of the national defense system at 
the level of NATO requirements. 
3. Level III cost or non-accession costs into NATO 
structures. 
4. Level IV cost or economic neighborhood costs with 
Russia covered by NATO members. 
The main aspects regarding the quantification of the four 
cost types are presented. The main difficulty consists in building 
the data series for variables used for characterizing the costs of 
national defense systems. 
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A.  Level I Cost 
Level I cost or in a narrow sense accession costs into NATO 
structures are formed out of all supplement expenditures which 
every country has to cover for adapting its national defense 
systems to Western standards. In order to successfully complete 
this adaptation process, national economies of candidate nations 
have to be stable and viable. Not surprising, the first three nations 
of the old Warsaw Pact which have been accepted as NATO 
members are those with the most advanced economic reforms. 
Moreover, Poland has allocated constantly between 1990 and 2004 
at least 2% of its GDP for the national defense system (excepting 
2000 – 1.9%). 
For example, one of the objectives set by NATO for the 
accession process of Estonia was the allocation of 2% from the 
GDP for military expenditure since 2002. Between 1992 and 2004 
Estonia had allocated from 0.5 to 1.8 % of its GDP for the defense 
budget (excepting 2003 – 1.9%). 
 
Table 5 
 
Percentage of Estonia’s military expenditure from GDP (%) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
0.5 0.8 1 1 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.8 
Source: SIPRI. 
 
In 2004, Estonia’s GDP for 2004 reached 181 mil. US$.  
In the last years, NATO candidates have participated in 
several humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and so on 
along with NATO forces. The expenditures have been mostly 
covered by these nations. For example, for humanitarian operation, 
quoting the National Defense Ministry of Romania, costs are 
estimated at 25-26 million dollars. 
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From the perspective of NATO integration, the level I cost 
of these nations can be calculated as follows:  
CIt = C1t + CS1t * 1Nt              [4] 
where: −1tC  is the actual cost of the national defense system 
in the narrow sense, represented as part of GDP allocated to the 
national defense system, the additional cost is supported by each 
state to adapt to the requirements of NATO and is a binary variable 
that has value 1 if the country is included in the alliance, and 0 
otherwise. 
Current economic systems, especially complex systems, 
depend to a large extent on a set of factors that ensure a climate 
suitable for economic and social conduct of economic processes. 
The National Defense system contributes to economic and social 
processes. For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11 at 
World Trade Center can not be viewed strictly as causing losses, 
but, among others, “can be translated through a decrease of 14.4% 
of shares in a week, and downsizing the activity of transport 
companies, hotels and places of tourism."16 
Given that most countries in recent years included in the 
NATO countries have not found an economic stability, creating a 
viable national defense is an important factor of stability. 
Therefore, in calculating the cost of defense, the effects induced by 
the neighborhood system will be taken into account. If the effects 
of neighborhood integration process are taken into account, than 
the cost of the national defense system is defined in a broad sense 
through the following: 
 
),11(1)( 11 Ntt
N
t
N
ttt
I
t EVEVCSCCE −⋅−⋅−+=                [5] 
where: −ItCE  is the cost of the national defense system in 
the broad sense, as regarded in the light of actual expenditure, and 
the effects propagated on the economic, social, level,  
                                                          
16 James K. Galbraith, The Meaning of a War Economy, Science economique, no. 
2748, 2002, p. 1. 
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N
tEV - neighborhood effects induced in the economy by the 
country's NATO integration and −tEV  neighborhood  effects 
induced in economic and social system by the current national 
defense system. Neighborhood effects17 may be positive, negative 
or neutral. They can be measured by GDP growth in a given 
period. Barro, Levine-Renelt models to be applied subsequently 
quantify losses of former socialist countries during the totalitarian 
system. Andrei’s model quantifies the losses of an unbalanced 
economic - social system on short term. To a certain extent, these 
economic losses can be made on account of the negative effects of 
a national defense system vulnerable to sudden changes at the level 
of civil society. Induced effects in the economy and society by the 
process of joining NATO are observable on short term. For 
example, a series of economic measures to reduce corruption are 
taken. S. Gupta estimated the effects of corruption on the economy 
concerning the military budgets18. 
On short term, It
I
t CCE >  due to additional costs resulting 
from the endowment and reforming the national defense system, 
but on medium and long term, It
I
t CCE < , due to neighborhood 
effects resulting from the inclusion of a country within a modern 
system of defense.  
For most countries that joined NATO, an increase in military 
expenditure is an effort supported by economy, when the 
mechanisms of market economy are far from working properly. 
However, in absolute value, military budgets are below those of the 
period in which these countries were part of the Warsaw Treaty. 
With few exceptions, military budgets for recently acceded 
countries are restricted by the decrease in economic activity. 
                                                          
17 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics, W.W. Norton & Company, New 
York, London, 1993, pp. 546-600. 
18  Gupta, S., Luiz de Mello, Sharan, R., Corruption and Military Spending, 
European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 17, 2001, pp. 749-777. 
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"Ministries of Defense and National Economy have a crucial role 
in building the budgets for defense”.19 
In 1997, Lithuania has allocated to defense 0.8% of GDP, 
while for 1999 it was 1.31%. For both years, most of the budget 
(71.3% in 1997 and 73.6% in 1999) was allocated for operational 
costs. To purchase major equipment 15.0% of the defense budget 
has been allocated for 1997 while for the next year, the allowance 
was 6.4%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Military expenditure per capita  
 (Source of data: Human Development Report 1998, 
Oxford University Press, 1998) 
 
The indicators that can be used to assess each country's 
efforts in national defense: the share of military expenditure in 
GDP and military expenditure per capita. In relation to the second 
indicator, in the hierarchy of the world, the East countries have a 
lower position than developed countries; the value of this indicator 
is, for most countries in this geographical region, almost 20 times 
less compared to USA or France. As shown by Figure 2, even 
among these countries there are significant differences. With the 
exception of Croatia, which recorded higher values than the other 
countries as the country is situated in an area of extreme instability, 
                                                          
19 Background information on the Lithuanian National NATO Integration 
Programme 1999-2000 (NNIP), p. 4. 
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the other countries, have reduced the values of this indicator over 
the past decade. For most countries in Eastern continent, the 
decrease is due to a large extent to reducing GDP, and reducing 
military budgets in the share of GDP. For example, Bulgaria has 
reduced the value of this indicator over a decade, from 250 U.S. $ / 
capita in 1985, to 40 U.S. $ / capita in 1996.  
For Romania and Bulgaria, countries aspiring to integrate into 
NATO in 2002, the development of personnel of national armed 
forces during the period 1988-1999 is different. According to 
SIPRI20 data for the two countries, a chart was drawn in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Total armed forces in Romania and Bulgaria  
 (Data Source: SIPRI) 
 
In 1992, armed forces personnel21 in total employment 
represented 2.3% in Bulgaria, while 1.6% in Romania. Five years 
later, the two countries have reached the same value of the 
indicator, namely 1.9%.  
 
                                                          
20 For all armed forces from the series of data provided by SIPRI and UNDP 
through Human Development Report 2001, 1990 there are significant differences 
for the two countries. For example, for the period 1995-1998, the series of data for 
the two countries, in thousands of persons are: Romania 217 (201.8), 228 (195.9), 
227 (194.45), 220 (194.45), 207 (179.7); Bulgaria 102 (76.2), 104 (77.8), 102 
(75.8), 102 (75.8). In parentheses we find SIPRI value. As remarked, for both 
countries, the values are lower when using SIPRI series. 
21 World Development Indicators, 2001, pp. 294-295 
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To compare the two countries that have military potential 
among acceding countries, an econometric model is built with 
panel data, which aims to explain the development of the budget 
for military expenditures in relation to two important factors: the 
evolution of GDP as a major source for supporting the defense 
system and dynamics of military staff of the two countries during 
1988-1999. In these circumstances, we define the econometric model:            
),0(N2,1i,AFGDPDE 2iititit2it1iit σεεββα →=+⋅+⋅+=  
                  [6] 
 
In order to analyze the dependence between the three 
variables,  the parameters of model [6] are estimated by MCMMP 
(OLS) without free common term, with free common term and 
with the model with fixed effects. Table 6 presents the results. 
 
                                                                                   Table 6 
Model 
 No free 
term 
With common 
free term With fixed effects 
c  
 
 
gdp  
 
af  
 
2R  
 
2
R  
LL test 
 
Fixed effects Bude_  
Rode_  
 
F-test 
- 
 
)64.7(
48.19−  
)25.1(
28.8  
 
770.0  
 
757.0  
1.119−  
 
- 
- 
 
28.60  
)78.114(
*74.129−
)71.7(
04.21−  
)55.1(
34.9  
781.0  
 
760.0  
88.116−  
 
- 
- 
 
24.31  
- 
 
)24.13(
**99.22−  
)9.3(
69.8  
79.0  
 
740.0  
8.116−  
 
51.56−  
1.59  
97.58  
1. The parentheses contain the standard errors for each estimator. 2. The symbol. 
*Marks parameters which do not significantly differ from zero, for a significance 
threshold of 10%.  
**Marks parameters significantly differing from 0, only for a significance 
threshold of 10%. 
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For the first two models we remark that while the reduction 
in GDP led to an appreciable reduction for both countries of 
defense expenditures, maintaining military staff  at certain levels 
led to military budgets at certain levels. According to the parameter 
of the third model with fixed effects, we remark that in the case of 
Romania, it is positive, while in the case of Bulgaria, it is negative. 
 
B.  Level II Cost 
Level II costs are taking into account the transformations in 
the economic system of national defense. These costs are directly 
related to the defense industry in each country. They consist of 
costs related to restructuring and privatization of economic units 
specialized in the production of armament and materials for the 
Army, as a result of agreements and criteria for accession in NATO 
structures. After the end of the Cold War, the armament industry in 
the world has undergone radical transformations. For countries in 
East Europe, level II costs are assessed taking into account:  
- Worldwide, military expenditures continuously decreased 
that implicitly generated major changes in the armament industry. 
These changes were felt even by the great military powers. For 
example, in  the  U.S. during 1987-1994, in  this  industry  around 
1150000 jobs were lost. For an overview concerning the 
importance of sustainability of defense system in promoting  
exports, we present some comparative figures for the USSR and 
U.S., military powers which had before 1990 around 75-80% of 
world armament market. In 1984, the Soviet Union had 26.9% of 
world armament market, while U.S. 22.0%. During 1993-1997 
Russia’s export diminished by 13%, while the U.S. had the 
monopoly of 47%22. According to military experts, the progress in 
military technology held by the U.S. represents 15-20 years in 
relation to all partners or potential opponents;  
- A continuous increase of the cost of weapons systems is 
recorded. Moreover, importers of weapons "will not only buy a 
                                                          
22 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook 1998, 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 294. 
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product but a service, sometimes doubled by security 
guarantees”.23 Countries in this geographical area, in search of 
security guarantees  have reduced substantially export due to new 
requirements in the market for armament and military systems. For 
example, in 1992, the share of exports of weapons in Romania's 
total exports was 0.5%, decreasing in 1997 to 0.1%. During the 
same period, the share of armament  in total imports increased 
from 0.6% to 2.2%. The same trend is observed in the case of 
Bulgaria, for export from 3.1% to 2.4% and import from 0 to 0.2%. 
In the communist period, many developing countries bought 
military equipment from the USSR or the member countries of the 
Warsaw Treaty. 
- The production of military equipment was affected in the 
early 1990s by disappearance of Warsaw Treaty. For example, 
between 1991-1993, the Bulgarian armament industry was in a 
serious recession. This country, during the period of the Treaty, 
was involved primarily in the repair of military material. Slovakia 
recorded a high potential in the military industry during the Cold 
War, but since its production was focused mainly on markets in the 
Middle East, Latin America etc., it has not felt immediately the 
abolishment of Warsaw Treaty. In 1990s Slovakia attempted 
reconversion of the military industry to civil products,  and 
upgraded this industry according to the current requirements. In 
early 1990s, we remark the downsizing  of market in Eastern 
European countries at the same time with the collapse of the 
socialist empire. It is a consequence of the trends in the world: the 
export of armament is done largely by countries which also provide 
an "export" of security. Moreover, countries in Eastern Europe 
became importers of military systems and technology in order to 
adapt to new military requirements. Disappearance of the socialist 
block represented the beginning of a period of reconfiguration of 
the weapons and defense systems. The table below shows the 
volume of import and export of armament for Romania and 
Bulgaria: 
                                                          
23 Ludovic Woets, La defense en Europe, L’Harmattan, 2000, p. 340. 
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Table 7 
Imports and exports of armament of Romania and Bulgaria 
Export of armament 
(mil. US $) 
Import of armament 
(mil. US $) Export-Import  
Romania Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
220 
80 
0 
0 
20 
10 
40 
20 
20 
430 
240 
80 
110 
120 
80 
60 
140 
100 
40 
20 
825 
170 
40 
0 
0 
10 
20 
400 
290 
675 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
150 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
Source: SIPRI; + when export> import, - for contrary situation. 
 
According to SIPRI, during 1990-1996, the import of 
armament exceeds export for the two countries. This is mainly due 
to massive import of armament in 1990, consequence of the tests 
made by the two countries as a result of the unstable situation 
created by the collapse of the socialist system. Throughout the 
period there is a considerable reduction of the export of armament 
for both countries.  
- The status of the defense industry represents the result of 
the transition from centralized economy to market economy. For 
example, Romania has an armament industry of poor quality from 
technical point of view. In the socialist period, Romania, desiring 
to have a certain independence in the Warsaw Treaty, has 
developed its own defense industry. Due to continuous reduction of 
military budget in the transition period, the enterprises producing 
military equipment decreased continuously their activity. 
Moreover, due to downsizing of internal market and relatively 
outdated technology, major difficulties have been encountered 
even in the shift to the civil market. Due to the difficulties of 
transition by reducing the activity or closing  units specialized in 
the production of armament, Romania lost a high quality 
engineering potential. In order to reduce the effects of the 
transition of this sector, Romania concluded agreements of  
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cooperation with foreign companies aimed to repair or upgrade the 
military equipment: Alouettes and Pumas, Manurhin, Matra, etc.;  
- Some Eastern European countries reduced the production 
of armament while the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 
and Slovenia did not have their own armament industry. 
 
C.  Level III Cost 
Level III cost or cost of non accession to the NATO 
structures includes costs supported by each country that is not a 
member of a viable military structure in order to ensure the 
country's defense against a possible attack from abroad, and also to 
propagate peace and social security. Any war in East Europe is 
directly felt by the countries involved, and also indirectly, through 
economic and social levers by  neighboring countries. Equally, 
Western European countries are affected by military costs arising 
from military operations aimed at military conflict management in 
the immediate neighborhood, as well as the economic costs as a 
result of downsizing the economic activity in adjacent areas, etc. In 
this study we present some methodologies for calculating the costs 
incurred by NATO countries in Kosovo war. 
We present some modalities to quantify the losses registered 
by a country, due to the lack of a viable defense system which 
should take into account the realities of this area. Level III costs 
consist of three categories: cost of  conflict situation, cost of 
neighborhood with a conflict area and cost of instability in a 
region.  
The three categories of costs are defined as follows:  
• The costs of conflict situation and the costs of 
neighborhood with a conflict area are the costs incurred by a 
country participating in a conflict or a neighbor to a conflict zone. 
They are costs estimated directly by increasing the defense 
expenditures and diminishing the economic performance. These 
costs are supported by a country situated in an area with military 
conflict. The best known example in order to analyse the 
consequences of war is Yugoslavia. This country, within less than 
ten years, was directly involved in two wars that led to the 
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dismantling in several independent republics as well as to 
decreasing the economic living conditions in Serbia and 
Montenegro. A country with the highest development in Eastern 
Europe, Yugoslavia recorded a considerable recession due to war. 
At the end of the 1980s, Yugoslavia was a medium developed 
country, where average income per person was 4000$ and ten 
years later, the average income was 1500$ per person. Domestic 
and foreign debt of Yugoslavia represents 150% of GNP, "in other 
words Yugoslavia must work more than a year to make debt 
cancellation! According to Dr. Pitic, we have to add between 11 
and 12 billion U.S. dollars in non-reimbursable bonds to foreign 
debt and 16 billion dollars (foreign debt, relatively old)."24 The 
biggest loss for the former Yugoslavia is the territorial 
fragmentation. If at the end of the 1980s, the European Community 
was interested in enlargement towards Yugoslavia.  
• The costs of instability are the economic costs resulting 
from placing the country in a volatile strategic area, not suitable for 
an economic activity. Unlike the first two categories of costs, they 
do not assume a conflict situation in a country or area, but a lack of 
confidence in the economic and financial environment, in an 
economic and military stability on medium and long term. They 
are estimated economically through loss of GDP per capita as a 
result of the perpetuation of instability status in an area, due to the 
inclusion of the country in economic and military systems non-
viable on medium and long term. This cost is difficult to assess, as 
the difference between the achieved and designed level by an 
econometric model will be shared between the various economic 
and extra economic factors, including the military factor. Including 
a country from this area in the structures of NATO was a positive 
signal for the economic and financial environments in view of 
development.  
For all countries in the crisis region, even if not directly 
involved in the hostilities, the experts consider three important 
                                                          
24 Vesna Kostic, L’économie surendettée de la Yougoslavie, Economie 
internationale, no. 2620, 1999, pp. 18-19. 
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mechanisms for transmission, directly or indirectly of negative 
effects of war or instability in this region:  
I) Foreign trade records a significant recession in this region 
through the interruption of economic relations totally or partially 
with the country involved in war or other countries representing a 
transit territory. For example, in the war in Yugoslavia, stopping 
navigation on the Danube due to bombing four bridges resulted in 
significant losses to riparian countries on the economic level.  
II) Local and foreign investments are affected directly. A 
considerable reduction of the volume of foreign investments has 
been recorded as a direct result of increasing country risk. Also the  
costs for the contracting loans from foreign financial markets have 
increased. These costs are even higher as the countries of this 
region are directly involved in the privatization process that 
requires the participation of foreign investors. 
III) The expenditure for defense and public order: due to 
instability, the direct expenditure for maintaining internal and 
external security have increased. For example, further the conflict 
in Kosovo, in Albania there were  365 thousand refugees 
(representing more than 11% of the population of this country), in 
Macedonia - 133 thousand refugees (7%), in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
32 thousand (1%) and in Montenegro - 74 thousand refugees 
(12%). This exodus of people has created economic and social 
problems to countries already  in economic difficulties due to 
transition to market economy.  
The three effects are included in the model by means of the 
variable of external shock. For example, in Yugoslavia, due to 
conflict situation and internal application of economic mechanisms 
specific during 1989-1998, GDP decreased to a half. According to 
expert V. Gligorov25, neighborhood effects were felt in the 
economies of countries in this area. Thus, due to these 
                                                          
25 WIIW, Wiener Institut fur Internationale Wirtschaftvergleich, quoted in Der 
Kosovo-Krieg wirft die gesamte Region  zuruck, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 
19/4/1999. 
Chapter 7 
 
187 
neighborhood effects, GDP reduced by 5% in Bosnia and 
Macedonia, by 2% in Bulgaria and Albania and 1% in Croatia.  
The war in the Balkans represents a reason for reflection in 
countries that are not included in an effective defense system, but, 
equally, for the EU that supports either directly or indirectly a part 
of costs of war in this area. Costs of adjacent countries, estimated 
by macroeconomic indicators are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
 GDP Export Trade deficit Labor 
Cost for 
budget  
(% GDP) 
 
Albania -2 - - -2 - 
Bosnia- 
Herzegovina 
-5 -10 +5 - +5 
Bulgaria -2 -10 +20 -2 +2 
Croatia -1 -10 +10 -1 +2 
Macedonia -5 -15 +20 -2 +2 
Romania -0.5 -2 - - - 
Source: Grigorov and Sundstrom, 1999 
 
The war in the region stressed a number of imbalances in 
these countries, undergoing the process of economic 
transformation.  
If a country in the region is directly involved in conflict, the 
costs are incalculable. For any country in this area, that has not 
solved the economic problem, vital to strengthening the democratic 
system, participation in a war could lead to very high costs. In this 
context we mention a few milestones:  
i) the war can generate and enhance regional ambitions in 
the country, the destruction of significant industrial installations or 
telecommunication and transport system; high costs for 
reconstruction. For example, in the case of Yugoslavia, it is 
estimated for the next five years an amount of 25-30 billion dollars 
for reconstruction, and for the next 15 years, an amount of almost 
90 billion dollars. According to estimates made by G17 group of 
economists, the states of former Yugoslavia can not reach the level 
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of development from 1989 until 2010-2015. The European 
Commission has estimated for the reconstruction of Kosovo, 1 
billion euros per year for three years26.  
The losses on the economic level in times of peace, as a 
result of non accession of a country to a viable military system, are 
estimated by four methods. The first two methods quantify 
economic losses for the countries of the former socialist block in 
the planned economy, the integration of the Warsaw Pact or the 
acceptance of status as neutral economic and military country. 
These methods offer a global cost for the socialist experience over 
two generations. Losses are found in long-term effects of the 
centralized economy, and as a result of artificial operation of the 
Warsaw Pact for the countries in the region. The economic losses 
recorded by Eastern European countries are based on non-variable 
economies, membership to economic and military structures 
(CAER and the Treaty of Warsaw) which did not take into account the 
realities of the  modern world.  
Method I. It is a method based on the equation of economic 
growth,  proposed by U.S. economist R. Barro (1991)27. GDP per 
capita is determined as a measure of economic growth, depending 
on the following four factors: i) the initial level of the indicator as a 
measure of the initial development of the country ii) the rate of 
primary education level; iii) the coefficient of secondary education 
level iv) the share of government expenditure in GDP. This model 
attaches great importance to the human factor in determining the 
rate of growth (second and third variables), and the fourth variable 
is a control one. In the simulation conducted by the IMF a level of 
government expenditure share in GDP of 10% has been taken into 
consideration.  
Method II. It is also an econometric model developed by 
Levine and Renelt economists (1992) which differs from the first 
model by replacing the fourth variable with investment share in 
                                                          
26 Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999, pp 42-43. 
27 Barro, R. Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, vol. 106, no. 2, May. 
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GDP. For this variable a level of investment in GDP of 30% has 
been taken into consideration. It is a model that attaches 
importance to higher investments in the economy. 
 
Table 9 
Losses recorded in the socialist economy measured  
by Barro and Levine-Renelt 
Losses calculated by Barro equation 
 
GDP per capita Number of years 
Number of years lost, 
calculated by Levine-
Renelt equation 
Bulgaria 9 946 26 25 
Czechoslovakia 9 000 15 18 
Poland 9 858 21 24 
Romania 10 537 31 30 
Hungary 9 810 20 21 
The average for 
socialist countries  
9 785 23 24 
The growth rate of Czechoslovakia is calculated as the average of Czech 
Republic and Slovak Republic.  
 
Method III. Estimating the economic losses due to 
subordination of the army to a political structure and artificial 
participation to civil projects. A consequence of this situation is the 
fragility of the economic system, vulnerable to political changes. It 
is valid for most countries in Eastern Europe. For example, in 
Romania, 1990 marked the beginning of a period of pronounced 
economic decline. Only some of these economic losses are 
attributed to the military itself: before 1989 the army subordinated 
to the political system, participated in the creation of economic 
objectives (Palace of the Parliament, Danube - Black Sea Channel, 
etc.) having a direct contribution to the sudden change of political 
system in Romania. 
Using Romania's GDP during 1975 - 198928, the 
econometric equation with trend is represented by: 
)754.31(320.20518.0951.251
)37.7(
1
)237.0()49.156(
=⋅+⋅+= − FtGNPGNP tt         [7] 
                                                          
28 During this period, in Romania, the macroeconomic indicators are calculated in 
the Material Production System. 
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In brackets under each estimator, the standard errors of 
estimators are written. Values of Student statistics, calculated for 
the three estimators show that the three parameters are significantly 
different from zero.  
Table 10 presents the achievements and forecasts based on 
the above estimation for the next two years after the Romanian 
Revolution in 1989: 
Table 10 
Losses of Romania in the first two years after the revolution 
 
tGNP  
(billion. lei) 
[1] 
Anticipation 
]2[  
89/GNPGNPt  
(%) 
80/]1[ GNP  
estim
tt GNPGNP /  
(%) 
]2/[]1[  
1990 755.194 927.80 93.58 81.39 
1991 745.832 976.41 92.54 76.49 
 
The values in the last column of the table show a significant 
decrease of the economic results of the Romanian economy in 
1990 and 1991. The decrease recorded on the economic level 
represents the result of the disruption occurring in a planned 
economy concurrently with the occurrence and development of a 
competitive economic environment. Removing the role of the 
national defense system of Romania from the economic civil 
activities determined directly and indirectly downsizing of 
economic activity in Romania in the first years after revolution. 
The main arguments are as follows:  
i) in the communist period, especially during the 1980s, the 
Army had a strong role in the economy.  
ii) industrial institutions subordinated to civil institutions and  
Ministry of National Defense participated actively in the export of 
Romania, contributing to pay the external debt of Romania during 
the socialist period;  
iii) army participation in the movements in December 1989 
contributed to increased tensions in that period, even if the military 
intervention was welcomed. 
iv) in less developed countries or developing countries the 
army has a major role in sustaining a totalitarian regime; in fact, 
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during the communist period, the army was directly controlled by 
the Communist Party through the party structures from military units.  
Method IV. It is based on the analysis of  rates of growth of 
GDP for Eastern European countries through panel data. In order 
to achieve the model of analysis of the losses arising from the 
inclusion of these countries in economic and military systems, non- 
viable to the modern world requirements, the following issues are 
taken into account: 
1. The artificial character of supranational economic and 
military systems has led to the collapse of the socialist system in a 
short period of several months;  
2. For most countries the disintegration of socialism marked 
the beginning of radical changes on economic, political, military 
and social level;  
3. Yugoslavia, a country neutral economically and military, 
recorded two costly wars that led to increased degradation of living 
conditions in this country in less than 10 years;  
4. The collapse of the socialist system has led to the 
emergence of new states;  
5. In order to achieve the model, we use the following variables:  
• tigdp  - the index of GDP growth compared with 1970. 
For this variable, data were used during 1970-2000 for Albania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania. In the model analysis 
only countries that have not suffered territorial transformations 
since 1989 were included. For this variable, series of data from the 
WEO were used.  
• ttime - with values between 1 and 31, in order to identify 
any trend in the evolution of the igdp  indicator.  
• tVBT - is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for a value 
of the indicator registered in 1989 and 0 for 1988.  
6. The model is represented by one of the following 
regression equations:  
- When a global analysis for the development of GDP is 
achieved, without taking into account the differences between the 
five countries, the regression model is as follows: 
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ttttt VBTatimeaigdpaaigdp ε+⋅+⋅+⋅+= − 32110           [8] 
 
- Regression model with panel data with fixed effects (the 
fixed effects model) 
 
),0(,31,...,1,5,...,1 2
3211
εσε
ε
Nti
VBTatimeaigdpaaigdp
it
ititititiit
→==
+⋅+⋅+⋅+= −           [9] 
 
- Regression model with panel data with random effects (the 
random effects model) 
 
),0(),,0(,31,...,1,5,...,1 22
3211
aiit
itiitititit
NaNti
aVBTatimeaigdpaigdp
σσε
εμ
ε →→==
++⋅+⋅+⋅+= −   
[10] 
 
7. Before using regression models with panel data, some 
descriptive characteristics of the evolution of GDP for this group of 
countries are presented. In order to simplify the presentation in 
Figure 5, the evolution of indices of GDP growth is revealed for 
the five countries incorporated in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Indices of GDP growth during 1970-2000 
compared with 1969 for Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland 
and  Romania  
(Source: WEO, 2002) 
 
During 1970-1989, with the exception of Poland, which has 
recorded an economic decline in the beginning of 1980s, the other 
four countries had significant growth ratios for GDP. Albania, 
country with the lowest level of GDP per capita, registered the 
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lowest growth ratio. For the five countries, the average annual 
growth ratio during 1970-2000 was: 2.74% for Albania, 5.67% for 
Bulgaria, 4.2% for Hungary, 3.1% for Poland, 3.9% for Romania. 
1990 marked a strong rebound for Eastern European countries.  
Bulgaria, Romania and Albania felt stronger the economic effects. 
During the period of transition to market economy,  Bulgaria has 
reduced the activity in economy, on average annually, by 2.23%, 
while Romania by 1.69%. Hungary and Romania, due to greater 
openness to Western European economies have succeeded the 
recovery in 1993, 1994. During the period 1990-2000, the two 
economies have recorded annual positive average ratios of GDP 
growth. Moreover, stable development of the economies of both 
countries, alongside the Czech Republic, represented essential 
elements for acceptance into NATO structures since 1999.  
The events of the past 18 years have shown that the status of 
neutrality or joining a military or economic system represent 
certain elements for the emergence of economic and social 
imbalances on medium and long term. The losses are quantified by 
the emergence of smaller states within the territory of current 
states, the emergence of local military conflicts, reducing the 
economic activity, etc. 
The table below presents the regression model used to 
analyze the evolution of index of GDP growth for five countries in 
Eastern Europe, following the transformations in 1989, which have 
not undergone territorial transformations. 
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Table 7. 
Equation for indices of GDP growth 
 Models   
 No free 
term 
With common 
free term 
With fixed 
effects 
With random 
effects 
c  
 
igdp  
 
time  
 
VBT  
 
2R  
2
R  
LL test 
e’e 
Fixed effects 
dplgA_  
Bugdp_  
Hugdp_  
Pogdp_  
Rogdp_  
Estimation 
method 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
observations 
panel type 
 
F-test 
- 
 
)0197.0(
9323.0
 
)014.0(
0045.0
 
)0203.0(
1176.0
 
951.0  
950.0  
5.260  
16.1  
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
MCMM 
30 
- 
 
 
 
1437.7 
)0450.0(
*0279.0−  
 
)0211.0(
937.0  
 
)0020.0(
0053.0  
)0295.0(
1310.0  
 
951.0  
950.0  
78.260  
16.1  
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
 
MCMMP 
30 
- 
 
 
 
954.5 
- 
 
)0283.0(
866.0  
 
)0019.0(
008.0  
)0296.0(
1612.0  
 
956.0  
954.0  
39.275  
05.1  
 
035.0−  
071.0  
051.0  
029.0  
 
0090.0  
MCMMP 
30 
 
150 
 
 
 
4125.67 
)0454.0(
*01256.0−  
)0234.0(
920.0  
 
)0019.0(
006.0  
)0294.0(
140.0  
 
953.0  
952.0  
99.275  
12.1  
 
018.0−  
0129.0  
0082.0  
0035.0  
 
0065.0−  
MCMMP 
30 
 
150 
 
 
 
- 
Remarks: 1. In parentheses the standard errors for each estimator are 
listed 2. * represents the values which do not differ significantly from 
zero for a significance threshold of 10%. 
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The first two models, whose parameters are estimated by 
MCMMP (OLS) emphasize an economic growth of GDP during 
1970-1989. The first two models provide an accurate estimation of 
igdp. The estimators of variables igdp and UBT are positive and 
differ significantly from zero. By using both models we obtain the 
same conclusion, that the changes in 1989 have determined a 
reduction in the pace of growth for the Eastern European countries. 
For both models more than 95% of changes in evolution of 
variable igdp are explained by variables included in the regression 
models. In order to emphasize the changes in each country,  two 
models with panel data are used: one with fixed effects, with 
parameters estimated by MCMMP and the second with random 
effects, estimated by generalized MCMMP (GLS). For these two 
models, the high values of F statistics emphasize that the variables 
retained in the models provide an adequate estimation for the 
dynamics of GDP index. 
 
D.  Level IV Cost 
The level IV cost or the cost of the neighborhood during 
times of peace with Russia represents the economic losses recorded 
by the NATO countries due to hostility expressed towards Russia. 
These costs are inverse proportional  related to distance to Russia 
and direct proportional to the dependence on the economic system 
of Russia. To take into account the size of these losses, we consider 
that Russia is an important supplier of natural gas to the countries 
in this geographical area. This cost is much higher for the Baltic 
countries. 
For Eastern European countries, former USSR represented 
an important market and a major supplier of raw materials and 
natural gas during the planned economy. CAER collapse and 
disintegration of political structures that governed relations 
between these countries have led to a strong rebuff of trade 
relations with this economic partner. 
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Fig. 6. Evolution of the share of import (I), export (E) and 
external trade (T) of Romania with Russian Federation in the 
import,  export    and    external   trade  of  Romania   during 
1991- 2000 
(Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1995-2001) 
 
In Romania, since the collapse of the communist system, 
there was a clear trend of distance against Russia. If in 1989, 
26.6% of Romania's foreign trade was done with the former Soviet 
Union, within a few years, the trade relations between these 
countries have decreased dramatically. The chart in Figure 6 shows 
these trends. Moreover, export of Romania to Russian Federation 
has decreased continuously, reaching in 2000 less than 10% of 
total export in 1991. Due to the economic policy applied during the 
first years after the revolution, Romania lost a major market.  
For Romania, the opposition of Russia to join NATO could 
be felt on the economic level through the policy of prices of raw 
materials imported by Romania. In 2000, a share of 8.58% from 
Romania's import is from the Russian Federation, represented 
especially by import of natural gas and raw materials.  
Equally, during 1990-2001, Eastern European countries tried 
to have to greater extent Western European countries as business 
partners. Imports of these countries are to a large extent from 
Western Europe and the USA. The same applies to foreign 
investments. For example, Slovakia, which during the planned 
economy achieved the trade especially with the Czech Republic 
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and Russia, now records 46% with the  EU countries. Among the 
countries of the former socialist block, only Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia "have succeeded in developing the 
export of machinery and equipment, while the Balkan countries 
have remained specialized in industrial intermediary products 
(metallurgy)”.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Distribution of foreign direct investment among 
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria 
(Source: Economic Survey of Europe, no. 1 / 2000, 1 / 2001) 
 
Membership of Eastern European countries to NATO in 
2002 represents an important factor in encouraging foreign capital 
investments. If in the early 1990s, the foreign capital was 479 
million U.S. dollars, in 1999 it increased to 16.8 billion U.S. 
dollars. The three countries that were included in NATO in 1999 
hold the highest share. "During 1987-1998 the European 
companies invested in PECO-5 countries  (Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria). German companies hold the first 
place, with a flow estimated at 11.4 billion ECU, representing 43% 
of Europe-15 commitments. They are followed by the French 
(10.9%), Dutch (10.6%) and Austrian (8.7) companies, as well as 
                                                          
29 Agnes Chevallier, Francoise Lemoine, Laurence Nayman, L’Union européenne 
et sa périphérie. Conséquences de l’intégration commerciale de l’Europe 
centrale, Revue Economique, No. 6, 1999, pp. 1169-1184. 
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US companies,  8.4 billion ECU (23.6% of total)”.30 Most foreign 
investments in this area were targeted to the three countries that were 
included in NATO structures in 1999. Intense flow of foreign capital 
to the three countries is due to both progress in implementation of 
market economy mechanisms and equally the additional guarantees of 
political and military stability. Including a significant number of 
countries in the list of countries aspiring to NATO would cause an 
increase in flows of foreign capital in this area, due to additional 
guarantees provided by this enlargement process. 
7.4. Consequences of corruption on financing  
the defense systems 
Due to reducing the threat of an armed conflict since the 
collapse of socialist block, there is a considerable reduction of the 
expenditure for defense. The integration of EU countries, the single 
currency and the costs related to the EU enlargement have led 
Western governments to maintain budgetary balance, the reduce 
significantly the military budgets. For example, major EU 
countries have substantially reduced the share of these 
expenditures in GDP: UK reported a decrease from 4.1%, as  
military expenditure in GDP in 1988, to 2.8% in 2004 (in absolute 
values a decrease from 53,418 million U.S. $ in constant prices 
(2003) in 1988 to 51,088 million U.S. $ in constant prices (2003) 
in 2004);  France reported a decrease from 3.6% in 1988 to 2.6% in 
2004 (a reduction of 2477 million U.S. $ in constant prices (2003) 
in 2004 compared with 1988)31. Moreover, along with the 
disappearance of the socialist block, the Western countries have 
switched to a new approach regarding the relationship between the 
economy and the military sector. The military system is an 
economic regulator for the European continent, having the role to 
ensure peace in Western and Central Europe, and its peripheral 
areas.  
                                                          
30 Toubal, L., Toubal, F., Le capital étranger en Europe centrale et orientale, Le 
courrier des pays de l’Est, no. 1013, 2001, pp. 56-65. 
31 Source: SIPRI (http://first.sipri.org/) 
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The new geopolitical circumstances, the forms of armed 
intervention and reduction of budgetary allocations have 
determined important  changes of the defense systems. The 
classical weapons were reduced and compulsory military service 
was replaced by armies of  professionals. The units of rapid 
intervention aim at prevention or control of regional conflicts. The 
new military structures must correspond to the types of conflicts 
that can occur in a given area. Thus, we could identify three types 
of armed conflicts: those aiming to neutralize or destroy the 
military ability of an aggressor. It is the situation of Gulf War or 
Afghanistan War;  interethnic conflicts in certain areas; Yugoslavia 
War; military intervention aimed to prevent the development of the 
capacity of a potential military aggressor. 
Europe does not have an operational military system. 
Therefore, in crisis situations, it called NATO to solve the conflict 
situation in that geographical area. It should be noted that  
countries in Western Europe are neutral from military point of 
view (Austria, Ireland, Sweden) and other oppose to the 
militarization of the EU and the creation of a common European 
defense system. Moreover, the gaps of the European defense 
system are not based on financial or technological factors, but 
primarily on political and institutional factors. Thus for the 
European continent, NATO remains the only political-military 
organization operating in Europe. Moreover, the Central and 
Eastern European countries wish to join NATO. Progressive 
extension of NATO towards east and its interventions outside the 
area put in a new light the Atlantic community32”. Crisis in the 
former Yugoslavia demonstrated the need of a body of army and 
political institutions appropriate to react quickly in order  to 
mediate regional crises.  
"Lacking states in position to act as regulator, it is no longer 
possible to claim that international anarchy could be controlled by 
a simple coalition of states aimed also at preventing international 
                                                          
32 Patrice Buffotot, La défense en Europe - édition, 1998, Paris, p.9. 
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conflicts"33 . In new situations, the powerful states refuse to meet 
the classic defense role of a military and economic order. The 
peripheral states are holding weapons of mass destruction. It is 
therefore recommended to set up a system of collective security, 
based on a network of military and civil institutions. In the military 
field, S. Gupta34 shows that "in companies perceived to have high 
levels of corruption, military expenditures have a high share in 
gross domestic product." The study shows that an increase by 1% 
of the corruption index is accompanied by an increase of military 
expenditure in GDP by almost 0.32%. 
In the following three charts the distribution of countries in 
three hypostases is presented. In each case, the corruption index is 
used as a causal variable. Results from this empirical analysis 
should be interpreted with caution. Thus we present the following 
recommendations: data on military expenditures from different 
sources are relatively different; the corruption index is calculated 
for civil activities in a civil economy and military transactions 
often do not have a public character, etc. However, the analysis of 
data series of the following three situations provides important 
information for characterizing the size of corruption and its 
implications on funding the defense systems in each country. 
Moreover, the coefficient of linear correlation for the series of 
corruption indices from different years shows a pronounced 
dependence. For example, the value of this indicator for 2001 and 
1998 is 0.97.  
In the first case, we consider the dependence of the index of 
corruption on the share of military expenditure in gross national 
product (GNP). For the two variables, the value of coefficient of 
the linear correlation is equal to -0.12. This value indicates a lower 
level of military expenditure share in GDP for countries where the 
level of corruption is lower. However, the linear regression model 
                                                          
33 L’Europe en bref- Paix et sécurité, Centre Européen de la Culture, 1977, p. 3. 
34 Gupta, S., Luiz de Mello, Sharan, R., Corruption and military spending, 
European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, 2001, pp. 749-777. 
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defined for the two variables does not indicate a significant linear 
dependence, as shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Distribution of countries in relation  
to corruption index and share of military expenditure in GDP 
 
In the second case we analyse the relationship between 
corruption index and share of military expenditure in total 
government expenditure in a country. In this case, the value of 
coefficient of linear correlation  calculated  for the  two variables is 
-0.31. This figure shows that military budgets as share in 
government expenditure, are more consistent in countries where 
corruption is higher. The high level of the coefficient of linear 
correlation is -0.29, between the corruption level in 2000 and 
military budgets as share in government expenditure in 1997. 
These empirical results reveal a negative dependency between the 
two variables: the level of corruption is higher (the values of the 
indicator are closer to 1, the share of military budgets in 
government expenditure is more significant). 
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Fig. 9. Distribution of countries in relation to corruption 
index and military expenditure in government expenditure 
 
The linear regression model defined for the two variables is 
represented by: 
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The value of student statistics for the parameter 
corresponding to variable IC equals  -2.9, highlighting a significant 
linear dependence between the two variables. Moreover, an 
increase of corruption indicates an oversized share of military 
expenditure in total government expenditure. Concretely, for an 
increase of corruption by one unit, military expenditure in total 
government expenditure increases by 0.82%. This increase is, in 
most cases, not equivalent to raising the standards of the defense 
systems, but to a preferential use of public funds.  
In the third case, we analyse the linear relationship between 
corruption index (IC) and the share of armament import in GDP 
(IAGDP). The value of the coefficient of linear correlation, 
calculated for these two variables, equals  -0.20, showing that the 
import of armament has a higher share in GDP, in countries where 
the corruption level is higher. For the two variables, we define the 
linear regression model: 
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An increase in corruption by one unit favours increasing the 
share of armament import in GDP by 0.14%. Corruption in the 
armament trade is difficult to be controlled by civil society in 
countries with high corruption level, as corruption acts are 
classified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Distribution in relation to the corruption index 
and the share of import of armament in GDP 
 
The high level of corruption is materialized through 
economic losses, resulting mainly from the following: i) reducing 
ratios of economic growth due to inefficient use of public funds. 
The econometric studies conducted for groups of countries in 
different regions show that “investments and corruption are 
negatively correlated”35; ii) reducing budgetary revenues in each 
country due to downsizing the activity in economy and 
development of underground economy; iii) inefficient use of public 
funds in financing public services etc36. 
                                                          
35 P., Mauro, Corruptions and growth, op. cit. R. 696. S.-J. Wei, Corruption in 
Economic Development: Grease or Sand?, op. cit., p. 104. 
36 Klitgaard, R., Tropical Gangsters, Basic Books, New York, 1990. 
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7.5. Conclusions  
In the current European and international economic and 
political conditions, the accession is not only a matter of military 
strategy, but also an economic one. Political, economic and 
military stability in the area contributes directly to economic 
growth of a country by attracting foreign capital into that area and 
stimulating the development of domestic capital. The accession to 
NATO propagates a series of neighborhood effects, beneficial on 
economic and social level, such as:  
- Stability support for membership in the EU structures and 
encouraging investments in that area. Cumulative foreign 
investments during 1989-2000 per capita, in dollars, are as follows: 
1935 in Hungary, 2102 in the Czech Republic, 751 in Poland, 161 
in Albania, 407 in Bulgaria, 303 in Romania, 768 in Slovenia, 669 
1337 in Estonia, 1027 in Latvia, 642 in Lithuania.  
- New technology for military logistics. Neighborhood 
effects in the economy induced by the economic units.  
- Moral support and psychological effects for the population 
of this area. Accession to NATO is viewed in most favorable terms 
by inhabitants.  
Integration in NATO structures involves high costs on short-
term, to adapt to the modern military defense systems, and in a 
historical perspective, the integration process is certainly a gain due to 
the neighborhood effects. Equally, for Western Europe, the integration 
process is benefic in the definition of a stable economic area, 
responding to the demands of globalization and liberalization of the 
modern economy.  
On the background of worsening internal problems, the only 
way to rebuild a country devastated by war consists in international 
aid and an economic plan supported by the economic powers. 
Solving problems arising in Balkans, taking into account the 
problems related to transition and instability in the area of Former 
Yugoslavia, is possible only through a global approach based on 
three dominant axes: political, economic and military.  
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For Eastern European countries, accepting the status of 
neutrality represents a risky and cost - based solution on long term. 
Arguments: the countries in this area are a buffer between the two 
great economic powers, Germany and Russia; the nationalist forces 
represent a disturbing factor, using the precarious economic 
situation as  means to develop nationalist ideas; on economic level, 
military neutrality in a traditionally volatile area will be a negative 
signal to foreign financial environments to encourage investments 
and to gain access to foreign financing.  
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Chapter 8 
 
“Globalisation of Corruption” and 
Development of the Binom “Corruption-Public 
Integrity” in the Context of Romania Integration 
into the European Union 
 
8.1. General aspects 
In the context of globalisation, the issue of corruption 
acquires specificity, deriving, on one hand from the diversification 
of the modalities to corrupt or to be corrupted and on the other 
hand, from multiplication of the means to fight against this 
phenomenon. The binom corruption-public integrity becomes a 
motto of the speeches held by politicians and generally those 
invested with leadership functions by the society. 
It is unanimously recognised the fact that a relevant indicator 
of an ethical leadership refers to the level and social perception of 
corruption. Speaking about “the devastating effect of globalisation 
on the developing countries and especially on poor populations”,  
J. Stiglitz (2002) allocates large spaces to corruption, referring to 
“the cases of foreign investments”, “capitalism based on 
favouritisms and mafia-typed connection” or “privatisation”. 
Including integration into the European Union as a form for 
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expressing globalisation in the European area, it is worth to analyse 
some consequences of this process on the evolution of the binom 
corruption-public integrity. 
When we speak about “globalisation of corruption” we refer 
to some conclusions emphasized by the specialized literature and 
studies. 
Without trying to make a hierarchy of those conclusions, we 
shall refer first of all, to its multiple facets that by chance or not, 
are overlapping the modalities for expressing globalisation on 
economic, cultural, political level and as well as on the public 
sector reform. If we analyse an outstanding paper about corruption 
of Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), we shall find out that three from the 
four basic chapters focus on approaching corruption as an 
“economic [1], cultural [2] or political [3] problem”. 
8.2.  Globalisation and corruption in the public sector 
In that paper, situating corruption in the public – private 
interface, the sub themes aim specific topics for the public sector, 
of which it is worth to mention the following: corruption at top 
civil servants level, public programmes reform, civil service 
reform, pressure on public administration etc. At the same time, it 
is worth to emphasize the endemic characteristics of corruption in 
various regions as well as the relations between democracy and 
corruption with its various modalities of expression, i.e. buying the 
votes and political influence or even control by political power. 
In the above briefly described context, the public sector 
reform, or better said the public management reform becomes an 
issue on the working agenda of governmental authorities. We find 
these preoccupations both in the developed and developing 
countries. For the first category, an eloquent image about those 
preoccupations is provided by the reports and studies achieved by 
OECD Public Management Service, published in the paper: 
“Governance in Transition: Public Management Reforms in OECD 
countries” (1995). “A performance-oriented and consequently 
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customer-oriented public administration represents the key focus of 
any strategy of reform.” [4]  
It is obvious that implementation of this principle gets 
characteristics of globalisation, being undertaken also in the 
strategies of reform for the public sectors in the developing 
countries. Another perspective, interesting for the proposed study 
is provided by E.J. Stiglitz’s paper, (2002), stating about “the 
devastating effort of globalisation on the developing countries, and 
especially on the poor populations” [5], awarding, in context, large 
spaces to corruption phenomena, referring to “cases of foreign 
investments” [6], “capitalism based on favouritisms and mafia-type 
connections” [7] or “privatisation” [8].   
Based on the analysis concerning the relations between 
market, state and social opportunity, Sen, A. (2000) presents “the 
social services provision and incentives” [9], emphasising a series 
of possible distortions due to information asymmetry, i.e. “the 
administrative costs, immense losses and corruption” [10]. The 
phenomenon, described as “power asymmetry, by which the 
‘bureaucrat monarchs’ have the power to grant benefits for which 
the beneficiaries are disposed to pay” will lead, consequently to “a 
greater possibility of corruption” [11]. 
The author presents a more profound approach concerning the 
ethical values, policy-making, for the latest asserting the following: 
- “justice is a central concept in identifying the objectives of 
a public policy and decision about the adequate instruments in 
order to achieve the targets; 
- all public policies depend on how individuals and groups 
behave in society. Those behaviours are influenced by 
understanding and interpreting the needs of social ethics” [12]. 
The perspective of social ethics and the relation with corruption 
in the public sector provide to Sen the opportunity to extend the 
analysis on the causes and consequences of corruption. “Dominance 
of corruption”, as defined by the author is really seen as one of the 
greatest obstacles for the economic progress. The high corruption 
level could provide negative effects on public policies effectiveness” 
[13]. Specific for the public sector, a series of attitudes are identified, 
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by which some legislative regimes encourage corruption, providing 
discretionary power to the civil servant, who may award favours, 
representing a large amount of money. 
At the same time, as asserted also by Campante, R.F., Chor, 
D., Do, Quoc-Anh, the temptation to be corrupt is more powerful 
when the civil servants hold great power. In fact, the above-
mentioned authors achieve their analysis within a framework 
taking into consideration political stability and corruption, 
emphasising two effects [14]:  
- the time horizon effect, namely greater instability leads to 
higher corruption for those holding the power, taking advantage of 
this short opportunity; 
-  the demand effect, namely the private sector is more eager 
to bribe the politicians who are politically more stable. 
Coming back to Sen, A (2000) paper, he associates to the 
civil servants holding the power the material situation, relatively 
modest, leading to increase of corruption temptation. 
“It happens at inferior levels of administration, explaining 
why corruption infiltrates at the basis of the democratic system, 
involving both middle civil servants and those on superior levels” 
[15]. Prevention and fight against corruption become up to date. 
The direct motivation of corruption is to have a certain profit, thus 
its eradication becomes very difficult. The specialised literature 
emphasises the possible partial efficiency of the organisational 
reforms and systems for inspection and sanctions for cutting off 
corruption. Their coverage area is relatively limited. It is worth to 
reiterate the example described by the Indian political analyst from 
the 4th century B.C, Kantilya, who made the difference between 
forty different ways in which a civil servant may be tempted to 
become corrupt from the financial point of view and he described 
how a cash payment system, followed by sanctions and rewards 
can prevent those activities [16].  
These arguments together with other assertions lead to 
supporting the opportunities to promote national or supranational 
strategies for the fight against corruption, or better said for 
ensuring public integrity. 
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8.3. Political determinations of corruption in Central  
and Eastern European countries, corruption profile 
Continuing the above-mentioned analyses, we can reveal an 
important conclusion, namely political determination of corruption 
phenomenon. 
To the arguments derived from specialised literature, we 
may add those from analyses and reports of important forums or 
international organisations, such as the World Bank (WB) or 
Transparency International (TI). The latest asserts an important 
conclusion: the areas and institutions most affected by corruption 
remain the political parties (4.0), parliaments (3.7), police (3.6) or 
judiciary (3.5) [17]. 
Without trying to ignore the details, the situation could be 
interpreted as worrying, because, at least during the last years, the 
main actors perceived to be most corrupted remain the political 
parties and parliaments. Table 1 presents the evolution of the 
sectors and institutions perceived to be most corrupted. 
A comparison between the world level and that of South - 
Eastern European countries reveals the exceeding of the indicators 
for quasi majority of the sectors or institutions, varying between 
0.2 for media, reaching 1.0 for the medical services, 0.8 for 
education services or registry and permit. Romania, as country in 
South - East Europe records, for 2006, lower values than the 
regional average, excepting the political parties, where it exceeds 
the regional level by 0.1. Unfortunately, the above situation is 
associated to a negative appreciation about the effects of the 
governmental authorities’ actions concerning the fight against 
corruption. 
Thus, as it results from TI reports, [18] at South - East 
Europe level, only 27% of the population appreciate those actions 
as effective or very effective and an important part of the 
population (9%) consider that those actions even encourage 
corruption. In Romania case, the perception about the effectiveness 
of the actions under discussion reveals even a lower percentage 
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(16%) of those appreciating as “effective” those actions, 11% 
considering that those actions even encourage corruption. 
Transparency International Romania has achieved analyses 
and comments concerning the current situation in Romania, 
showing the following: 
- The Government’s efforts in the fight against corruption 
are perceived as less effective by 39% of the public. The 
appreciations are similar also for Bulgaria, while in Turkey, only 
25% of the respondents say that the fight against corruption is 
ineffective and 29% appreciate it as effective. 
- Romania is doing better than the European Union, taking 
into consideration the perception, where 42% represents the 
average of negative perception related to the effectiveness of EU 
Member States Governments actions. Those results may be 
explained in this way: in the context of the pressures of accession 
into the European Union on 1 January 2007, in Romania, great 
efforts were done in the fight against corruption; its results, 
although insufficient were intensely promoted to population by 
officials. 
- Within the framework of the anticorruption measures, 
Romania ratified United Nations Convention against Corruption 
[19] and on legislative level, there were fulfilled the obligations 
provided by the Convention concerning the protection of integrity 
alarm signals [20] and conduct codes for the civil servants [21]. 
However, TI Romania states: “the implementation of those 
measures remains in deficit as long as the law on protection of 
integrity alarm signals is still opaque for most of the employees in 
the public sector and the case law for sanctioning the civil servants 
is quasi lacking.” 
Coming back to the worldwide considerations, we shall 
reveal some conclusions from TI report for 2006, formulated under 
the header: “corruption is a worldwide problem” [22]. The 
arguments, although they are not new, are based on the social 
perception that corruption is a major problem, and at the public 
authorities level it is expressed by abuse of office for private gains. 
The practice of bribe influences the poor countries, no matter its 
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forms of expression. The funds embezzlement diminishes the real 
allowances for public services, health or education. Government 
actions to stop corruption have been judged as lacklustre and 
ineffective. In all countries analysed by TI, the corruption 
phenomenon greatly affects people lives. And above all, TI report 
emphasises the fact that political parties are involved in corruption 
equation.  
8.3.1. Evaluating the social perception of corruption 
The evaluation of the social perception on the level and 
coverage area of corruption phenomenon has marked in the last 
decade and a half, major preoccupations on behalf of international 
institutions, already above-mentioned. 
We refer to the World Bank (WB) and Transparency 
International (TI). By its effects, corruption is not only a problem 
of public funds embezzlement or obtaining gains by the 
representatives of the political power; it has more serious 
consequences within the governance process and good 
administration on social, economic level. 
Below, we shall focus on the evolution of corruption in some 
South and Eastern European countries, on one hand, and 
achievement of a comparative situation with the evolution of the 
corruption phenomenon in the EU Member States, on the other 
hand. For Romania, country that recently acceded into the 
European Union, situated in South - East Europe, this analysis 
creates the premises to determine more realistic measures, aimed to 
inscribe our country on an ascending evolution concerning the 
corruption phenomenon. 
 
A. Romania and South - Eastern European countries 
Concerning TI index on evolution of corruption for South - 
Eastern European countries, Table 2 presents the current situation. 
Chart 1 presents a more suggestive image on the evolution of this 
phenomenon. Some relevant conclusions for Romania, in the 
context of South - Eastern European countries derive from the 
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descending trend of corruption, since 2003, on one hand, and from 
comparison with the average of TI corruption indices for the 
mentioned countries, on the other hand. 
The second perspective leads to the following conclusions: 
- Variance as statistical characteristic for the level of 
corruption, measured by TI perception indices is 0.031 for 
Romania and 0.010 for the average of the South - Eastern 
European countries, revealing a more increased rhythm for cutting 
off corruption in Romania related to the average of the other 
mentioned countries. 
- Calculating Pearson correlation coefficient, we shall find 
out for Romania a very good correlation with the average of the 
South - Eastern European countries (0.917), Serbia (0.903), Greece 
(0.860) or Macedonia (0.834). With Turkey, the correlation 
coefficient is lower (0.663), with Bulgaria (0.253) and Albania 
(0.181) is extremely reduced, even closer to lack of a correlation 
connection from statistical point of view. The correlation is 
negative with Croatia (-0.837). 
Trying a similar analysis, using KKM index from the 
available data [23], we obtain the data in Table 3 for South - 
Eastern European countries. Chart 2 presents a more suggestive 
image on the evolution of this phenomenon. Table 3 and Chart 2 
reveal the consistence of the two methods for evaluating the social 
perception of corruption. 
From the prospect of the analysis for Romania, we find out 
that 2002 marked the starting moment for a corruption cutting off 
process. At the same time, we find out that the corruption level in 
Romania is higher than the average of South - Eastern European 
countries. Proceeding to a more detailed statistical analysis, we 
shall rediscover the conclusions previously exposed, when the 
analysis was achieved using TI index. 
Using the input data of KKM indices, we reiterate the 
following conclusions: 
- Statistical variance is 0.013 for Romania and 0.006 for the 
average of the South - Eastern European countries, revealing a 
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more accelerated rhythm for cutting off corruption, related to the 
average of the mentioned countries. 
- This time, Pearson correlation coefficients for Romania are 
positive only with Turkey (0.585) and Serbia (0.575), being 
negative with Greece (-0.973), Macedonia (-0.632) and with the 
other countries, the coefficient is almost zero, showing practically 
the lack of a correlation. The correlation with the average of the 
South - Eastern European countries is also reduced (0.259). 
 
B. Romania and European Union countries 
Both the period before accession and the recent accession of 
Romania into the European Union offer the opportunity for an 
integrated comparative analysis concerning the evolution of 
corruption in Romania in the context of the evolution of this 
phenomenon in European Union countries. 
Using the available data on http://transparency.org.ro, for the 
period 2001 – 2006, we obtain an evolution for social perception of 
corruption, as presented in Chart 3. 
Obviously, for Romania and the other European countries, 
the comparison only in regard with corruption level leads to the 
conclusion that the level of corruption perception is highest. In 
other order of ideas, we find out that since 2002, the trend for 
cutting off corruption is ascending, as the average of the corruption 
indicators for the EU countries. 
At the same time, proceeding to a more detailed statistical 
analysis, we find out the following: 
- The decreasing trend of corruption for Romania varies 
faster on a growing scale than EU average, as variance for 
Romania is 0.031 and only 0.014 for EU average. 
- Pearson correlation coefficient is very high in the 
comparison between Romania and France (0.958), Czech Republic 
(0.949), Slovak Republic (0.896), Austria (0.890), Estonia (0.843), 
Germany (0.810), as well as EU average (0.906). Negative 
correlations for Romania are described by Pearson correlation 
coefficient, related to the Netherlands (-0.879), Luxembourg  
(-0.771), Spain (-0.619), Poland (-0.601), Italy (-0.591), Finland   
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(-0.521), as well as Sweden (-0.209), United Kingdom (-0.103). 
Related to Lithuania, the model does not capture any correlation 
connection (0.0). 
- Pearson correlation coefficient is very high in the 
comparison between Romania and France (0.958), Czech Republic 
(0.949), Slovak Republic (0.896), Austria (0.890),   Estonia (0.843) 
as well as EU average (0.906). Negative correlations for Romania 
are described by Pearson coefficient related to the Netherlands  
(-0.879), Luxembourg (-0.771), Spain (-0.619), Poland (-0.601), 
Italy (-0.591), Finland (-0.521), Sweden (-0.209), United Kingdom 
(-0.103). Related to Lithuania, the model does not capture any 
correlation connection (0.0). 
Similar with the method used for comparative analysis in 
view of KKM index for all South - Eastern European countries, we 
shall attempt a similar analysis for all EU countries (Chart 4). 
This time, the comparison between the average of EU 
countries (MEAN UE) and Romania reveals the following 
conclusions: 
- At EU level, KKM index signalises a growing trend for 
corruption since 2003, unlike Romania, where the same index 
indicates a slight decreasing trend for corruption. 
- We may argument the above conclusion also by 
calculating Pearson correlation coefficients and making their 
comparison. Thus, the respective coefficient indicates a negative 
correlation with EU average (-0.334) and at higher levels with 
Greece (-0.973), Italy (-0.808), Sweden (-0.605), Netherlands  
(-0.485), United Kingdom (-0.483) etc. Positive correlations are 
indicated only with Slovenia (0.408), Malta (0.475), Germany 
(0.227), Belgium (0.209), Austria (0.103). 
In our opinion, additional to those presented, other two 
conclusions are important for a more profound analysis. 
Thus, when comparing those two indices, different results 
occur significantly. Therefore, the first idea that could be 
operational relates to some aggregated corruption indices that 
cumulate the results regarding social perception. Such index will 
be presented, with experimental title even in this study. On the 
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other hand, we consider that in this complex mechanism for 
evaluating corruption, in the comparative analyses with EU 
countries a dual effect occurs between the real evolution of 
corruption and social perception in this regard. This effect 
originates from the stages of EU construction, precisely the periods 
previous to EU enlargement (we refer to enlargements from 2005 
and 2007). On one hand, in older EU countries it is hard to believe 
that the corruption level has increased and on the other hand, in 
fact only the social perception has increased, due to social concerns 
about the effects of integrating new states, where this phenomenon 
registered more powerful levels and coverage areas. Thus a gap 
occurs between the real level of corruption and the social 
perception in this regard. It is obvious in the growing trend of 
corruption perception for many of older EU Member States. The 
situation is different for the countries that acceded recently, where 
the trend of corruption is decreasing both as perception and real 
situation, due to insistent anti corruption measures. We shall come 
back to this analysis when referring to the proposal about an 
aggregated model for corruption analysis based on KKM and TI 
indices.  
8.4. Decentralization and corruption 
The decentralization process represents a direct effect of 
globalisation in the public sector. Several specialised papers and 
studies have already approached the connection between 
decentralization and corruption. Without ignoring Rose-
Ackerman’s contributions and other outstanding contributions, the 
core ideas of our brief analysis take into consideration a recent 
study presented in The Policy Research Working Paper Series, by 
Anwar Shah (2006) [24]. For Romania, Andrei, T. (2007) achieved 
a relevant study [25]. 
In Romania, public administration reform in the area of 
decentralization and devolution includes three major elements: 
continuing decentralization by transfer of competences and 
administrative and financial responsibilities from central to local 
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public administration authorities; continuing the devolution process 
by delegation of responsibilities in the territory, depending on the 
needs on local level, within the same administrative structure (the 
devolved services are subordinated to the ministry that delegated 
the responsibility); transforming the devolved services in territory, 
depending on citizens’ needs into decentralised services under 
local authorities’ responsibility. It is unanimously recognised the 
fact that the decentralization process and corruption could 
determine significant negative effects on economic and social 
level, on medium and long term. 
Andrei, T. (2007) achieves a study aimed to determine some 
characteristics of corruption in local public administration. The 
research was achieved on a representative sample of mayors of 
Romanian localities during November – December 2005. 
In order to create the sample, a cluster-type technique was 
used, the volume of the sample representing 9% from the total 
population of mayors. All mayors from seven counties were 
interviewed, the counties were randomly extracted. The error for 
estimating the parameters at the reference population level is 
plus/minus 1.2%. 
The questionnaire comprised questions on measuring the 
mayors’ opinion about actual issues concerning public 
administration reform, namely: civil service management, civil 
servants’ in-service training, local public administration reform by 
continuing the decentralization process, ensuring the training of 
elected officials on topics specific for local public administration, 
corruption, changes in the technical body from administration 
under the pressure of the political factor, quality of communication 
in the reform process etc. We shall use the database from the 
prospect of analysing the characteristics of corruption phenomenon 
in local public administration and identifying some characteristics 
of the decentralization process. A logistic model will be defined for 
corruption analysis. The analysis on the database aims to identify 
the mayors’ position related to corruption in local public 
administration, thus estimating the amplitude and causes. 
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Within the framework of the study, based on the data 
recorded for the sample, the corruption phenomenon is signalled 
especially by the mayors that consider citizens to be directly 
involved in relevant decision-making on community level. Thus, 
Pearson correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.315, 
significant for a threshold of 1%. This characteristic emphasises a 
direct cause for occurrence and maintaining of corruption 
phenomenon, namely lack of transparency in decision-making in 
public institutions from local public administration. 
In the context of decentralization, the study states: 
”corruption together with other factors contributes directly to low 
quality for service provision by a local public administration. The 
study defines the derivate variable: “Extent to which local public 
administration achieves its core functions” (Q5), as average of four 
variables, defining core functions: a) administrating and managing 
the public goods and funds at local level (Q1); b) ensuring basic 
services at local level (health, social security, education, culture, 
military etc.) (Q2); c) prognosis and economic-social development 
(Q3); and d) organisation (Q4). In order to quantify the mayors’ 
opinion related to the extent in which local public administration 
achieves its core functions, a scale of ordinal measure was defined 
with the following items: 1- very low extent, 2- low extent,  
3- great extent, 4- very great extent. Table 4 presents the 
characteristics of the four primary variables and derivate variable.   
In the current study about decentralization, the mayors’ 
vision is that local public administrations can fulfil their core 
functions only on a low extent; the less favourable situation is the 
low capacity of prognosis and economic-social development at 
local level, and ensuring basic public services. The low capacity of 
local administrations in basic service provision is determined 
directly by inadequate administration and management of public 
goods and funds at local level (Pearson coefficient is 0.549) and 
low organisational capacity (0.563). 
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8.5. Public Integrity Systems 
As known, the country studies entitled National Integrity 
System, achieved by Transparency International are reports of 
analysis, presenting a detailed evaluation of the national systems 
for the fight against corruption. 
At the same time, in Transparency International (TI) 
conception, the National Integrity Systems (NIS) comprise “key 
institutions, laws and practices (the ‘pillars”) that contribute to 
integrity, transparency and accountability in a society. “ [26] 
The perspectives of the analysis and modelling the 
corruption phenomena are supported by the country studies that 
provide both an overview on NIS, the indicators for measuring the 
subsequent progresses from those countries, as well as a basis of 
comparisons among states. 
The above-mentioned country study asserts: “when it 
functions correctly, NIS fights against corruption as part of a 
broader fight against the abuse of power, law infringement and 
fraud under all its forms” [27]. 
Ideas and studies about public integrity and description in this 
context of the role of important “pillars” have been also developed 
by other institutions. For example, The Economic Development 
Institute of the World Bank, in 1998 approaches the role of Supreme 
Audit Institutions (SAI) in promoting the responsibility and 
transparency within the governance process. Concerning public 
integrity, Dye, M.K. and Stapenhurst, R., (1998) appreciate: 
“building strong institutions is a central challenge of development 
and is a key to controlling corruption’ [28]. 
Within the concept developed by the mentioned authors, 
“the integrity pillars” are as follows [29]: 
- political will; 
- administrative reforms; 
- “watchdog” agencies (Anti-corruption agencies; Ombudsman; 
Auditor general) 
- parliaments; 
- public awareness/involvement; 
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- the judiciary 
- the media; 
- the private sector. 
 
Previous to this study, we remark Pope, J.’s contributions 
(1997) [30] on development of the national integrity systems. 
8.5.1. Stages in developing the National Integrity System  
 in Romania 
The country study on NIS for Romania has been elaborated 
since 2005. Synthesising the analysis achieved in the study from 
2005 in developing the National Integrity System, in Romania, 
three stages [31] could be revealed up to present: 
1990 – 1998 
- The period coincides with the first half of the transition 
period; 
- The main exponents of the national public integrity were 
the Parliament and Government, that did not elaborate a public 
policy to promote the public integrity; 
- The Judiciary had no capacity to adjust the deficiencies of 
the other two powers in the state; 
- The social perception on the public pillars reveals a high 
degree of corruption, just in the interior of most of the public 
integrity pillars; 
- The civil society was not concerned with corruption, 
focusing on ensuring the basic requirements of democracy, rule of 
law and respect for human rights; 
- The international institutions were concerned about the 
economic and democratic reforms. 
1999 – 2004 
- The second stage coincides with the beginning of the 
negotiations of accession into the European Union; 
- The international agencies have expressed their interest 
towards the Romanian public integrity system (programmes were 
initiated and political pressures were exerted for reforms); 
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- The main pillars of integrity – the Executive and 
Legislative – have realised the seriousness of the national 
corruption level; 
- In 2001, the Government elaborated a National 
Anticorruption Strategy and the National Anticorruption 
Prosecutor’s Office was set up; 
- Other NIS pillars were strengthened, such as Ombudsman 
or Court of Audit. 
- The progresses have determined Romania  to become 
NATO member and closing the negotiations for accession into the 
European Union; 
- The other pillars: Parliament, justice, police have not 
recorded progresses; 
- The civil society was focused on the fight against 
corruption, adding on the public agenda law drafts, essential for 
public integrity; 
- The public policies designed to ensure the cooperation 
between pillars were inconsistent, proving a low capacity of 
implementation and reduced political will. 
2005 – present 
- The third period coincides with signing the Treaty of 
Romania Accession into the European Union; 
- The main political criteria were fulfilled; 
- Romania should implement effectively EU standards in the 
area of justice concerning corruption level, competition and control 
in customs. 
8.5.2.  Social perception of NIS pillars 
After Romania accession into the European Union, the 
National Integrity System has created significantly its own 
mechanisms of interaction, designed to lead to a better 
accomplishment of its mission. The research concerning social 
perception on the efficiency level of NIS pillars was achieved 
during January – February 2007, on a sample comprising 700 
employees from the public sector, based on some characteristics of 
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civil servants: age, sex, length in service, current job, level of civil 
service position. From the respondents, 34% worked in central 
administration and the rest in local administration, of which 26.1% 
in city halls and 14.1% in county and local councils. Judging the 
results obtained, on average, by each variable associated to the 
integrity pillars, the research reveals important issues (Table 5). 
Chart 5 presents the variance of social perception on a scale 
from 1 to 4. 
The perspective of a coherent action in the fight against 
corruption derives from research, using a statistical analysis of 
Pearson correlation coefficient. Thus, between NIS pillars there are 
different degrees of correlation, as follows: the most powerful 
correlation is between Parliament and Government (0.762) or 
Judiciary System (0.708). A medium correlation exists between 
Parliament and Control Institutions (0.629) or Ombudsman (0.603) 
and a lower correlation between the same Parliament and Court of 
Audit (0.458), Political System (0.485), Media (0.456), Civil 
society (0.474) or International Organisations (0.493). 
8.6. Conclusions 
The aspects presented in this study represent a brief 
synthesis about corruption in the context of economic, social and 
political development of Romania. The globalisation processes 
with direct consequences also on the public sector determine a high 
degree of generality for various forms of  corruption, on one hand 
and impose generalization of mechanisms and means for the fight 
against corruption, on the other hand. The National Integrity 
System represents such a mechanism, of great complexity that 
becomes operational since Romania accession into the European 
Union. The analysis on the corruption phenomenon within the 
framework provided by NIS creates the premises of an 
overwhelming action by all actors. Only after few years since 
application of this mechanism, the social perception is not very 
high. This fact is revealed also by the sociological research, 
presented in this study. The analysis on the statistical correlation 
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determines new directions for NIS development as well as the 
necessity to create more effective coordination mechanisms. 
Concerning the social perception of corruption, we come back to 
an important finding of the current study.  It regards the dual effect 
induced in the social awareness, where in a first perspective in the 
older EU countries it occurs the perception of increased corruption, 
and in other perspective in the recent EU countries, perception is 
contrary, even not supported by reality. It is worth to pay attention 
to this effect, for a series of further studies, as well as to conceiving 
and making operational some aggregated indicators of corruption 
perception, leading to compatible results, closer to reality. 
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Table 1 
Evolution of the corruption level during 2004 – 2006 
Sector/institution 2004 2005 2006 
1 2 3 4 
Political 
parties 
4.0 4.0 4.0 
Parliament/ 
Legislature 
3.7 3.7 3.7 
Police 3.6 3.6 3.5 
Judiciary System 3.6 3.5 3.5 
Tax revenue 3.4 3.4 3.3 
Business/ private 
sector 
3.4 3.4 3.6 
Customs 3.3 3.3 - 
Media 3.3 3.2 3.3 
Medical services 3.3 3.2 3.1 
Education system 3.1 3.0 3.0 
Registry and permit 3.0 2.9 2.9 
Public services 3.0 3.0 3.0 
The military 2.9 2.9 3.0 
NGOs 2.8 2.8 2.9 
Religious bodies 2.7 2.6 2.8 
Source: TI, “Global Corruption Barometer”, 2004, 2005, 2006 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Evolution of corruption (TI) in South-Eastern European countries 
Year Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Albania - 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.6 
Bulgaria 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0 
Croatia 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.4 
Greece 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 
Macedonia - - 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Romania 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 
Serbia - - 2.3 2.7 2.8 3.0 
Turkey 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.8 
Average 3.19 3.11 3.11 3.24 3.26 3.38 
Source: http://www.transparency.org 
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Table 3 
Evolution of corruption (KKM) in South - Eastern European 
countries 
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Albania 0.07 0.99 -0.68 -0.86 -0.71 -0.81 -0.76 
Bulgaria - 0.71 -0.56 - 0.20 - 0.19 - 0.09 - 0.03 - 0.05 
Croatia - 0.51 - 0.39 - 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.06 0.07 
Greece 0.42 0.78 0.84 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.40 
Macedonia - 1.06 - 0.36 - 0.52 - 0.75 - 0.73 - 0.56 - 0.50 
Romania - 0.18 - 0.44 - 0.50 - 0.35 - 0.29 - 0.29 - 0.23 
Serbia - 0.98 - 1.03 - 1.13 - 0.77 - 0.55 - 0.55 - 0.55 
Turkey 0.10 - 0.07 - 0.36 - 0.45 - 0.27 - 0.25 0.08 
Average - 0.36 - 0.14 - 0.32 - 0.32 - 0.26 - 0.24 - 0.19 
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz 2005 /sc_country.asp 
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Chart 1. Evolution of TI corruption perception index  
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Table 4 
Characteristics of the variables Q1… Q5 
Variable Average Standard deviation 
Matrix for correlating the primary 
variables 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q1 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
2.79 
2.38 
2.27 
2.70 
0.701 
0.755 
0.798 
0.779 
1 0.549* 
1 
0.317* 
0.534* 
1 
0.521* 
0.563* 
0.515* 
1 
Q5 2.53 0.600 - - - - 
* significant value for a threshold equal to 1%. 
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Table 5  
Statistic average for social perception on NIS pillars  
(using a scale from 1 to 4) 
 
Pillar Average Pillar Average 
Parliament 1.621 Government 1.729 
Judiciary System 1.925 Audit 2.338 
Ombudsman 1.794 Control 2.028 
Civil servants 2.369 Political System 2.516 
Political System 2.206 Public Procurement 2.014 
Media 2.948 Civil Society 2.928 
Internationals 
Organisations 
2.864  
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Chapter 9 
 
Public Integrity and Performance  
of Governance. 
A Comparative Study  
for South-Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
9.1. The governance performance 
9.1.1. A Systemic Framework  
The issue of governance performance is more and more 
present in the field literature. Regarded as a finality of a complex 
public management process, the governance performance, we refer 
either to the central, or to the local government, acquires systemic 
characteristics and, according to their level, the governors establish 
the feedback that is carried out through new public decisions, 
meant to lead towards a performance improvement.  
The concerns for a systemic modelling of the public 
management can be met both when the issue of the public 
administration comes out (Pierre, 1995) and, lately, the public 
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management reform1 (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). A brief 
presentation of some systemic models used in the public 
management of the local development is also made by Matei 
(2008). Referring to the performance oriented managerial reforms, 
Pollitt (1995; 1998) shows that, for the public sector “the 
organisations must redirect in order to focus more on results. These 
have to take into account the costs, to measure the outputs, to 
assess the effects and to use all this information in a systemic 
process of feedback and continuous improvement”.2  
The most relevant and recent point of view respecting the 
systemic approach of the public sector performance is presented by 
Bouckaert and Halligan (2008). Following a logical sequence of 
building a complex systemic model of the public sector 
performance, the mentioned authors described micro, meso and 
macro models, integrated or individual, that can deliver the proper 
framework for understanding and study thoroughly the specified 
concept.3 The result of this measure is a complex system, with 
mixed architecture that includes more cycles of intermediary 
feedback and that integrates “four positions on managing 
performance: Performance Administration, Management of 
Performance, Performance Management and Performance 
Governance”.4 In this context, the governance performance can be 
seen as a subsystem of the public sector performance or, more, of 
the managerial performance. The specific of the governance 
performance is also that of being a result of the interaction between 
public economic systems and that of the public management. Thus, 
the fundamental concepts as the public intervention, public 
decision, optimisation, and so on, become adjacent and 
determinant for the level of the governance performance.   
                                                          
1 Pollitt, Ch., Bouckaert, G., (2000), “Public Management Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis”, Oxford University Press, Epigraf Publishing House,  
p. 39. 
2 Idem, p. 154. 
3 Bouckaert, G., Halligan, J., (2008), “Managing Performance. International 
Comparisons”, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 11-34. 
4 Idem, p. 32. 
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9.1.2. Present approaches 
Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) make an international 
comparison related to “managing performance”. The statistical 
ratios and/or connections between management the performance, in 
the context of the public sector, become determinant both for the 
understanding of the processes of performance management, and 
for the governance performance.  
The general approach framework of this issue is delivered by 
the New Public Management (Hood, 1995) or by “reinventing 
government” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
A broad and generic definition of performance – based 
public management is taking/allocating responsibility for the 
performance of the system and being accountable for its results.5  
Hannagan (2008), referring to the performance management 
in an organisation, states that “the term performance management 
means different practices to different managers but usually 
includes the following elements: 
¾ The organisation has a shared statement of its objectives, 
or a mission statement or corporate objectives, which it 
communicates to its employees; 
¾ Individual performance management targets are set, 
which are related to the organisational objectives; 
¾ A regular, formal review is carried out to monitor 
progress toward the objectives; 
¾ The review process is used to identify training needs, 
career development and possible rewards; 
¾ The effectiveness of the whole process is evaluated 
against the overall performance of the organisation”.6 
Important and constant concerns this time with regard to the 
performance of the public sector can be also found in the UN 
Public Administration Programme7, which in the 2005 and 2008 
                                                          
5 Idem, p. 32. 
6 Hannagan, T., (2008), “Management. Concepts & Practices”, Prentice Hall,  
p. 294. 
7 See http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN.pdf 
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reports presents both the public sector performance (WPSR, 2005), 
and the issue of the public governance (WPSR, 2008). Thus, 
WPSR (2005) focuses upon the way in which the human potential 
will be transformed in order to improve the performance of the 
public sector. The general context in which the stated issue is 
approached is characterised, on one hand, by the complexity of the 
policy making processes and of the public strategies and, on the 
other hand, by the deterioration of the human resources capacities 
of accomplishing these functions. The aspects set forth render 
difficult, for many states, the application of the national objectives 
and strategies for increasing the governance performance through 
poverty and corruption reduction, promoting the sustainable human 
development as it is underlined in the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).8       
WPRS (2008) emphasizes the role of the civic engagement 
in the public governance process. By presenting several case 
studies, it is being emphasised, in a real manner, the role of 
different practices in consolidating the governance capacity 
through transparency and responsibility. In this context, the 
relations between the power and the civil society organisations are 
tackled, as well as the necessity of adopting methodologies and 
strategies proper for each state’s condition for a successful civic 
engagement in the public governance.  
The mentioned technical support is also offered by the analysis 
made by Willmore (2005).  
9.1.3. The integrity, as a governance principle in the public 
sector 
Along with the UN concerns there are also the ones of the 
World Bank, who dedicate numerous studies both to the researches 
regarding the Governance Indices and the Public Sector 
Governance. The concern of the present study is situated at the 
meeting point of the two mentioned topics. Worth to be mentioned, 
                                                          
8 A more detailed presentation of these aspects can be found in the UN 
Millennium Declaration, http://222.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml 
Chapter 9 
 
235 
from the point of view of the World Bank, are the governance 
principles in the public sector, which are referring to: 
 Responsibility – according to which the public authority is 
responsible for the decisions and promotes mechanisms that ensure 
the application of public management high standards; 
 Transparency/ openness – that expresses the public 
authority capacity regarding the roles and responsibilities assumed, 
as well as the decision-making procedures and the power exercise; 
 Integrity – with reference to the public and personal, 
impartial, ethical action, and in the interest of the public authority; 
 Stewardship – imposing the use of each opportunity for 
developing the public assets; 
 Efficiency – ensuring the best use of resources in order to 
accomplish the organisation’s objectives; 
 Leadership – applied through a commitment for good 
governance.9       
All these principles lead to a public governance approach 
that would allow obtaining some superior results, in terms of 
efficiency and with a high performance.10 
In the view presented in the above papers, the public sector 
governance includes: “…the set of responsibilities and practices, 
policies and procedures, exercised by an agency’s executive, to 
provide strategic direction, ensure objectives are achieved, manage 
risks and use resources responsibly and with accountability”.11 We 
used this approach of the concept of public sector governance 
giving the practical approach manner and turning account of the 
possible connections with the second part of the study referring to 
                                                          
9 ANAO, (2003), “Public Sector Governance”, Volumes 1&2: Better Practice 
Guide, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp.2. 
10 For details and explanations can be seen also Australia Public Service 
Commission, (2005), “Foundations of Governance in the Australian Public 
Service”, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, http://www.apsc.gov.au/ 
foundations/  
11 ANAO and Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, (2006), 
“Implementation of Programme and Policy Initiatives: Making Implementation 
Matter, Better Practice Guide, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 13, 
http://www.anao.gov.au/uploads/documents/” 
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integrity and economic freedom. The State Services Authority 
(SSA) from Australia addresses the issue in the same manner, 
accentuating the public integrity among the main pillars of public 
integrity, assuming the “promotion of high integrity and conduct 
standards in the public sector”.12 Similar stands took the 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), 
emphasising the fact that “the governance can also cover the 
behaviour standards, the organisational structures and the 
processes”.13 
At the same time, OECD states that “good, effective public 
governance helps to strengthen democracy and human rights, 
promote economic prosperity and social cohesion, reduce poverty, 
enhance environmental protection and the sustainable use of 
natural resources, and deepen confidence in government and public 
administration”.14 The real issue of public integrity is developed by 
OECD, in this very moment a global forum is being organised with 
regard to “building integrity in government”.15 
9.2. The corruption, integrity and economic freedoms 
As it was also shown in the 1st chapter of the present study 
there are several indices of the governance performance. We will 
keep in mind as indices, as Prohniţchi (2003) does too, the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per inhabitant, as well as the economic 
freedom (IEF). The mentioned author reaffirms the conclusions of 
the World Bank or Transparency International, according to which 
                                                          
12 “Public Sector Standards Commissioner (PSSC), Ethics framework”, 
http://www.ssa.vie.gov.au/ 
13 http://www.accaglobal.com/.../activities/subjects/publicsector/governance/ 
14 OECD, (2009), “Public Governance and Management”, http://www.oecd.org, 
p.1. 
15 Details regarding the recent concerns of OECD about promoting governance 
integrity can be found, for example, in “Building a Clearer World: Tools and 
Good Practices for Fostering a Culture of Integrity” (2009), Paris, 
http://www.oecd.publicgovernanceforum.org/, or “OECD Recommendation on 
Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement”, (2008), http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/...html. 
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“the poorer the country and the more reduced is the economic 
freedom, the more corrupt is its bureaucratic and political 
system”.16 The present study perspective determines us to take into 
account many organisations’ analysis based on the conclusion that 
the “concern about the negative social and economic impact of 
corruption has grown rapidly in both emerging and advanced 
democracies”.17 
The conclusion is also supported by the World Bank who 
identifies the concept “as the single greatest obstacle to economic 
and social development. It undermines development by distorting 
the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on 
which economic growth depends”. 18 A similar position is that of 
the International Monetary Fund, which states that “many of the 
causes of corruption are economic in nature, and are its 
consequences – poor governance clearly is detrimental to economic 
activity and welfare”.19 
The development of theoretical and empirical studies has not 
always been the cause and effect type, between corruption and 
economic performance.  
Worth mentioning here are the comments made by Rose-
Ackerman (2009) with regard to the conclusions expressed by 
different specialists and analysts of the corruption issue.20 
Mauro (1995, 1998) demonstrates that the high corruption 
levels are associated with low investment levels as part of GDP. 
The corruption indices are extremely isolated from the 
bureaucratic efficiency, as for example the level of bureaucracy 
and judicious quality. As a consequence, Mauro was incapable of 
                                                          
16 Prohniţchi, V., (2003), “Contextul economic şi instituţional al corupţiei”, Analytic 
Report, RA/1, TISH Publishing House, p. 31. http://www.transparency.org/ 
17 Akai, N., Horinchi,Y., Sakata, M., (2005), “Short-run and Long-run Effects of 
Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data 
for the United States”, CIRJE – F – 348, http://www.e.n-
tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/ 
18 http://www.worldbank.org/ 
19 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues6/ 
20 Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005), “Corruption and Government. Causes, 
Consequences and Reform”, Cambridge University Press, p. 3. 
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measuring the marginal effect of each of these measures. By 
putting together the separated indices in a measure of bureaucratic 
efficiency (on a scale from one to ten): “if Bangladesh, with a 
score of 4.7 would have improved the integrity and the 
bureaucratic efficiency at Uruguay’s level, 6.8, its investment rate 
would increase with approximately five percentage points and the 
annual growth rate of GDP would increase with almost half of a 
percentage point” (Mauro, 1998). Also, Mauro proves that the 
extremely corrupted countries tend to under-invest in human 
capital, spending less on education. Mauro argues that this fact 
happens because the education delivers less work opportunities for 
corruption than other types of capital-intensive public 
expenditures.   
 
Ades and Di Tella (1997) state that an aggressive industrial 
policy could be motivated, on a certain extent, by the corrupt gains 
made available by that policy. In such cases, the positive direct 
effect of the policy could be submitted by its role in the increase of 
corruption, thus discouraging the investments. Their empirical 
results demonstrate that, in presence of corruption, the positive 
influence of the industrial policy is reduced to a half. 
Also, for public integrity we end up choosing the corruption 
perceptions index (TI) computed by Transparency International in 
the last decade, for the South-Eastern Europe states21, as well as the 
KKM index (control of corruption) computed by the World Bank, 
for the same sample and period, as aggregated and individual 
governance index. The two used indices express, in different ways, 
the perception upon the way in which the public power exercise 
has an impact upon the private sector profit, including both the 
narrow and the wide corruption form, as well as “capturing” the 
states by the elites and the personal interests.     
 
 
                                                          
21 http:/www.transparency.org/ 
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9.2.1. Corruption and governance 
One of the fundamental papers presenting the indissoluble 
link between the corruption and the governance is that of Rose-
Ackerman (2005) that eloquently proves how the high level of 
corruption limits the investment and the economic growth and 
leads to the government’s inefficiency.  
For the developing countries, as well as for those being in 
transition from socialism, the risk is higher. The mentioned author 
identifies the corruption phenomenon as a complex one of 
economic22, cultural23 and political24 nature.   
Also, a series of classical papers must be mentioned, having 
as object the identification of causes and mechanisms of corruption 
transmission inside an economic and social system, from which we 
mention: Krueger (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1975), Mauro (1995), 
Tanzi (1998), etc. In the field literature four categories of factors 
are identified, which directly influence the corruption in a system: 
historical factors, social and cultural factors and economic factors. 
In the political and juridical factors category we include the quality 
of the political system, the features of the juridical system (Leite 
and Weidmann (1999)), especially the legislation and the 
institutions specialised in the fight against corruption, the quality of 
the democratic system, the features of the electoral system in a 
country, the features of the administrative system, the degree of 
administrative decentralisation in a country etc. A series of studies, 
like La Porta (1999) and Treisman (2000) accentuate the influence 
of the traditions and historical factors upon the level of corruption 
in a country and the features of the mechanisms of its development 
and transmission. The social and cultural factors have a special role 
in accentuating the corruption features in a country (La Porta 
(1999), Treisman (2000), Alesina (2003)). Equally, the religious 
factor plays an important part in spreading the corruption on a 
                                                          
22 See more details in Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005), “Corruption and Government 
Causes, Consequences and Reform”, part I, chapters 1-5, pp. 7-89. 
23 Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005), op.cit., part II, chapter 6, pp. 89-111. 
24 Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005), op.cit., part III, chapter 7-9, pp. 111-175. 
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social system level. The economic factors, as well as the openness 
level of the economy (for example Dreher (2003), Treisman 
(2000), Wei (2001)), the size of the public sector (Tanzi (1998), 
Treisman (2000)), the salaries’ level in the public sector (van 
Rijckeghem and Weber (1997)) etc. directly influence the 
corruption level in a country.  
Another important aspect when studying corruption is 
choosing the most appropriate econometric models for estimating 
its effects upon some sectors of activities. From the most important 
research directions that target the estimation of corruption’s effects 
upon the economic and social environment, we mention: 
(i) Measuring the corruption effect upon the economic 
growth (Mauro (1995), Abed and Davoodi (2000), Krueger 
(1974)); 
(ii) The corruption’s effects upon the development of some 
sectors of national economies (Tanzi (1998), Wei (2001)); 
(iii) The effects of the decentralisation process upon the 
level and the mechanisms of corruption transmission in a system 
(Shah (2006)) etc.; 
(iv) The consequences of corruption upon the financing 
systems of some activity sectors, like the military one, Gupta 
(2001), the salaries in the public sectors (van Rijckeghem and 
Weber (1997)). 
For the states in South-Eastern Europe, with special 
reference to Romania, we remark the papers of Andrei, Matei and 
Rosca (2008), as well as Andrei, Matei, Stancu and Andrei (2009), 
approaching the effects of corruption in the public administration 
systems, education or health, formulating econometric models for 
evaluating performance in the public sector. 
9.2.2. Public Integrity Systems 
The first chapter of the study approached the relation 
between integrity and performance of governance. The National 
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Integrity Systems (NIS) represent an important instrument for 
promoting public integrity.25 
In Transparency International (TI) conception, the National 
Integrity Systems (NIS) comprise “key institutions, laws and 
practices (the ‘pillars”) that contribute to integrity, transparency 
and accountability in a society. “ 26 
The perspectives of the analysis and modelling the 
corruption phenomena, aimed by our study, are supported by the 
country studies that provide both an overview on NIS, the 
indicators for measuring the subsequent progresses from those 
countries, as well as a basis of comparisons among states. 
The above mentioned country study asserts: “when it 
functions correctly, NIS fights against corruption as part of a 
broader fight against the abuse of power, breaking the law and 
fraud under all its forms”. 
9.2.2.1. Stages in developing the National Integrity System  
  in Romania 
1990 – 1998 
- The period coincides with the first half of the transition 
period; 
- The main exponents of the national public integrity were 
the Parliament and Government, that did not elaborate a public 
policy to promote the public integrity; 
- The Judiciary had no capacity to adjust the deficiencies of 
the other 2 powers in the state; 
                                                          
25 The broad description of the relations between public integrity and corruption 
concerning the South-Eastern European states is presented in Matei, A., (2008), 
“Corruption, Transparency and Quality. Comparative Approaches and Judiciary 
Support; Themis Project “Transformation of the Role of the Judiciary within a 
European Integrated Context”, Bibliothéque de Droit Public Européen, vol. 
LXXXV, Esperia Publications Ltd, London, pp. 127-142 
26 “National Integrity System.  Country Study. Romania 2005, Transparency 
International Romania, p. 1. 
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- The social perception on the public pillars reveals a high 
degree of corruption, just in the interior of most of the public 
integrity pillars; 
- The civil society was not concerned with corruption, 
focusing on ensuring the basic requirements of democracy, rule of 
law and respect for human rights; 
- The international institutions were concerned about the 
economic and democratic reforms. 
 
1999 – 2004 
- The second stage coincides with the beginning of the 
negotiations of accession into the European Union; 
- The international agencies have expressed their interest 
towards the Romanian public integrity system (programmes were 
initiated and political pressures were exerted for reforms); 
- The main pillars of integrity – the Executive and 
Legislative – have realised the seriousness of the national 
corruption level; 
- In 2001, the Government elaborated a National 
Anticorruption Strategy and the National Anticorruption 
Prosecutor’s Office was set up; 
- Other NIS pillars were strengthened, such as Ombudsman 
or Court of Audit. 
- The progresses have determined Romania  to become 
NATO member and closing the negotiations for accession into the 
European Union; 
- The other pillars: Parliament, justice, police have not 
recorded progresses; 
- The civil society was focused on the fight against 
corruption, adding on the public agenda draft laws, essential for 
public integrity; 
- The public policies designed to ensure the cooperation 
between pillars were inconsistent, proving a low capacity of 
implementation and reduced political will. 
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2005 – 2007 
- The third period coincides with signing the Treaty of 
Romania Accession into the European Union; 
- The main political criteria were fulfilled; 
- Romania should implement effectively EU standards in the 
area of justice concerning corruption level, competition and control 
in customs. 
 
2007 – present 
- Getting thorough knowledge about European standards, 
instruments and practices about strengthening public integrity as 
indicator of efficient governance. 
The stages undergone by Romania in order to develop its 
own integrity system are present, with certain features in most 
states analysed in the actual study. 
9.2.3. Integrity Framework 
The concerns of various public bodies, institutions and 
authorities, universities or outstanding specialists have shaped a 
model for ethics framework in the public sector27. Adapting this 
framework to the general topic of public integrity, we obtain a 
logical causal relation between integrity and performance of 
governance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 See “State Services Authority: Supporting Government Serving Victorians – 
Ethics Framework”, 
http://www.ssa.vic.gov.au/.../Ethics Framework 
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Fig. 1. Integrity Framework 
 
The Integrity Framework comprises in fact three subsystems 
concerning: integrity leadership, creating the integrity system and 
managing the integrity system. We add the integrity resource kit, 
referring to take the integrity challenge, to develop integrity skills 
and implement the kit. 
9.2.4. Economic freedom 
According to the assertions of Heritage Foundation, the 
economic freedom represents the individual’s right to control 
his/her work and property. In an economically free society, the 
individuals have the freedom to work, produce, consume and 
invest in any way, being protected and not constrained by the state. 
In order to determine the global indicator of economic freedom 
(IEF), Heritage Foundation uses ten specific indicators, evaluated 
on fields such as: business, trade, taxation, government size, 
monetary freedom, investment, finance, right to property, freedom 
from corruption, labour. 
Altman (2007) analyses the impact of economic freedom, 
including its various components, on the global economic 
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performance of a country. The author states that some specific 
indicators of IEF are positively correlated to higher levels of GDP 
per capita, while other indicators are in the opposite situation. 
Hall and Lawson (2008) conclude concerning Altman’s 
approaches (2007): ‚Altman’s simple correlations add nothing to 
the on-going and important discussion about the role of economic 
freedom in contributing to aggregate economic performance”28. 
The specialised literature emphasises connections between 
the economic freedom and corruption. Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) 
investigate the impact of various components of the economic 
freedom on corruption. Also, in this case, the results confirm the 
fact that certain fields of economic freedom discourage corruption 
– financial and monetary freedom, freedom of affairs- while others 
favour corruption – size of government. At the same time, Rose-
Ackerman (1997) remarks the possibility to increase corruption 
when obstacles are imposed in free development of economy. Eiras 
(2003) carries out a complex analysis, referring to ethics, 
corruption and economic freedom. The conclusions of the author29 
reveal relations between the economic freedom and corruption on 
the formal and informal economic activities. Informal economy, 
direct effect of the corruption phenomena will have a higher weight 
in GDP as long as the economic freedom disappears. „On average, 
the size of the informal economy in economically unfree and 
repressed economies is almost three times the size of the informal 
economy in free economies and almost double the size of the 
informal economy in mostly free economies”30.  
The following charts are illustrative in the study mentioned, 
showing “the relationship between economic freedom and the level of 
                                                          
28 Hall, J., Lawson, R. (2008), “Theory and evidence on economic freedom and 
economic growth: A comment”, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 18, p. 3. 
Altman, M. (2007), “How much Economic Freedom is Necessary for Economic 
Growth? Theory and Evidence”, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 1-20. 
29 Ana Isabel Eiras in Senior Policy Analyst for International Economies in the 
Center for International Trade and Economies at the Heritage Foundation. 
30 Eiras, A. J. (2003), “Ethics, Corruption and Economic Freedom” Conference 
“Ethical Foundations of the Economy”, Krakow, Poland. 
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corruption in 95 countries around the world.  Chart 1 shows a strong 
correlation between these two factors. As economic freedom vanishes, 
corruption flourishes. On average, as shown in Chart 2, the level of 
perceived morality- as a contrast to corruption- in economically free 
countries is almost four times the level of perceived morality in the 
public sector in mostly unfree or repressed economies, and almost 60 
percent greater than in mostly free economies”31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1. Economic Freedom and Corruption 
 
Sources: Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Edwin J. Feulner, and Mary 
Anastasia O’Grady, 2003 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: 
The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2003); 
Transparency International, The Corruption Perception Index 2001 and 2000, 
Berlin, Germany, 2001 and 2000, available at http://www.transparency.org/ 
cpi/2001.htm and http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2000.htm  
                                                          
31 Idem 3. 
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Chart 2. Economic Freedom and Corruption 
 
Sources: Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Edwin J. Feulner,  
and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, 2003 Index of Economic Freedom 
(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & 
Company, Inc., 2003); Transparency International, The Corruption 
Perception Index 2001 and 2000, Berlin, Germany, 2001  
and 2000, available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001.htm and 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2000.htm  
 
Mushfiq  and Dean (2007) achieve similar studies with our 
study, using an econometric model applied in a panel of 60 
countries, including the economic freedom as independent 
variable.  
9.3. An empiric comparative study 
The theoretical framework briefly presented in the first two 
chapters again substantiates the idea of some mutual 
determinations between public integrity, corruption and 
governance performance. 
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The following empirical study focuses on a sample of 11 
states, most of them belonging to the former European communist 
space and situated at different EU integration levels: an older EU 
state (GR), 4 states that entered the EU in the last but one wave 
(2004), (HU, CZ, SK, SL), 2 states that entered EU in the last wave 
(RO, BG), or others in the process of adhering (HR, TR, MD, UA).  
Extending the sample outside the South-Eastern European 
area also, was determined both by the need to obtain a more 
relevant comparative study and by the use of some empirical data 
as comprehensive as possible that can deliver the adequate support 
necessary for the statistical processing. The states taken into 
consideration belong to both the former Soviet Union (MD, UA), 
former Yugoslavia (HR, SI), Balkan area (GR, BG, TR), Central 
Europe (SK, CZ, HU) and, of course, Romania.  
The analysed period is 1998 – 2008 and the results regarding 
the used indices belong to the World Bank, Transparency 
International, Global Integrity or Heritage Foundation.  
9.3.1. Correlating the used indices for public integrity 
We stopped both at the index for corruption perception of 
Transparency International and that of corruption control, annually 
computed by the World Bank. At the same time, we made a 
connection with the Global Integrity Index (G.I.) although, as the very 
ones who promote it are announcing that their computing 
methodology32 is different from that of other governance and 
corruption specific indices. G.I. embodies an appreciable quantity of 
quantitative data delivered by more than 300 indices related to 
responsibility and governance transparency, as well as different 
anticorruption mechanisms, benefiting from the expertise of famous 
analysts and specialists in the complex field of public integrity. 
Exactly as their presentation shows, G.I. does not measure 
the “corruption disease”, but rather it tries to find remedies that the 
                                                          
32 For the data regarding the computing methodology of the integrity index see 
Camerer, M., (2006), “Measuring Public Integrity”, Journal of Democracy No. 17:1, 
National Endowment for Democracy and the Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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citizens and governments could use in order to fight against it.33 
Considering that it is impossible to accomplish a real corruption 
measuring34, G.I. assesses the corruption’s opposite – that is “the 
access that citizens and businesses have to a country’s government, 
their ability to monitor its behaviour, and their ability to seek 
redness and advocate for improved governance”.35  
 
For 2008, the integrity indices have been organised on six 
big categories and 23 subcategories. The mentioned categories are: 
Civil Society, Public Information and Media, Elections, 
Government Accountability, Administration and Civil Service, 
Oversight and Regulation, Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law.36   
 
The analysis preliminary to the results’ completion regarding 
the G.I. refer not only to the formal aspects – the existence of the 
legislative framework, procedures, etc. – but also to their 
assessment and their application through the indices of personnel, 
budgetary support, political independence, the citizens’ access to 
the most important anticorruption mechanisms. We insisted on a 
wider presentation of the G.I. approach model in order to 
substantiate, as it will be seen, an option of the present study for 
using the TI corruption perception index as a relevant index, from a 
statistical point of view, for determining the connections between 
public integrity and governance performance.  
The quantitative data used in the statistical analysis are 
presented in Appendix 1, for the TI index, Appendix 2, for the 
control of corruption index of the World Bank (KKM) and 
Appendix 3, for the Global Integrity Index (GI).  
In Table 1 are presented the Pearson linear correlations for 
the evolutions of the corruption perception index, TI, in the 
mentioned states.  
                                                          
33 http:/report.globalintegrity.org/globalIndex.cfm. 
34 An idea also supported by authors like Arndt and Oman (2006). 
35 The Global Integrity Report: 2008, Methodology White Paper, p. 1, 
http://globalintegrity.org/documents/Whitepaper2008.pdf. 
36 Idem, pp. 5-6. 
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Also, in Table 2 are presented the Pearson linear correlations 
for the evolutions of the control of corruption indices in the 
mentioned states. For each of the two tables there were introduced 
two variables, TI and KKM, representing the mean of the presented 
indices.    
 
In order to ensure an unitary correlation framework, upon 
the KKM indices a translation and adnotation was performed so to 
place them in the same interval as the TI. Knowing the fact that the 
KKM index varies in the (-2.5, 2.5) interval, giving the conditions 
from above we obtain: 
 5.2
2
1 −= TIy   or 52 += KKMx    
      (1) 
Also, for the G.I. index the following transformation: 
GIz
10
1=        
      (2) 
 
The different assessment methodologies of these indices lead 
to the impossibility of drawing some common conclusions 
regarding the evolutions of the corruption phenomena in the 
analysed states. The support for this statement results also from 
Table III.3 where there are presented the Pearson linear 
correlations between the TI and KKM indices. Moreover, the very 
value of - 0.386 for the correlations of the indices’ means reveals 
negative correlations of the variables. The same conclusion results 
also from most of the correlations for indices at the level of the 
analysed states.     
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As a result, we will proceed to drawing some conclusions 
relevant for each type of correlations.  
So, the analysis of Table III.1 results in contradictory 
evolutions of corruption perception between  TI_BG  and  most  of  
the  other  states’  indices, the  strongest   being TI_GR (- 0.817), 
and the lowest TI_MD (- 0.018). For SK, as well as for RO, CZ, 
TR and MD, except for TI_BG, and for SI, except TI_HU, all the 
other correlations are positive, the strongest correlations, though 
not having a high level of significance. In Table III.4 are presented, 
in brief, the types of correlations with the other states.  
 
Table 4 
The synthesis of correlations and significance levels for the evolutions 
of corruption perception index, TI 
Index Positive correlations 
Negative 
correlations 
Sig 
0.01 level 
Sig 
0.05 level 
TI_RO 9 1 3 1 
TI_BG 2 8 1 - 
TI_HU 7 3 - 2 
TI_CZ 9 1 4 1 
TI_SK 70 0 3 1 
TI_GR 7 3 1 1 
TI_SI 9 1 2 2 
TI_HR 8 2 - - 
TI_TR 9 2 1 2 
TI_MD 9 1 0 1 
TI_UA 7 3 - 1 
 
The previous conclusions are stressed also by the 
correlations’ analysis of the mean index for corruption perception 
(TI) from which we infer three levels of correlations: 
 Weak – TI_BG (0.116) and TI_GR (0.235) 
 Medium – TI_HU (0.484), TI_HR (0.438), TI_MD 
(0.582), TI_VA (0.484) 
 Strong – TI_RO (0.906), TI_CZ (0.880), TI_SK (0.953), 
TI_SI (0.808), TI_TR (0.873). 
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From analysing Table 2, the synthesis of the correlations and 
significance levels is the one presented in Table 5.  
 
Index Positive correlations 
Negative 
correlations 
Sig 
0.01 level 
Sig 
0.05 level 
KKM_RO 4 6 - 1 
KKM_BG 5 5 - 1 
KKM_HU 4 6 - 2 
KKM_CZ 3 7 - 1 
KKM_SK 3 7 1 3 
KKM_GR 6 4 - 1 
KKM_SI 5 5 - 2 
KKM_HR 6 4 - - 
KKM_TR 4 6 1 - 
KKM_MD 3 7 - - 
KKM_UA 3 7 - 2 
 
From this synthesis, as well as from Table 2 we observe that 
drawing certain conclusions is heavier. This is due, in our opinion, 
on one hand, to the complexity of the model used by the World 
Bank to determine the corruption control index, as well as the 
series of data insufficiently used.  
This time we will find a negative correlation too, with the 
mean control of corruption index (KKM) for KKM_CZ (- 0.2). The 
other positive correlations with the mentioned index can be 
considered: 
 Weak: KKM_BG (0.161), KKM_HU (0.135), KKM_SI 
(0.122), KKM_UA (0.129) 
 Medium: KKM_RO (0.382), KKM_SK (0.401), 
KKM_HR (0.395), KKM_MD (0.258) 
 Strong: KKM_GR (0.556), KKM_TR (0.628). 
 
From the two analyses appear as obvious the differences or 
similarities between the processes of corruption perception and 
control of corruption (see Table 6).  
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Table 6 
Compatibility of the methodological processes concerning the 
corruption perception and control of corruption 
Compatibility Incompatibility 
Major 
 
Mean Major Mean 
TR, BG 
 
HR, MD CZ, GR, SI HU, UA, RO, SK 
 
For Global Integrity Index, taking into account the available 
series of data, we cannot achieve correlations for the developments 
of the above indices in the states under analysis. 
However, we calculated a mean index of integrity (GI) and 
on this basis we calculated the correlations with the other mean 
indices. The results are not surprising if we take into consideration 
the calculation “philosophy” of the Global Integrity Index, briefly 
presented in this study, the major differences between the 
legislative and procedural framework of anticorruption 
mechanisms and concrete public action, in view to change the 
social perception on this phenomenon in those states. 
 
Table 7 
Pearson linear correlations between mean indices of corruption 
perception and control of corruption and public integrity 
Indicator TI KKM GI 
TI 1 -0.386 -0.797 
KKM  1 0.701 
GI   1 
 
All correlations being significant for 0.01 level, we find out 
a negative correlation between TI and GI and another strong 
positive correlation between KKM and GI, whose justification 
derives once again from the calculation methodology. 
Therefore, related to the significance of the regression 
coefficients, it is likely to use TI or KKM or GI index as dependant 
variable. In fact, a simple regression between the latter 2 indices 
leads to the relation: 
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KKM = 4.529 + 0.102 GI + ε               (3) 
with coefficients revealing a corresponding significance 
level. 
The results included in Table III.7 emphasise a characteristic 
element for the states analysed, that could be transposed in the 
conclusion anticipated concerning social inefficiency for the 
mechanisms of anticorruption action, even in the conditions of an 
adequate legislative and procedural framework. 
9.3.2. Correlations of the indicators of governmental  
 performance 
As stated, from the indices of governmental performance we 
took into consideration the Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDP) and the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF). 
The qualitative data are presented in Appendix 5 for GDP and 
Appendix 6 for IEF. In statistical processing, we apply log GDP so 
that the statistic analyses use data of the same order of dimension. 
Concerning GDP index, the correlations of the indices for 
the analysed states are not significant, taking into consideration the 
ascending evolution of GDP during the period analysed. At the 
same time, the correlations between IEF and GDP indices are 
approximately constant for each country, emphasizing either strong 
positive correlations (BG, HR, HU, RO, SK) but with a 
significance level almost null or negative correlations or almost 
null, with a high significance level (for the other states). 
The correlations for  IEF are more relevant (see Table 8). 
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The analysis on the results in Table 8 emphasise different 
policies of economic freedom, therefore it is hard to establish the 
perspective. The synthesis of the developments and significance 
levels is presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 
Synthesis of IEF correlations 
Index Positive correlations 
Negative 
correlations 
Sig 
0.01 level 
Sig 
0.05 level 
IEF_BG 7 3 1 2 
IEF_HR 8 2 - 1 
IEF_CZ 6 4 3 - 
IEF_GR 4 6 2 - 
IEF_HU 9 1 - 1 
IEF_MD 3 7 1 - 
IEF_RO 8 2 1 3 
IEF_SK 6 4 2 1 
IEF_SI 8 2 1 - 
IEF_TR 6 4 2 1 
IEF_UA 6 4 1 2 
 
In Table 9, we emphasise the situation for HU, whose policy 
of economic freedom positively correlates with most states and at 
extreme, MD which has negative correlations with most states 
analysed. 
The correlations with a mean index of economic freedom 
underline evolutions almost independent related to the other states 
(CZ (- 0.084), GR (- 0.042), MD (- 0.195), weak correlated (TR 
(0.233)),  mean correlated (HR (0.587), SI (0.496) or (UA (0.457)) 
and strong correlated (BG (0.830), HU (0.767), RO (0.938), SK 
(0.905)). 
9.3.3. Linear regressions 
The analyses reveal that the single interesting regressions in 
view of the current study are those using TI or GI (or KKM) as 
dependent variables and IEF and GDP as independent variables. In 
order to emphasise statistically the influence of the European 
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integration process on public integrity, we introduced an 
independent variable “dummy”, called UE, awarding the following 
values for each state during the analysed period: 
 
              1,  if the respective state is EU Member State 
UE =  
               0,  in the opposite case 
 
UE variable introduced in the above regressions will 
underline quantitatively the influence of the integration process on 
the indices of public integrity. 
For TI, we obtain: 
 
TI = - 2.944   +   0.759   IEF    +    0.606 Log GDP + ε1              (4) 
          (0.219)       (0.371)                (0.699) 
or 
TI = - 1.122   +   0.654   IEF    +    0.287 Log GDP   + 0.276 UE + ε3 
(5) 
          (0.832)       (0.485)                (0,877)                      (0.701) 
 
In both situations, the significance levels of the coefficients 
are in parentheses. 
Unfortunately, lacking comprehensive series of data, for the 
other regression, the significance levels of the coefficients are null. 
Both expressions (4) and (5) help us to determine, 
approximately, possible influences of the governance indices on 
public integrity, expressed by means of TI. 
As an example, for Romania, the increase by 0.5 of IEF 
index (in reality by 5, according to formula 2) will lead to an 
increase by 0.33 of the index concerning perception on corruption, 
taking into consideration the influence of the European integration 
process, thus it results an increase by 0.4. 
In 2007, the year of Romania’s accession in the EU, the 
increase by 0.6 of the index concerning perception on corruption is 
due especially to the mentioned event (0.56), according to (5). 
GDP growth influences significantly TI index only if it 
exceeds the annual mean of GDP evolution. Thus, for Romania, an 
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increase by 1500$ of GDP will lead to an increase by 0.0125 of TI 
index. Consequently, the index of economic freedom will have the 
most significant influence and UE index will have the most signi-
ficant influence at the moment of accession of a state in the EU. 
9.4. Conclusions 
The study presents a new approach for public integrity in 
view of the influence of the indices concerning GDP and economic 
freedom. The further developments might take in consideration 
both enlargement of the area of analysis, comprising more states 
and longer periods, and introducing new indices for governmental 
performance. 
At the same time, even in the conditions of the current study, 
other relevant regressions could be determined. For example, if 
GDP is dependant variable and TI and IEF independent variables, 
we obtain: 
 
Log GDP = 1.139     +    0.032 TI     +    0.467 IEF + ε3                     (6) 
                   (0.020)         (0.699)             (0.002) 
or introducing UE variable: 
 
Log GDP = 1.994     +    0.013 TI     +    0.326 IEF + 0.168 UE + ε4  
(7) 
                 (0.037)           (0.877)          (0.066)        (0.247) 
 
Continuing the judgements, we shall obtain for IEF: 
 
IEF = - 0.781     +    0.133 TI     +    1.53 Log GDP + ε5              (8) 
           (0.450)           (0.371)           (0.002)         
 
IEF =   0.432     +    0.110 TI     +    1.237 Log GDP + 0.184UE + ε6  
(9) 
        (0.843)           (0.485)           (0.066)                 (0.530) 
 
All the above regressions reveal a strong dependency 
between IEF and GDP. For more consistent series of data, the 
significance level of the coefficients of regression will increase. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Economic Freedom INDEX 
 
Economic freedom is the fundamental right of every human 
to control his or her own labour and property. In an economically 
free society, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and 
invest in any way they please, with that freedom both protected by 
the state and unconstrained by the state. In economically free 
societies, governments allow labour, capital and goods to move 
freely, and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the 
extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself. We measure 
ten components of economic freedom, assigning a grade in each 
using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum 
freedom. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an 
overall economic freedom score for each country. The ten 
components of economic freedom are: Business Freedom | Trade 
Freedom | Fiscal Freedom | Government Size | Monetary Freedom | 
Investment Freedom | Financial Freedom | Property rights | 
Freedom from Corruption | Labour Freedom. 
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